Reasons for high fertility rates. Child for later. Why is the birth rate falling so much in the world? What this diagram makes you aware

The demographic catastrophe of the 90s and early 2000s receded. But the number of Russian people continues to decline, and migrants from Central Asia come to replace them. You need to react. Not only to the state, but also to ourselves ...

"Men are becoming feminine": why the birth rate in Russia has fallen

According to Rosstat, the birth rate in Russia fell to ten-year low. For the first time in recent years in the country recorded a natural decline in population. RIA Novosti figured out why this happened and what to expect in the coming years.

Back in 1990s

According to report Rosstat, in 2017 -m in Russia on light had 1.69 million children. It's on 203 thousand or on the 10.7% lessthan a year earlier. According to this indicator, 2017 turned out to be the worst year for ten years - v last time fewer newborns in Russia was only in 2007 year. The decline in fertility is observed during all regions of Russia, except for Chechnya. There they gave birth actively, on 2016 level — 29 890 people. Maximum fall - v Nenets Autonomous Okrug (minus 16.5%), followed by — Chuvashia (minus 15%).

But there is also reasons for optimism. Mortality in Russia in last year also decreased significantly: for year in 1.824 million people died in the country. It's on 63 thousand less than in 2016, — lowest inXXIcentury indicator... Decreased significantly and infant mortality. In 2016 at 1000 births died 6 children, in 2017th — 5,5.

However, all this is not helped to keep natural population growth. Fixed natural decline - minus 134.4 thousand people... In 2016, there were plus 5.4 thousand. But the total population of Russia still increased over account of migratory influx. For a year in the country added 200 thousand visitors. The main donor countries were Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine.

Surprisingly, such results for experts not become. Scientific Director of the Laboratory of Population Economics and demography of the Faculty of Economics of Moscow State University Valery Elizarov says that demographic difficulties are inevitable as at least in the next 15 years. He cites the socio-economic situation in the 1990s as the main reason.

“The birth rate depends on number of young women in reproductive age. V last year, the smallest in Russian generation - born in 1999. The entire second half of the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s fertility was extremely low... The increase only started after 2006. We had completely wild swings associated with socio-economic upheavals. Second half of the 1980s - 1986-1987 years - 2.5 million births! Then the fall - To the mid-1990s, there were 1.3-1.4 million births in year. Finally, 1.2 million in 1999 ", - notes Elizarov.

The expert emphasizes that now to the age of childbearing is suitable for the generation of those who were born v period of demographic crisis... “Give birth children now most often in 25-26 years old. Those who were born in 1992-1993, and at this time, a fall was already recorded. Now you yourself understand that this is not yet the end", - says Elizarov.

Women men

Together with only the problems of the 1990s do not explain the situation is exhausted. Yes, there are fewer women, but after all and each individual woman gives birth less. The very approach of citizens to building a family, priorities have shifted. According to data the same Rosstat, average age of a Russian mother - 26 years... It's on five years more than 1990s. During this time, the interval between appearances in family of the first and second child. In the 1990s it was in on average three years a in 2017 - already 5.6 years... Thus, the birth of the second and subsequent children moved over the border of the 30th anniversary of the mother.

Professor of the Department of Labor and social politicians Civil Service Institute and management (IGSU) RANEPA Alexander Shcherbakov indicates that the reason should also be sought v low standard of living and striving for through work, own labor to increase the well-being of the family. Moreover, in Russian women in overall now much more career ambitions... “We have a paradoxical situation: about women only think about their gender identity in second stage... They share more male look at a lifewhere is the career at first place. And modern men are more and more like women. They often fail set themselves the task of financially providing for the family ”, - Shcherbakov warns.

The country's authorities understand that the state of affairs is very serious, and take action. So, in November 2017, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced about the “reset” of the country's demographic policy. In December, the head of state signed law O monthly payments to families after the birth of their first child. On average, the amount in 2018 will be, in dependence on region, 10 523 rubles, v 2019th — 10 836 rubles, in 2020th — 11 143 rubles. Targeted payment, if accrual takes into account the income of each family. Right to the receipt of money is provided to those who who is the average income per family member not exceeds one and a half times the cost of living.

Besides, in December, the President signed a law on extension to the end of 2021 maternity capital program. At the birth of the second and the third child, citizens of Russia are entitled to a payment. Its size in 2017 year — 453 026 rubles.

Sex is not want

The solution of economic issues, however, is not panacea. Just look at global trends. According to the data UN, from 21 countries with the highest fertility rates 19 are in Africa. All European states belong to countries with the lowest fertility rate, although it is understandable that the economic situation it's much better there than on the African continent.

Sexologist, head of the Center for Sexual Health Anna Koteneva believes that on reduced fertility affects specific modern morality. “There is too much unnecessary information, too much fuss. Modern man lives by principle “here and now ”,“ after me even a flood ”. Everyone wants to enjoy life, responsibility, in including for children is perceived as burden. Selfishness, individualism, independence, even infantilism rules“, She says.

Koteneva adds that current technologies seem to open up endless opportunities for communication, many moral prohibitions have been removed. “But the modern generation is not knows how to communicate, often and doesn't want it... The value of physiological intimacy has dropped. Used to be sex for young people was something forbidden, mysterious, desirable. It's available now, but got up in one row with other pleasures, entertainment, intimate relationships have depreciated ”, - says the sexologist.

Anyway was, forecasts for the near future is not too optimistic. Rosstat warns: natural population decline is expected every year up to 2035, a the peak will be at 2025-2028 years. This trend will be counterbalanced by migration gain, but the population of Russia, demographers believe, in the specified period will still be shorter.

Demographics: Russia is being let down by the "women's question"

The Federal State Statistics Service of Russia has published the Demographic forecast before 2035 year. By Rosstat forecast that the population of Russia is expected to 2036 will remain at 2017 level - 147 million people, give or take a few percent. At the same time, the share of the working-age population will remain practically constant. - 55-56%. Such data is not enough to the number of working age see internal changes... After all, if in within these 55-56%, there will be an increase in the number of young people up to age 40, and a decrease in the number of the older part of the working age, then a favorable demographic future for Russia lies ahead. AND quite another thing awaits us if, on the contrary, the young part decreases.

Developing the forecast of Rosstat, (by what method - about this below), it is possible to determine the dynamics of the number of young ages up to 2040.

Separate men and women on charts do not make much sense, since recessions and climbs in the dynamics of the future number of 20-year-olds, 30-year-olds and 40 year olds - almost double. A the number of men and women in ages from 20 to 40 years differ only by a few percent.

What does this diagram make you realize?

First. The number of 20-year-olds will increase to 2035 but insignificantly.

Second. The number of 30-year-olds in the coming years will begin to decline. Moreover, in the first half of the 2020s, the reduction will be very strong - about 10% annually.

Third. The number of 40-year-olds up to the second half of the 2020s will increase. But this increase will be negligible. A v 2030s will begin to decline, from about that the same rate as the shrinking 30-year-olds in 2020 years.

So the total number of the young part of the working age is the interval 2018-2040 will decrease.

V conclusion

V in recent years, official publications are full of cheerful statements about the outlined long-term favorable trend in the demography of the Russian people.

V The Russian people make up about 80% of the total population. So the results of the spectral analysis of the Rosstat forecast can be extended to Russian people.

I like it, I don't like it, but for cheerful statements about the emerging long-term favorable trend in the demography of the Russian people - there is no reason.

Over the next decades, social upheavals led several times to a decline - demographic crises.

First(1914-1922) began during the First World War and the revolution, and the intervention, epidemics and famine of 1921-1922. Emigration from Russia acquired a large scale. In 1920, the population of Russia was 88.2 million. The total demographic losses in Russia for the period 1914-1921. (including losses from declining birth rates) are estimated at 12 to 18 million people.

Second demographic crisis was caused by the famine of 1933-1934. The total losses of the population of Russia during this period are estimated from 5 to 6.5 million people.

Third demographic crisis falls on the years of the Great Patriotic War. The population in 1946 was 98 million people, while in 1940 it was 110 million. Taking into account the decline in the birth rate, the total losses of Russia in this period are estimated from 21 to 24 million people. For fertility changes in the late 1960s. and in the mid-1990s. of great importance were "demographic waves" caused primarily by a sharp decline in the number of births during the Great Patriotic War (the length of the demo wave is approximately 26 years).

In the early 1990s. socio-economic and environmental factors were added to the demographic factors of the decline in the birth rate, which caused a kind of demographic resonance (the combination of the demo wave and socio-economic reasons leads to demographic interference). In the periodical press there is information about the beginning fourth demographic crisis in Russia.

The dynamics of the resident population according to the post-war censuses is shown in the table below.

Table 1. Number of resident population according to census data

From 1989 to 2002, the resident population of the Russian Federation decreased by 1,840 thousand people, or 1.3%.

The decline in the population was mainly due to the natural decline in the population, as well as due to the emigration of Russians to the countries of the “far abroad”, which was significantly higher than the volume of immigration from these countries.

Population growth in Russia before the early 1990s occurred both due to natural and migration growth, which, as a rule, did not exceed a quarter of the total increase. With the onset of natural population decline, migration has become the only source of compensation for losses in the population of Russia.

The resident population of the Russian Federation as of January 1, 2009 was 141.9 million people, of which 103.7 million people (73%) were urban dwellers and 38.2 million people (27%) were rural residents. In 2008, 1,713.95 thousand people were born, 2075.95 thousand people died, natural loss - 362 thousand people. In 2008, the natural decline was by 71.0% replaced by migration gain (in 2007 - by 54.9%, in 2006 - by 22.5%).

Migration growth from foreign countries in 2008 amounted to 281.614 thousand people, in 2009 - 242.106 thousand people.

The number of Russian citizens in 2008, taking into account the increase in migration, decreased by 104.9 thousand people. According to forecasts, by 2030, taking into account the birth rate, mortality rate and migration growth, the population of Russia will decrease to 139.4 million people. at the average (most probable) level of the forecast and up to 128.5 million people. at a low (worst) forecast level.

A number of measures to solve demographic problems in Russia are:

• ensuring the safety of citizens;
• reducing the level of forced and premature death;
• reduction of morbidity and disability arising from unsatisfactory working conditions, unfavorable environmental conditions, emergencies caused, first of all, by a low level of fire and transport safety;

The state and prospects for the development of human potential in the structure of the Russian Federation are the fundamental conditions for the well-being of the country and the most important factors, which is based on taking into account the variety of various factors.

Over the past 20 years, mortality has increased 1.6-2.4 times... The highest rate of its growth (2 times or more) in men is at the age of 25-50 years, in women - 25-40 years. At present, the mortality rate for men of working age exceeds the mortality rate for women by 5-7 times, as a result of which there is an unprecedented gap in life expectancy between men and women in more than 12 years. There is no such gap in life expectancy between men and women in any developed country in the world.

The numerical excess of women over men in the population is observed after 28 years and increases with age. At the beginning of 2008, the number of women exceeded the number of men by 10.6 million. (16% more).

The average expected survival time of Russian citizens who turned 15 in 2008 is: men - 47.8 years, women - 60 years.

The projected life expectancy of Russians is presented in table. 2.

Table 2. Life expectancy of Russian citizens at birth (number of years) *

Year of birth	Low option		Medium variant		High option

* The low version of the forecast is based on the extrapolation of the existing demographic trends, the high version is focused on achieving the goals defined in the Concept of Demographic Policy of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2025, the middle version of the forecast is considered the most realistic, it takes into account the prevailing demographic trends and the measures of demographic policy ...

For comparison, in table. 3 shows data for some countries of the world on the average projected survival time of citizens who in 2007-2008. turned 15 years old.

As you can see from the table. 3, in terms of life expectancy of the population, Russia is significantly inferior to the developed countries of the world, including the BRIC countries (Brazil-Russia-India-China). In world statistics, out of 192 UN member states, Russia ranks 131st in life expectancy among men, and 91st for women.

The socio-economic development of the country depends on the state, the quality of which is largely determined by the level of health and the size of the population of working age. According to statistics for 2010, the working-age population is 62.3% (of the total population); children under 15 years old - 16.1%; persons over working age (men over 60 years old, women over 55 years old) - 21.6%.

According to international criteria, a population is considered old if the proportion of people aged 65 and over in the total population exceeds 7%. This threshold was passed by Russia in 1967. Currently, 14% of the country's inhabitants, that is, every seventh Russian citizen, is at this age.

Table 3. The projected survival time of citizens who in 2007-2008. 15 years old, for some countries of the world (number of years)

In 2006, the population of working age began to decline(working age: men - 16-59 years old, women - 16-54 years old), that is, the most economically active part of the population. In the short term, this process will grow, which may cause a shortage of labor in the labor market. According to the most probable forecast estimates, by 2030 the size of the able-bodied population of Russia will decrease to 54.8% of the total population (76.4 million people). The number of people under working age will be 17% (23.7 million people), and over working age - 28.2% (39.3 million people).

Low life expectancy in our country is primarily associated with high mortality rates, especially among men. The overall mortality rate (the number of deaths per 1000 people) over the past 5 years in Russia exceeds the United States by 1.9 times and the EU countries by 1.6 times. A decrease in the death rate to the level of 1990 would save the lives of more than 650 thousand people - this is 1.8 times more than the natural decline in the country's population that took place in 2008.

When analyzing the causes of depopulation processes in Russia, one must also take into account the quality of reproductive health, which determines the country's demographic prospects. As a result of measures taken to stimulate the birth rate, the total fertility rate in our country in 2008 became comparable with its value in the EU countries. However, the birth rate in Russia is lower than the overall mortality rate, which leads to a continuing decline in the country's population.

In Russia there is an increase general contingent disabled registered with the social protection authorities. In the last ten years alone, it has increased from 7.9 million to 12.7 million people., what is 9% of the total population of the country... The number of disabled people of working age is growing and has reached about 600 thousand people. For the first time, more than 1 million people are recognized as disabled per year. On average, from 12 (2008) to 15 (2000) thousand people become disabled due to the consequences of occupational injuries and occupational diseases per year. But this is only official statistics, because disability caused by work activities is often not diagnosed, but refers to general diseases.

A threatening decline in the population of our country has taken shape. It is especially dangerous that there remains a high mortality and morbidity rate among people of working age. A relatively favorable situation with the size of the able-bodied population may persist for the next few years, and then increasingly fewer categories of citizens born in the 1990s - early 2000s will enter the working age, and those born in the 50s and early 60s of the past will leave the working age. centuries. Then the indicator of the demographic burden on the working-age population of people of retirement age will increase, with a simultaneous increase in the average age of workers, which may aggravate the socio-economic situation in the country.

The size of the population is the labor resource on which the economic power of the country depends. For Russia, with its vast territory (more than 17 million sq. Km - Russia is the largest country in the world by area), the population is of the utmost importance for the control of the territory. A further decrease in the population at the same rate can lead to a decrease in population density to a critical level at which it will not be possible to control the territory purely physically, and this threatens the territorial integrity of Russia.

The causes of diseases leading to death, disability, disability, and the degree of labor activity are varied. These are socio-economic conditions of life, and increasing informational, mental and emotional stress. A significant role in the causes of diseases belongs to the state of the environment and working conditions. So far, it is not possible to reliably estimate what contribution to mortality and premature decline in working capacity is made by the environmental situation and working conditions that occur during the onset of the disease or preceding it. However, according to the estimates of most scientists, this contribution is very significant.

Population crisis in Russia

At the turn of the century, Russia continues to experience a deep and protracted demographic crisis, which manifests itself in a shrinking population, a deterioration in its quality, a decline in life expectancy, and an aging population. The birth rate of the population fell to 1.3 million people in 1999 against 2.4 million in 1985, or by 45.8%, and the death rate increased from 1.6 to 2.3 million people (then dropped to 2 million) ... Fertility rate, i.e. the average number of children born to one woman in her life decreased from 2.1 in 1985-1986. up to 1.2 in 1999. In other words, over the past 15 years, simple reproduction of the population has not been ensured in Russia, i.e. each generation of children is smaller than the generation of parents.

Life expectancy for these years has decreased for the entire population from 69.26 to 67.02 years; for men - from 63.83 to 61.3; for women - from 73 to 72.93. The quality of public health is decreasing. The number of disabled minors has exceeded 600 thousand. 90% of schoolchildren are diagnosed with a variety of diseases during a medical examination. More than half of the young people of draft age are "of limited suitability", i.e. essentially sick.

Now we are seeing a downward trend in the number of children in a family. According to Goskomstat, most Russians nowadays consider it most acceptable to have one child.

If earlier it was absolutely normal to have three or four children in a family, now large families are much less common. But, as before, families of rural residents are characterized by a greater number of children than urban ones.

If the current trends are not overcome, then in the XXI century. Russia will face the problem of the survival of the nation, the preservation of its statehood. The current demographic situation dictates the need for further research on possible options for the development of socio-demographic processes in Russia.

There are three main directions for overcoming the demographic crisis.

First - changes in the reproductive behavior of the population, orientation of the value attitudes of young people towards family and children.

The second direction is decrease in mortality of the population, increase in the quality of life of people. In the current situation, the birth rate is unlikely to increase, therefore, it is necessary to help the family by all means to save those already born, to raise them physically and morally healthy.

The third direction - assessment of the possibility of compensating for the losses of the Russian population through a more complete use of the migration potential of the CIS countries. This direction can give the most tangible results in improving the demographic situation, or at least stabilizing it at the lowest cost and in a shorter time frame. The latter is very important, given the need for a quick response to depopulation processes.

Before the First World War, the birth rate in Russia was one of the highest among European countries - 47.8 per 1000 population (1913). Such a high birth rate was explained by early marriage, a high level of marriage among the population, and the predominance of the rural population, which always had a higher level of fertility. However, since the 1930s, there has been a decrease in the se level. The Second World War only intensified this process. The post-war compensatory rise in the birth rate, which continued until the end of the 40s, did not restore the pre-war level.

The decline in the birth rate resumed in the 1950s, which was largely facilitated by the abolition in 1955 of the ban on artificial termination of pregnancy. In the next decade, the dynamics of fertility indicators reflected the continuation of the transition to a new type of reproductive behavior. Since the late 60s in

Russia began to dominate the two-child family model, the birth rate dropped to a level slightly lower than necessary to ensure simple reproduction of the population.

In the following decades, fertility rates stabilized and fluctuated under the influence of market factors (economic, political, social), not deviating far from the level of two children born per woman. These fluctuations include the rise in birth rates in the early 1980s, which began soon after the introduction of state support for families with children aimed at stimulating the birth rate (prolongation of paid parental leave, an increase in child benefits and other benefits). ... By 1987, the total fertility rate for the first time since the mid-1960s had risen to a level that significantly exceeded the simple reproduction of the population. But the effect of these measures was short-lived, which only confirms the experience of other countries.

The sharp drop in the birth rate in the early 90s can no longer be interpreted only as a normal fluctuation in the process. It is explained not so much by the influence of radical socio-political and socio-economic transformations as by changes in the “calendar” of births caused by the measures of socio-demographic policy introduced in the early 1980s. Social benefits prompted families to give birth to their planned babies earlier than they expected. But since the intentions of the spouses regarding the total number of children in the family did not change, the contingent of potential parents was largely exhausted, which caused a decrease in the absolute number of births in subsequent years.

The socio-economic crisis to a certain extent accelerated the process of transition from the traditional to a new type of reproductive behavior, in which intrafamily regulation of childbearing becomes universal and becomes the main factor determining the level of fertility.

If in relation to the process of declining fertility, Russia followed the path of the countries of Western Europe, then the dynamics of mortality in our country fits into the so-called model of demographic transition. The improvement in the standard of living and the quality of medical care in developed countries has contributed to a noticeable increase in the life expectancy of the population. The decline in mortality as a result of changes in life priorities was followed by a fall in the birth rate.

The model of the demographic development of Russia, like, indeed, of most Eastern European countries, currently combines the low birth rate characteristic of highly developed countries with the lower average life expectancy, which was observed during the recovery of post-war Europe. Thus, there is some delay in the aging process, which is explained by the large number of premature deaths, especially among men.

A long-term decline in the level of natural reproduction of the population, combined with an increase in the absolute number of older people, made the process of demographic aging of the population practically irreversible, and the sharp decline in the birth rate in the 90s accelerated it.

In accordance with international criteria, a country's population is considered old if the proportion of people aged 65 and over exceeds 7% of the total population. According to this indicator, Russia can be classified as an aging country since the late 1960s, and at present 12.5% ​​of its inhabitants (that is, every eighth Russian citizen) are over 65 years old.

However, thanks to a well-funded national project to increase the birth rate in Russia, a turning point in this trend occurred in 2007: for the first time in the last 20 years, the population of Russia stopped shrinking, and a trend towards an increase in the birth rate began to form.

Low fertility and population aging: causes, consequences, policy options

Today, almost all European countries are experiencing a prolonged decline in fertility and, consequently, an aging population. Fertility rates in most of them are below the level of population replacement (2.1 children per married couple), which leads to a reduction in natural population growth, and in some cases - to natural decline. At the same time, the share of economically and socially inactive elderly people continues to grow in the structure of the population, and the number of working-age population in relation to the entire population is decreasing. In addition, immigration, which could potentially compensate for the decline in the working-age population, remains low in most European countries.

Such demographic trends can lead to devastating consequences for the European economy: a decrease in the share of the working-age population leads to a decrease in human capital and, therefore, can lead to a decrease in productivity; the pension and social insurance systems may become too burdensome; caring for a growing older population can fall entirely on the shoulders of households; the growth of the elderly population requires a significant increase in health care costs.

This development could prove to be a very serious obstacle to the achievement of the goals of the European Union's "social program" of full employment, economic growth and social cohesion. Population aging, driven by low fertility and increased life expectancy, is likely to force EU governments to overhaul social insurance systems. Differences in the social, economic and political structure of these countries are reflected in differences in demographic structure. And EU enlargement will only exacerbate already considerable regional differences. Concerns about these trends have sparked a heated debate about what policies can help overcome them, or at least mitigate the negative impact. During these debates, three main approaches were discussed:

1. encouraging marriage / cohabitation and childbearing through government measures aimed at changing the income structure of couples who decide to create sustainable alliances and have children;
2. encouraging immigration of the working-age population from other countries;
3. social policy reform: for example, increasing the statutory retirement age or promoting female employment, which makes the pension system sustainable in the long term.

To achieve the goals of the EU social program, it is necessary to understand the degree of influence of national policies on demographic trends. However, the relationship between politics and demography is still not fully understood, and it is often very difficult to find out the real reasons for demographic changes, and sometimes even impossible task.

The purpose of the research on which this article is based, conducted by analysts from the RAND Corporation, was to assess the population structure and main demographic trends in the EU member and candidate countries, to identify the relationship between European public policy and the current demographic situation, and to establish policies that can prevent or to mitigate the adverse effects of low fertility and aging populations.

POPULATION STRUCTURE AND MAIN DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

Traditionally, when considering the structure of the population and the dynamics of its development, the indicators of population growth and the sex and age structure are taken into account. The population growth rate depends on natural population growth (the difference between the birth rate and the death rate) and the net migration rate (the difference between the immigration rate and the emigration rate). The general population growth rate shows the annual changes in the population per 1000 people, which allows you to compare countries with different population sizes.

Natural population growth. As a result of the sharp decline in the number of births relative to the number of deaths in all European countries, which began in the 1970s, the general rate of natural population growth has also decreased. On average in member countries, this ratio fell from 5.7 in 1970 to 1.7 in 2001, and in candidate countries - from 6.7 in 1970 to 1.6 in 2001, that is, the number of deaths exceeds today is the number of births. Among member countries, Ireland had the highest rates, with a population growth rate of 7.3 per 1,000 in 2001. This ratio was also high in France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands - 4 per 1000 people.

Further examination of countries by region reveals similarities between different countries in terms of natural population growth. In the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), there has been a natural population decline since the mid-1990s. Likewise, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have either already faced the threat of natural population decline (in the case of Poland and Slovakia), or have been experiencing a decline in natural growth rates for a long time. For example, in Hungary, the rate of natural increase has gradually declined since the early 1980s, reaching 3.4 in 2002. The Mediterranean countries - Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain - experienced a sharp decline in natural population growth; the average overall indicator for these countries, which stood at 9.2 in 1970, fell to 0.5 in 2001 (the lower limit was reached in 1998 at 0.1 per 1000 people).

Net migration. Trends in net migration rates are less obvious, as population inflows to one European country may be accompanied by outflows from another, and migration is highly dependent on war and political instability. In general, all member countries throughout the 1990s experienced annual population growth due to immigration, which significantly exceeded emigration. In 2001, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain set the record for net immigration of 5 per 1,000 people. On the other hand, the population of candidate countries declined in the 1900s due to external migration; this is especially noticeable in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in the Baltics. For example, in the early 1990s, the outflow of the population from Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Romania was 17 per 1000 people.

General population growth. Summing up the coefficients of natural population growth and net migration, one can obtain the coefficient of general population growth. In general, in the 1990s, the general population growth in the member countries was positive, and where there was a decline in natural growth, this process was made up for by immigration. In 2001, Ireland and Luxembourg had the highest overall growth rates at 11 per 1000 people. On the other hand, in the 1990s, most of the candidate countries experienced a decline in overall population growth, which, in the case of many countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics, was exacerbated by population outflows.

Age and sex structure. There is a relationship between the structure of the population and the number of births and deaths. The age and sex composition of the population is determined not only by the level of fertility, mortality and migration in the past, but also largely determines the level of fertility, mortality and migration in the future.

At present, two main features can be distinguished in the sex and age structure of the population of European countries. First, in member countries, there are more men aged 25 to 39 years than women of the same age, which appears to be a reflection of the pattern of immigration, as immigrants tend to be able-bodied men of reproductive age. Second, as of 1999, women of childbearing age between 25 and 44 had higher fertility in member countries than women in candidate countries.

The age distribution of the population is largely determined by fertility, but it is also influenced by migration and mortality. The more able-bodied youth in the age structure of the population, the easier the task of providing for the elderly. Trends towards an increase in the number of the elderly population appeared in the 1970s, in the early 1980s they gave way to a decline, and in the mid-1980s they resumed with renewed vigor. Therefore, the proportion of older people (over 65) in the age structure of the population of European countries is steadily increasing. The exceptions are Ireland (where the proportion of older people has been declining throughout the 1990s), Sweden (which had the largest number of older people between 1977 and 2000), Austria, Denmark and the United Kingdom (where rates have not changed significantly since the mid-1980s). ).

Major demographic trends. Typically, the main demographic trends are associated with fertility and international migration. The structure and dynamics of the population depends on the decisions made by individuals and households. The birth rate is influenced by social decisions about marriage, divorce, cohabitation and economic factors - financial instability, as well as the level of education of women and their employment.
The data show that in all European countries, with the exception of Ireland and Sweden, fertility rates have fallen and are now below replacement levels, at 1.5 children per woman. This trend inevitably leads to a natural population decline, especially among young groups. The decline in fertility was due to a number of factors (the decision to marry, the decision to have a child, the woman's decision to get a higher education, the woman's decision to start working, the desired standard of living and family structure).

One of the important components considered in the study of fertility patterns is marriage. Recently, however, in many countries, marriage is increasingly being replaced by cohabitation, and the divorce rate is constantly growing. Since the early 1980s, in most member countries, the average age at first marriage for women has gradually increased. If in 1980 it was 23 years old, then in 1995 it was already 26 years old. The growth was especially noticeable in the Scandinavian countries: in 2001 in Sweden - 30 years, in Denmark - 29 years, in Finland - 28 years. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that cohabitation is increasingly becoming an alternative to marriage. In the candidate countries, the average age at marriage has also increased, but overall it is slightly lower than in the member countries: if in the 1980s it was 23, then in 2001 it was 25 years. The pursuit of higher education also forces women to postpone the decision to marry. In 2000, in member countries, the proportion of women among university graduates was over 6%. There are similar trends in the candidate countries. In addition, after graduating from higher education, women tend to give preference to work, rather than creating a family.

The age of a woman's first childbirth is largely determined by the age of marriage or cohabitation, the desire to obtain a higher education, a job and an appropriate income, as well as the desired standard of living and family structure. Since the late 1970s, the average age at birth of the first child in European countries has gradually increased: if at the beginning of the 1980s in member countries it was 25 years, then in 2000 it was 27 years; in the candidate countries, this age increased from 23 in the early 1990s to 25 in 2000.

The structure and dynamics of the population is also influenced by migration, which is determined by micro-level decisions of individuals and households. Immigration to a country increases its population, while emigration decreases it. Net migration is positive when the influx of immigrants exceeds the outflow of emigrants, and negative when the opposite is true. At the same time, it is important to understand that the problem of migration is complex, multifaceted and always associated with a clear definition of the status of migrants and the adoption of migration measures.

In 2000, in a number of member countries - Germany, Greece, Italy and Sweden - population growth was only due to immigration. In 1999, in Austria, Belgium, Germany and Sweden, the share of immigrants exceeded 5% of the total population. Natural population growth exceeded immigration only in Finland, France and the Netherlands. Among the candidate countries, population growth was observed in Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia. The combination of emigration and natural loss has led to a decline in the population in Latvia, Lithuania and Romania. Analysis of migration by gender shows that the majority of immigrants are usually men of working age. The only exceptions here are Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

So, despite significant cultural, social, political and economic differences between European countries, demographic trends are quite similar. At the same time, there are certain differences in the degree of changes: there is either a tendency towards a reduction in the natural increase in the population, or towards its natural decline. The decline in natural population growth is due to a number of demographic factors. In general, despite the differences in the degree and duration of changes, such development is based on similar microlevel trends:

• raising the age of first marriage;
• raising the age of birth of the first child;
• increased divorce rates;
• the drop in fertility rates below the level of population replacement;
• increase in the number of older people.

Since changes in natural population growth are slow, future population structure and potential problems are relatively easy to predict. But this is precisely why it is very difficult to influence this development through political decisions.

The picture of international migration is much more complex. In general, in most countries, net immigration is small, but in some countries there is a significant inflow or outflow of population from time to time. One of the factors capable of causing unexpected changes in migration trends may be the enlargement of the European Union that took place in May 2004. The development of migration trends and their consequences for the structure of the population is much more difficult to predict, but it is obvious that they largely depend on political decisions.

POLITICS AND DEMOGRAPHY IN FIVE COUNTRIES

In order to better understand the policies pursued to influence fertility and population structure, and to assess the effectiveness of policies in this area, RAND undertook a study of five European countries: France, Germany, Poland, Spain and Sweden. Since the focus of this study was on fertility and, to a lesser extent, migration, countries were selected to meet three main criteria related to fertility rates, migration, and member or candidate status. European countries with extremely low fertility were separated from the rest of European countries. Extremely low fertility was understood as general fertility indicators that did not exceed the reproduction level over the past 20 years (i.e. 2.1) and for the last several years have been at a level below 1.5. In terms of migration rates, a distinction was made between high and low migration. High migration was understood as the total migration over the past 10 years, exceeding 20% ​​(i.e., the average annual rate exceeded 2 per 1000 people). Distinguishing between member countries and candidates is important because of the differences in history, politics and approaches of these countries to problems related to population structure.

France was selected as a low migration member country. Distinctive features of its demographic development are, firstly, a relatively high birth rate (in 2001, according to the total (total - Demoscope) fertility rate of 1.9 children per woman from all member countries and candidates, she was second only to Ireland) and, secondly, long and strong traditions of family policy (problems of family policy were discussed already in the 19th century and led to the adoption of the Family Code in 1939) ... The demographic situation in France is characterized by the so-called "fertility paradox": a combination of fairly good fertility rates compared to other European countries and a high level of economic activity of mothers. This paradox is explained by the peculiarities of the French family policy, which differs from the family policy of many other European countries. First of all, we are talking about the "third child" policy and the "work-family balance" policy.

In its family policy, the French government encourages large families on the assumption that population renewal and growth are directly dependent on couples who decide to have more children. State payments for the third child and subsequent children significantly exceed payments for the second child. At the same time, there are no payments for the first child at all. The economic justification for such a policy is the increased costs associated with the growth of the family: the third child is much more expensive, so after his birth, a woman often has to give up work and devote all her attention to children and home. At the same time, the French government never considered a woman's place to be at home. As early as 1913, maternity leave was introduced in France. Public kindergartens and creches were more affordable than in other countries, and families were provided with large benefits and parental leave. Today, the availability of a high-quality free childcare system allows more than 80% of French women between the ages of 25 and 39 (the most likely age of childbearing) to work full-time. Thus, the fairly high birth rates in France since 1975 can be at least partly attributed to French family politics.

Germany is an example of a member country with extremely low fertility and high migration rates. For 50 years, Germany was divided into the FRG and the GDR, and different family policies were pursued in both countries. Therefore, it is important to find an answer to the question of whether the different fertility rates in the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic are explained by differences in the family policy of these two countries. Despite German reunification in 1989, differences in fertility rates continue to be observed in the eastern and western parts of the country. Throughout the history of divided Germany, the birth rate in the GDR exceeded the birth rate in the FRG by an average of 0.5 children per woman. This difference was due to the pursuit of a purposeful policy of increasing the birth rate in the GDR.

The main goal of the demographic policy of the GDR was to encourage the creation of large families and maintain a high level of female employment. Among the measures taken in the GDR to increase the birth rate, one can single out the provision of long paid maternity leave and childcare, significant payments for childbirth and monthly child benefits, shorter working hours for young mothers and the provision of interest-free loans to newlyweds for the purchase of housing. In addition, the GDR had a developed system of state creches and kindergartens. Since 1984, a similar French “third child” policy has been pursued. In contrast to the GDR, family policy in the FRG and reunified Germany was and remains "symbolic" and focused mainly on ensuring gender equality. Thus, the purely economic incentives of family policy in the GDR directly influenced the increase in the birth rate, but the long-term consequences of such a policy were not so visible.

Poland makes it possible to study the relationship between politics and demography using the example of a candidate country with a low level of migration. Like many socialist countries in Eastern Europe, Poland for 50 years pursued a policy aimed at increasing the birth rate. However, after the fall of the Iron Curtain, family politics underwent major changes and the birth rate fell. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a link between changes in family policy and changes in fertility rates in Poland over the past 50 years and find out what led to the sharp decline in fertility in the 1990s.
The demographic history of Poland is a clear example of how the communist government used family politics as a tool to increase the birth rate. In the early 1970s, child benefits and maternity leave were increased, and a decision was made to give priority to housing for large families. Thanks to these measures, the birth rate rose markedly by the early 1980s. However, during the transition to a free market economy, there was a rapid decline in the birth rate, although the government made every effort to keep it at the same level. During this time, political, social and economic changes were so significant that it is extremely difficult to identify a causal relationship with demographic changes. Three potential reasons for the decline in fertility can be identified: economic difficulties associated with the transition to a free market economy, the penetration of Western European culture and changes in family policy (reduction of maternity benefits, child benefits, privatization of nurseries, kindergartens and schools, etc. .).

Spain is a member country with extremely low fertility and high migration. Many of Spain's problems are more or less common to Greece, Italy and Portugal. The Franco dictatorship in Spain banned the sale of contraceptives and encouraged large, traditional families with women as spouses and mothers. After his death in 1975, a democratic government was established in Spain, and the government completely abandoned the old family policy, choosing a policy of non-interference in family affairs.

For years, the Spaniards have opposed any government action to increase the birth rate. They are convinced that fertility rates are already too high, and the population of Spain rejects any policy associated with the Franco regime. In addition, there is no government program to increase the birth rate in Spain. In the long term, such a passive family policy can lead to serious difficulties. Given the current demographic situation in Spain, many of its middle-aged citizens, upon retirement, may well face a lack of assistance from a large family. In all likelihood, the decline in fertility in Spain after 1975 was due to the virtual absence of family policy.

Sweden is a member country with “undulating” birth rates and high migration rates. In the 1980s, Sweden experienced a rise in fertility, but in the 1990s there was a noticeable decline. In this regard, the relationship between such fertility trends and the policy action of the Swedish government is of interest.

One of the most important factors behind the rise in fertility in Sweden in the 1980s was that Swedish women could easily combine work and parenting. In the 1990s, women's employment in Sweden was one of the highest in the world, accounting for 83% of the total number of women of working age. Throughout the 1980s, Swedish social policies aimed at gender equality in income generation had a positive effect on fertility. The increase in the birth rate was also facilitated by the state policy of creating a system of childcare. The decline in the birth rate in the early 1990s was nothing new in Swedish history. Similar recessions also occurred in the 1930s and early 1970s, when the country was in a state of economic crisis.

In Sweden, a woman's earnings represent a significant share of household income, in which a man and a woman are equal partners. Therefore, the behavior of families turns out to be very sensitive to changes in the macroeconomic situation, so that women with relatively low incomes and women in education have lower fertility than other women. Thus, the rise in fertility in the 1980s was driven by a combination of a favorable economic environment, low unemployment, tolerant attitudes towards working mothers and fathers, and improved conditions of employment. The marked decline in fertility that began in the 1990s has shown that the absence of one or more of these factors can have a negative impact on fertility rates. The Swedish example shows that economic cycles and changes in social policy can lead to “undulating” trends in fertility.

GENERAL RESULTS

So, the purpose of the study, conducted by experts from the RAND Corporation, was to find the relationship between government policy and demographic trends and establish which policies can prevent or mitigate the adverse effects of low fertility and aging populations. As a result of the study, the following conclusions were made.

Population aging and its consequences cannot be prevented through immigration. The research literature has extensively debated the question of whether immigration can fill the gap in the working-age population. Despite the diversity of points of view, all researchers agree that such a policy cannot be feasible or acceptable in the long term.

It would take a record number of immigrants to fill the labor gap. Moreover, in the current socio-political situation, when European countries are trying to limit immigration, such a number of immigrants would be simply unacceptable. But even if such a significant number of labor immigrants were allowed to work in the EU countries, the problem of population aging would hardly be solved. Rather, slowing the aging of the population from it in the short term would be a simple postponement of the problem in the long term. The same immigrants themselves would grow old, thereby creating imbalances in the age structure of the population. By 2050, the influx of migrants would be 59-99% of the total population. Such a high level of migration has not been observed in the past in any of the countries or regions reviewed. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that such an influx could occur in the foreseeable future. Thus, the question is whether immigration can be used to effectively slow down population aging, rather than prevent it.

But the problem of filling the shortage of the able-bodied population with the help of immigration is far from being solved. Important questions remain unanswered. For example, since the early 1980s, there have been major differences between American and European immigration policies. The US policy was more open to the immigration of skilled labor compared to the relatively closed policy of European countries. Over the same period, productivity in the US has grown significantly compared to that in the EU. Therefore, it is important to establish the existence of a relationship between greater openness in American politics and higher economic growth.

Government policies can slow the decline in fertility rates. Government policies can affect fertility. But this conclusion requires a number of important reservations, namely:

• there is no single policy that can be recommended to improve fertility;
• the effectiveness of such policies is strongly influenced by the political, social and economic context;
• it takes a long time for the consequences of such a policy to become visible.

The influence of government policy is always limited, since it can only slow down the decline in fertility rates, but not stop it or bring these indicators at least to the level of population replacement.

This conclusion is supported by specific studies. Today, France has the second highest fertility rates in Europe and one of the most mature family policies. To some, France's relatively high fertility rates may seem surprising, since France was the first country in Europe to experience a fertility decline that caused deep concern among the population and government. But thanks to the adoption of family legislation, the state managed to significantly increase the birth rate.

Unlike France, Spain currently has the second lowest fertility in the EU, behind only Italy, and has no clear demographic policy. However, a generation earlier (in 1971) Spain ranked second among European countries with the highest fertility. The sharp decline in the birth rate is associated with the rejection of the family policy pursued by the Franco regime (prohibiting contraception, encouraging large families), and the transition to a democratic regime with a passive demographic policy.

In Poland and the GDR, after the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, there was a decline in the birth rate. The GDR has repeatedly adopted various packages of family policy aimed at increasing the birth rate. At the same time, the 1986 program was not as effective as the 1972 program. The economic incentives of East German policy in 1976 had a direct impact on fertility growth: the fertility rate rose from 1.54 in 1975 to 1.94 in 1980. However, in the long term, the impact of this policy has been less visible.

In Poland, the success of family policy in the 1970s gave way to a short-lived decline in the birth rate in the mid-1980s. In the late 1980s, the decline in the birth rate resumed, and in the 1990s, with the onset of economic transformations accompanied by changes in social and economic policies, it acquired catastrophic proportions.

In turn, the decline in the birth rate and subsequent changes may be associated not so much with policy changes as with the socio-economic situation. For example, in Spain, low fertility rates were attributed, among other things, to high unemployment among people under 30, high housing costs and the propensity of young people to live with their parents longer than in other European countries. Thus, indirect policies that stimulate economic growth can reduce unemployment and increase cash income. To a certain extent, the increase in the birth rate can also be facilitated by the adoption of a program to build more affordable housing for young families.

In most countries, population policies affecting fertility tend to be geared towards other goals. For example, in Sweden, the challenge for family and full-time policies is primarily to enable couples to combine parenting with work. Therefore, it would be a mistake to consider the increase in the birth rate as the main goal of policy, for example, the provision of parental leave. Within the framework of this policy, such a task is, of course, of secondary importance.

In addition, any policy to increase fertility rates must be affordable. Raising fertility to reproduction rates (from 1.69 children per woman in 1988) would require a sevenfold increase in family benefits from C $ 289 to C $ 1,982 a year, according to a Canadian Population Policy Survey, a rate not very different from family benefits. in some European countries. In this case, one of the possible solutions may be to turn to the French experience of the "third child policy". The French government pays such attention to her because it believes that influencing the total number of children (the decision to have more children) is easier than the decision to have children at all (the decision to have the first child). Since at present in Europe most couples seek to have at least one child and often postpone the birth of a second and subsequent children due to economic uncertainty, the use of the French experience can be very effective in developing a common European policy to increase fertility. It is important to understand the causal relationship between policy decisions and changes in fertility-related behavior, but the data required to do this is often incomplete, especially when it comes to policy choices.

No policy works by itself. No political intervention by itself can completely overcome low fertility in all situations. To be sure, with some policy instruments, governments have sometimes been able to slow down fertility declines. For example, over the past decades, France has made some progress by focusing on the "third child policy". But it is hardly justifiable to associate these successes with a single political mechanism. Rather, it is about creating a social, economic and political environment conducive to having more children. And such an environment can only be created by combining a range of different policy measures aimed at achieving this goal.

Sweden overcame the decline in fertility by resorting to several policy instruments. Parental leave policies in the 1980s allowed many women to raise children and keep their jobs at the same time. But neither child welfare nor extended parental leave alone led to an increase in fertility in the late 1980s. It seems that it was the combination of these policies with those aimed at ensuring gender equality in pay that played an important role in creating families and improving the quality of life.

In the former GDR, fertility was boosted by the 1976 family policy package, which included extended maternity leave, paid school and work leave, interest-free honeymoon loans, high monthly child benefits, and quality medical care. And again, when creating families, the decisive role was played not by a single measure, but by the whole range of measures. However, a package of similar policy measures adopted in 1986 did not have the desired effect.

Finally, there is no one-size-fits-all recipe for a policy of increasing fertility: what worked in one country may well not work in another. Studies show that in some countries there is a correlation between the size of social transfers to families and the birth rate, while in others there is no such correlation, although it should be emphasized that this does not in itself imply a causal relationship. Therefore, family policy is a necessary but insufficient component of demographic policy aimed at increasing the birth rate.

Despite the fact that many different kinds of demographic events were carried out in the countries considered, there is no evidence that they were in any way coordinated or aimed solely at increasing the birth rate. However, if the EU wants to prevent rather than mitigate the consequences of an aging population and a decline in human capital in the next generation, it will have to turn to demographic policy.

Political, economic and social contexts. Typically, the same policy measures lead to different demographic outcomes due to the complex and fluid political, economic and social contexts in which they are implemented. The best examples are the German Democratic Republic, Poland and Spain. The decline in fertility in the former GDR after German reunification cannot be attributed to specific policies; rather, it is associated with a change in the social environment. Women facing difficult personal economic situations will not have children right away. Likewise, the transition to a free market economy in Poland caused a change in the economic environment, deprived families of the incentive to have children, and instilled Western values ​​in wide sections of society. In Spain, a sharp decline in the birth rate was associated with democratic rule that followed the fall of the Franco regime.

France is prudently concerned that declining birthrates threaten its economy. Therefore, French demographic policy interferes with the life of families to a greater extent than the policy of other European countries.

In Sweden, the economic context has had a significant impact on fertility. Women's income is directly related to childbearing. Policies that encourage women to work can promote economic growth, but they will ultimately lead to lower fertility if not accompanied by appropriate family policies that allow women to combine childbearing and raising children with work.

The results of demographic policy do not appear immediately. Policy implementation is slow. This process can be divided into five main stages:

1. reaching political agreement;
2. transforming consent into policy;
3. policy implementation;
4. micro-level behavioral change as a result of these policies;
5. achievement (direct or indirect) of the goal of the policy.

Thus, direct or indirect government policy aimed at overcoming the decline in the birth rate requires many years of effort and, as a rule, turns out to be unattractive for politicians. While some policy measures (such as prohibiting, restricting or freeing abortion) can have dramatic impact in the short term, they usually have only a short-term effect. Electoral cycles and demographic policy cycles do not coincide, and therefore politicians have no immediate incentives to pursue such a policy. They usually tend to favor policies that are not time consuming.

One way to mitigate the adverse effects of low fertility and an aging population is to increase human capital by creating an environment in which women and older people benefit from working rather than doing household chores or retirement. However, full employment policies that encourage women to work can have a negative impact on fertility if women choose a career over the family. At the same time, these consequences can be avoided: the example of Sweden shows that the combination of full employment policies with sound family policies can have a beneficial effect on fertility. In the 1970s and 1980s, thanks to the policies of the Swedish government, the adverse effects of women's participation in the labor force were minimized, the birth rate in the country increased and the employment of women increased. But the Swedish example also shows that such a balance is fragile because it depends entirely on a favorable economic environment.

Thus, migration and fertility policies are unlikely to halt the aging of the European population, although they may slow it down.

1 - The study was conducted in 2003, when Hungary, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Estonia, which became full members of the European Union on May 1, 2004, had the status of candidate countries for accession to the EU, therefore, further in the division into Member and Candidate countries as of 2003 remains.

Let's now look at the myths about the reasons for the decline in fertility and point out the real cause of this phenomenon.

The first myth: declining fertility is a natural phenomenon and should be accepted as normal. A nuance is important here: yes, a phenomenon is natural for sociogenesis (more on that later), but it does not follow from this that it should be recognized as the norm. Here "on the fingers": disease is a natural phenomenon, isn't it? But this does not mean that they should be considered the norm - a completely healthy person should be the norm, even if he exists only in theory. Of course, modern postmodernism seeks to philosophically erode the concept of norm, reaching “illness is just a different way of existence” (J. Lacan), and liberal ideology requires that everything that does not bring direct physical harm to another individual be considered the norm, but we will not be distracted.

The essence of the myth: all Europeans are like that - they do not want to give birth, but are we slurping cabbage soup with bast shoes? There is nothing to worry about, we will die out for the company!

From the fact that the decline in the birth rate in modern society relative to the peasant is natural, it does not follow in any way that the decline below the level of reproduction should be considered the norm. Decreasing is normal, but not that much! Once again I recommend Thilo Sarrazin's book Germany: Self-Destruction.

The second myth- reduction of the question to the economy: "if they have something to raise their children, they will have it." The myth is easily refuted by the fact that until recently, Europe does not want to give birth in a materially very prosperous country. Social payments are also not a solution to the problem, they do not increase the number of children desired in the family. There is a positive effect: women start giving birth statistically a little earlier, but for this the allowances must be large enough. The reason is simple: in any case, child support costs more than the amount of social benefits, and at the same time, after childbirth, a woman automatically lags behind in career growth and in most cases loses some qualifications, which affects further earnings. Well, to be honest, caring for an infant, which is required around the clock, is much more difficult work than the usual work "from 9 to 18", especially if not in production, but simply in the office (just do not fall into postmodernism like “Both spouses must take maternity leave” - this will not solve the problem with family finances, and the man is evolutionarily “not sharpened” for caring for babies, his role comes later). In other words, for social benefits to be guaranteed to increase the birth rate, they must at least be equal to the average salary in the country, which no state budget can withstand.

In addition, the payment of cash benefits actually stimulates the birth rate - but it is precisely among the marginalized part of the population, for which money, right now, is more important than the future of children. I will quote a leading researcher at the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences Vladimir Mukomel: "Both foreign and Soviet experience demonstrates that attempts to materially stimulate the birth rate evoke a response either from marginal groups of the population, or from representatives of ethnic groups prone to having many children."

I note that against the background of this myth, there are sometimes calls for a kind of reduction of sociogenesis - they say, since the number of children decreases with an increase in the standard of living, then let's go back to the pampas! Subsistence farming only, hardcore only! Usually accompanied by immoderate religiosity. For the apparent insanity of the concept, we will not disassemble it: after all, if its propagandists are so opposed to progress for obsolescence, then why are they writing such appeals on a computer on the Internet?

The third myth: declaring migration a panacea for all ills. I will quote Igor Beloborodov, director of the Center for Demographic Research: “Substitutional migration carries with it a number of social risks that are already felt today ... Let's list just a few of them: violation of the ethno-demographic balance; interethnic conflicts; the growth of drug addiction; ethnic crime; deterioration of the sanitary and epidemiological situation; threat of loss of strategic territories, etc. ”.

To be honest, I do not see the need to examine this issue in detail, the violation of the ethno-demographic balance is quite enough. And if someone claims that there is nothing wrong with that - all people are equal, etc., then he should honestly, "head-on", ask a question, without arguing with the formal equality of rights, etc. different nations: WHY are you promoting a position that inevitably violates the ethno-demographic balance of countries in the direction of reducing the relative number of representatives of the white race? On the example of the same Europe - everything is very clear.

Fourth myth: improving the quality of life is much more important than the quantitative growth of the population. The same connection to money as in myth # 2, but “from the reverse side”: they say, the quality of children depends only on the amount of money invested, you need to save! I will once again quote I. Beloborodov: “it is often assumed that quality parameters can have a positive coloration only with a decrease in quantitative indicators. ... The main motive for reasoning about the priority of quality over quantity, as a rule, is the desire for the expedient spending of state and family funds. "

And again: no one argues that the quality of life is an important parameter, but this does not mean that for this reason it is permissible to reduce the birth rate below the level of self-reproduction of the nation - it is obvious, right? Taking this opportunity, I note that since fertility is important Total population, then appropriate social guarantees are required for Total population, a guaranteed decent standard of living, and not abstract economic indicators such as GDP and so on.

The fifth myth: family crisis. I clarify: the fact that a crisis of family relations is taking place is a fact. And it negatively affects the birth rate (we will analyze it in more detail in the next article). However, the myth lies precisely in what is declared overriding importance this factor. The influence is there, but not critical: modern life allows you to raise children alone (which, of course, is bad - but possible) and even more so with the support of the family.

Usually this myth is pushed by the guardians of the condo-patriarchal values.

Perhaps the same myth (and the same category of its adherents) can indirectly include the variant of "family planning": they say, sex education is unacceptable, it corrupts children, teaches them to protect themselves instead of marrying virgins and giving birth-giving birth-giving birth. Here one should distinguish the need for adequate sexual information at school (and along with the ethics of inter-sex and family relations, etc.), from what liberals understand by this: the propaganda of the normality of homosexuality, etc., not to mention the approach to sex only as physiology - I think everyone is in the know, and we will not be distracted. The difference is similar to that of the Soviet commission on juvenile affairs from modern juvenile justice.

Sixth myth- about the "decline of spirituality", ie earlier people were "highly spiritual" and gave birth, but now they have become materialistic and therefore do not want to give birth, but take care of themselves. Whether it is the ancient times, when children were given birth as on a conveyor belt, half died in childhood, and whoever lived to forty years old is essentially an old man, since the average life expectancy at the end of the 19th century in Russia is just over 30 years.

In this case, the standard logical error of posthocnonpropterhoc is obvious: yes, a couple of centuries ago people were much more religious, but the high fertility was also due to the lack of normal contraception, very early marriages, etc. Now you can compare the birth rate in very religious countries, and the birth rate in them will be quite distinctly different: religious factors can delay, but not stop the development of society.

Natural reason- this is de-peasantization, i.e. there is a process of reduction of the rural population in the cultivated area. I will quote A.N. Sevastyanova: “if at the beginning of the century the employed population of Russia consisted of 86% of peasants, 2.7% of the intelligentsia and 9% of workers, then by the 1990s. the proportion of workers in the RSFSR increased almost 7 times, the intelligentsia - more than 10 times, and the peasantry, as already mentioned, fell more than 7 times. It must be admitted that the communists brilliantly succeeded in the task that tsarism failed to cope with: the energy of peasantization was taken under state control and spent, by and large, on useful, important, grandiose goals. And all this for some seventy years is an unprecedented case in history that distinguishes us for the better from other nations ”(note: here the intelligentsia means those who are engaged in mental labor).

High birth rates are observed in those countries where the majority of the population is rural. The transition to industrial production inevitably leads to a decrease in the birth rate. There are two main reasons, and they act not just simultaneously, but systemically.

First, there is an economic reason. Traditional society implies an appropriate type of farming: some hydroponic farms or even just high-tech land cultivation is already an industrial way of farming, and it also has a high "entry barrier" both in age and in skills - a seven-year-old does not work as a combine operator will be able. And in the traditional peasant life, he has long been working on the sidelines, as a help, and so on. In such an economy, the birth of children was economically profitable: they worked from early childhood. Industrial-type work implies long training, etc., and children in "family accounting" become an item not of income, but of expenses. Compare the situations themselves “a five-year-old can already graze and feed poultry” (as an example) and “fully provide for a child up to at least 17 years old, and in most cases - seriously help at least until graduation” (and I am silent about the housing issue); clearly? The birth rate is causally correlated not with “spirituality”, but with the rate of lack of education (however, “spirituality” and education have an inverse correlation). As soon as the people become educated, since labor requires education, the birth rate falls after a generation (the first retains the habit).

Secondly, the lack of industrial development always correlates with the lack of adequate medicine (and the corresponding norms adopted by the population), which also applies to contraception. It is important to understand that we are talking not only about technical capabilities, but also about the culture of use: "Postinor" and even more so abortion is, you know, not a method of contraception, as some actually practice. And the approach of "delaying an abortion until the deadline" on the reproductive function is by no means positive. And all this is also a question of culture, naturalness of use, a responsible approach to childbirth. In traditional cultures, the approach “once it flew, then give birth” is widespread (and when the corresponding level collides with the moral norm “not necessarily”, then behavior mutations of the form “abortion as contraception” are obtained).

Both reasons are interrelated and have a systemic effect. Some researchers emphasize urbanization, but this factor is derivative.

So: the scientifically grounded reason for the decline in the birth rate is the spreading of peasants, the transition to an industrial society. This is a natural process of sociogenesis, but a decrease in the birth rate below the reproduction level is the suicide of the nation. The question arises: is it natural not just to reduce the birth rate in a civilized society, but to this exact extent? We will talk about this next time.

One of the most pressing problems for the national security of the Russian state is the demographic situation in the country. It is known that the birth rate in modern Russia, despite a certain improvement associated with a relative increase in living standards in the 2000s (compared to the 1990s) and some government measures to stimulate demographic growth, remains at a fairly low level. At the very least, it is hardly possible to say that the Russian birth rate currently covers the needs for replenishing the country's population. Russian citizens are aging rapidly, especially in the “Russian” regions of the country, where the birth rate is lowest.

Reasons for the demographic decline

A strong demographic decline was observed in Russia throughout almost the entire twentieth century and was associated not only with changes in the socio-economic and sociocultural foundations of the Russian state, but also with the fact that during the years of wars, revolutions, collectivization and industrialization, political repression, the Russian state lost 140 -150 million people. Accordingly, since a significant part of the dead and the deceased were people of both sexes of childbearing age, as well as children and adolescents, the number of potential newborns who could be born to victims of global domestic cataclysms has decreased by tens of millions of people.

However, an equally significant role in the demographic crisis in Russia was played by the decrease in the number of children of the average Russian woman. According to A. Vishnevsky, one of the largest domestic specialists in demography, for the period from 1925 to 2000. fertility decreased by an average of 5.59 children per woman (Vishnevsky A. Demography of the Stalin era). Moreover, the most active decline in the birth rate occurred in the period from 1925 to 1955. - that is, for periods of industrialization and collectivization, the Great Patriotic War, the post-war restoration of the Soviet infrastructure. The population of modern Russia is annually declining by about 700 thousand people, which allows us to speak of the country as gradually dying out (yes, this is exactly how President Vladimir Putin himself characterized it, without hesitation in these words, back in 2000, and 6 years later - in 2006 year - he said that the population of Russia by the end of the XXI century could decrease by half, if drastic measures are not taken to improve the demographic situation in the country).

Very often, in ordinary judgments about the reasons for the decline in the birth rate, there is an explanation of the low birth rate by social conditions, first of all - the insufficient material well-being of the population, the lack of well-paid work for parents, separate and large housing, infrastructure of kindergartens and schools. However, when compared with the countries of the third world or the same pre-revolutionary Russia, such arguments do not stand up to criticism. We see the conditions in which the bulk of the Central Asian population lives, not to mention the Africans or the inhabitants of South Asia. However, overcrowding, poverty (and sometimes outright poverty), lack of social prospects do not at all prevent people from having children - and in quantities "from five and more."

In fact, the reasons for the decline in the birth rate in Russia in the twentieth century lie rather in the ideological plane. Their main stimulus is the devaluation of traditional values ​​and the destruction of the way of life of the Russian and other peoples of the country during the revolution and, especially, the post-revolutionary Stalinist transformations. One cannot but pay tribute to the Stalinist era as a period of maximum development of industry, defense, security of the Soviet state, the spread of universal literacy of the population, and the availability of medical care (albeit not highly qualified, but still significant).

However, for a rapid breakthrough in the economy of the USSR, it was necessary to mobilize as many citizens as possible, to attract to work practically the entire working population of the country, including both men and women. According to A. Vishnevsky, “the very methods by which the Stalinist leadership of the USSR sought - and achieved - a“ great turning point ”in people's life were such that they recklessly destroyed the entire system of traditional values, including family values” (Vishnevsky A. Demography in the Stalin era).

Despite the fact that Stalin and his entourage negatively assessed the activities of the "leftist" wing of the Bolshevik party, which in the first post-revolutionary years insisted on the complete destruction of the institution of the family, which promoted the sexual freedom of men and women, freedom of abortion, in reality, the "left communists" had a lot borrowed. And, first of all, a specific model of the organization of family relations. It can be called proletarian, since it was precisely among the proletariat, as a class of wage workers, mainly living in cities and employed in factory production, that such a family organization became possible. For a peasant, the number of children did not really matter, moreover, having many children was in favor, since children are future hands, where you can feed two, you always feed three, and so on. The peasants also had the opportunity to accommodate numerous offspring in their hut, in the case of growing up children - in a hut built nearby, in an extension.

In contrast to them, the urban proletarians, huddled in the rooms and apartments of apartment buildings, could not afford numerous offspring. And due to the lack of places for accommodation, and due to the different nature of labor activity - the proletarian worked for a salary and the child became just another eater, reducing the well-being of the family without any return (when he grew up, he did not work in his father's household, like a peasant son, but went on their own "bread", that is, did not bring direct material return to the parental family). Moreover, in urban proletarian families, as a rule, women also went to work. Women workers, who found themselves in a situation of independent choice of work activity, place of residence, formed a completely different model of sexual behavior. First, they were much less dependent on the opinions of those around them than peasant women. Second, as self-employed workers, they could afford the behavior they saw fit. Naturally, for them, having many children was an obvious hindrance - after all, it directly hindered factory work.

The concept of the "new woman" and fertility

The ideology of the family policy of Soviet Russia was formed under the influence of the concepts of the "new woman", which began to take shape in the 19th century in the works of both Russian and foreign writers and philosophers of a revolutionary democratic persuasion. In Russia, first of all, N.G. Chernyshevsky. In the West, the idea of ​​women's emancipation has been much more developed. The ideology of feminism was formed, which now includes many branches - liberal, socialist, radical, lesbian and even "black" feminism. What the spread of feminism in the countries of Western Europe led to - you need not recall that this situation is quite deplorable for European societies and is the cause of significant contradictions between various groups of the European population.

In Russia, feminist ideas, including the concept of creating a “new woman,” have found grateful supporters among representatives of revolutionary parties and movements, primarily the Social Democrats. The Socialist-Revolutionaries - "populists" were nevertheless to a greater extent native, although similar theoretical constructions were spread among them. During the revolutionary years, Alexandra Kollontai became the main theoretician of the concept of the “new woman”. This amazing woman - a politician, diplomat, revolutionary - managed not only to form her own concept of family and sexual relations in a socialist society, but also to demonstrate with her own biography to a large extent what the image of a “new woman” is.

According to Kollontai, the traditional image of a woman from time immemorial has been associated with humility, focus on a successful marriage, lack of initiative in building her own life and life independence. A traditional woman is such a specific addition to a man, his companion and comrade-in-arms, deprived, in fact, of her own “I” and, often, of her own dignity. In contrast to the traditional image of a woman, Kollontai put forward the concept of a "new woman" - self-sufficient, active politically and socially, treating a man as an equal and really being equal to him in building his own independent life.

The image of the “new woman” is, first of all, the image of an unmarried woman. Let's add - and, as follows from the disclosure of this image, childless - after all, the presence of a child, especially two or three, not to mention five, deprives a woman of her independence in the understanding of Alexandra Kollontai. She names three main principles of building new love and marriage relations: equality in mutual relations, mutual recognition of the rights of the other without claiming complete possession of the partner's heart and soul, comradely sensitivity towards her love partner (A. ).

Already in the mid-1920s. Kollontai's works were formally criticized in the Soviet Union. Gradually, its concept turned out to be forgotten - people preferred to keep silent about it. Moreover, with the strengthening of the Soviet statehood, the country's leadership had no other options but a partial return to traditional values. In the official press, literature, cinema of the Stalinist era, the type of Soviet woman was promoted, who manages to combine the features of the “new woman” Kollontai in terms of party and social activity, labor exploits, and the traditional family behavior of mother and wife. However, it is not difficult to guess that the ideology of the Soviet state was at odds with the real practice of organizing family and demographic policy. Formally, motherhood was promoted, divorces were assessed negatively, in 1936 the Soviet government banned abortions, but in fact the social policy of the Soviet state was not aimed at real strengthening the demographic foundations of the country.

The decline in the birth rate during the Stalin era testifies to the fact that the measures taken to ban abortion did not give the desired result. First, in the Soviet Union, women in the bulk were employed. Those who received higher and secondary vocational education, after graduating from educational institutions, were sent to work on assignments - often in completely different regions of the country. Their chances of getting married quickly diminished. And the system of state propaganda itself, to a large extent, did not orient women (as well as men) to family values.

Although the Soviet state needed numerous workers' hands, soldiers and officers, new engineers and scientists, and indeed took colossal steps in this direction (just look at the number of educational institutions of all levels that appeared in the Stalin era, at the number of children "from the people", who received a high-quality professional education and achieved heights in various fields of scientific, military, industrial, cultural activity), something turned out to be irretrievably lost. And this "something" was the very meaning of childbearing and creating a strong full-fledged family. The family was deprived of its economic, economic, social content, although it was proclaimed as a "cell of society." Children could be brought up in kindergarten, husbands or wives could be changed periodically (if they weren’t satisfied with some of the nuances of living together, or even simply “tired”), the cohabitation of a man and a woman in a city apartment practically had no economic value.

After the death of Stalin and the “de-Stalinization” of the Soviet Union, even those measures to preserve the birth rate that Stalin tried to introduce by banning abortions were canceled. Despite the fact that after the war there was even a slight increase in the population, it was not possible to reach such a birth rate that would have allowed the population of the Soviet state to increase many times over time. There is no need to remind what happened in the post-Soviet period. In the 1990s, economic factors played a role, and, to an even greater extent, the final destruction of traditional values ​​and their replacement by a Westernized surrogate. Moreover, if in the Soviet model of family and sex policy women at least oriented themselves, if not to family life, then to creative activity “for the good of the motherland and the party,” then in the post-Soviet period the values ​​of personal material well-being have completely eclipsed all other life guidelines.
Since motherhood and marriage have ceased to be seen as real values ​​by the majority of Russian youth, a global "shortage of children" has formed.

Although many sociological surveys of young Russians indicate that the family remains the most important value in life for Russian youth (or, at least, the second most important), it is obvious that there is a discrepancy between the desired (which Russians answer to sociologists) and the actual. The latter is not encouraging - the level of divorce is extremely high in the country - 50% of marriages break up, which keeps Russia among the world leaders in terms of the number of divorces. As for childbearing, only in the 2000s, after the introduction of real material incentives, citizens began to give birth to more children (however, some skeptics explain the relative increase in the birth rate in the country in the 2000s by the fact that during this period the generation of “demographic boom” entered the childbearing age "Of the 1980s, and the socio-economic conditions of life in the country have relatively stabilized).

An important role here was played by the introduction of payments of the so-called. “Maternity capital”, which is paid at the birth of a second child and attaining the age of three years. The decision to start paying maternity capital was made in 2006, while, in order to prevent the possibility of its use for personal gain by representatives of the marginal segments of the population, it was decided not to issue it in cash, but to issue a special certificate allowing a certain amount of housing to be purchased. , close the mortgage loan, pay for the child's education.

Currently, maternity capital is about 430 thousand rubles. The amount is rather big - in some regions of Russia, you can buy your own home with it, or at least really improve your living conditions. The conditions and emergence of other opportunities for spending maternity capital funds in the interests of families and children are discussed. However, it is impossible to achieve an increase in the birth rate only by material motivation. Moreover, considering the fact that in order to receive maternity capital, it is still required to give birth to the first child. Therefore, some sociologists assess the very idea of ​​material stimulation of the birth rate very skeptically, referring to the fact that only representatives of marginal segments of the population or migrant diasporas will give birth in order to receive aid from the state in the amount of 430 thousand rubles. That is, even in this case, the problem of the demographic security of the Russian state will not be solved.

Abortion threatens demographics

Another problem for Russia in the area of ​​fertility is abortion. Officially, abortion was allowed in Soviet Russia immediately after the October Revolution. In 1920, the RSFSR allowed termination of pregnancy not only for medical reasons, becoming the first country in the world to legalize abortion. In 1936, abortion was banned and re-legalized only in 1955 after the policy of “de-Stalinization”. In the period from 1990 to 2008. in post-Soviet Russia, according to official data, 41 million 795 thousand abortions were performed. This number covers the real needs of the Russian state in the labor force (about 20 million people in the specified period), which allows many public and political figures to view abortion as a direct threat to the demographic security of the Russian state.

About half of the country's population is against abortion in Russia today. Sociological polls show a gradual decrease in the number of abortion supporters - from 57% of respondents in 2007 to 48% in 2010 (Levada Center. On the reproductive behavior of Russians). Opponents of abortion are usually expressed by nationalist political movements and religious organizations. Among them there are both absolute opponents of any abortions, including even abortions for medical reasons, and moderate opponents of abortions, who recognize the possibility of their commission in justified cases (medical indicators, rape, social disorder, etc.).

First of all, Russian public figures and traditionalist philosophers object to the practice of abortion. For them, abortion is not only a threat to the national security of the Russian state, one of the reasons for the reduction of the potential population of the Russian Federation, but also a challenge to religious values, traditional ideological guidelines, inherent in almost all peoples of the world, but collapsing in the process of de-traditionalization of modern society, assimilation of individualistic and consumer values ​​of modern Western capitalism. After all, the ideology of “childe free” - voluntary childlessness, elevated to valor by modern “creakles” and narrow-minded consumers striving to imitate them, is a deliberate implantation of essentially anti-Russian principles of refusing to have children, creating a full-fledged family in the name of “self-realization”, which is more often everything is just an opportunity for everyday and carefree "hanging out", shopping, or even just idleness, drunkenness and drug addiction.

Reducing the birth rate is one of the goals of numerous "family planning" associations that originally emerged in Western Europe on the initiative of feminist movements and sponsored by international financial circles interested in population decline - primarily in developed countries, since here a large population means both the growth of social responsibility and economic burdens on capitalists. Therefore, it is more expedient to "reduce" the number of the indigenous population, while simultaneously importing foreign migrants from the backward states of the "Third World" who will be ready to perform hard work without social guarantees and any requirements to improve their situation (now the experience of modern Europe shows that this is far not so, and many migrants by no means work in a new place of residence, but they very much even require social guarantees and all kinds of privileges, however, it is no longer possible to change the situation for most Western states).

The philosopher Oleg Fomin-Shakhov, who is one of the most convinced opponents of abortion in modern Russia, emphasizes that “the problem of abortion for today's Russia is, first of all, a problem of demographic security. At the International Conference on Population and Development, held in Cairo on September 5-13, 1994, a program of action was adopted, which essentially represented voluntary-compulsory self-reduction sanctions for Russia. The program said that for sustainable regional and global socio-economic development, it is necessary to take measures to reduce the birth rate, primarily through the development of family planning services (contraception, sterilization, abortion "in adequate conditions") "(O. Fomin-Shakhov. Russia without abortion. Newspaper "Zavtra". Electronic version of June 5, 2014).

At the same time, Oleg Fomin-Shakhov proposes to take advantage of the American experience of the proliferation movement, that is, opponents of abortion and supporters of preserving human life already in the womb. American prolifers, according to Oleg Fomin-Shakhov, for the first time transferred the topic of abortion to the plane of social problems, whereas before them, abortion was regarded as a personal sin of a person or as a crime against the laws of the state. The question was raised about the essence of abortion as a tool of biopolitics to regulate the population of individual states. As for Russia, it is obvious that its vast territories and natural resources have long been the envy of a number of neighboring states. Throughout history, the Russian state faced hordes of foreign conquerors, but today more far-sighted theorists and practitioners of the world financial oligarchy can afford to use technologies such as biopolitics, that is, the regulation of childbearing in Russia, the level of mortality of the population, including propaganda mechanisms - propaganda of abortion, "free" lifestyle, all kinds of social deviations, criminal subculture, etc.

Another well-known philosopher, Alexander Dugin, in his article "Childbirth as a Philosophical Problem" links the lack of desire for childbirth with the destruction of the traditional values ​​of Russian society, the rejection of religious values ​​and the assimilation of alien individualistic models aimed at the exclusive "self-worth" of a person. Within the framework of this axiological model, childbearing becomes an obstacle to the “free”, but in reality - aimless and characterized only by consumerism - human life. “The system of dirty monstrous lies, outright Russophobia, aimed at destroying our cultural and physical code, leaves no desire to create an honest, cultured, Orthodox Russian family and raise a large number of wonderful Russian children. And it is far from obvious whether it will become an argument for young people that if they don’t bear children, there will be no Russia ”- writes Dugin (A. Dugin. Childbearing as a philosophical problem).

Should abortion be banned in modern Russia? Of course, it is hardly possible to go to a total ban on abortion in modern conditions. And this step will not be really justified and understood by the population. However, strict control over the practice of abortion should be introduced - and this is one of the necessary measures in the direction of ensuring the demographic policy of the Russian state. First of all, all cases of abortions by Russian women should be strictly controlled, taking into account the reasons for their commission. So, for medical reasons, in the interests of preserving the life of a woman, after rape (the criminal background of abortion), abortion should be allowed. The possibility of abortion should also be left for families who already have several children or are experiencing justified difficulties of a material nature.

However, the bulk of abortions performed by women of young age, childless, with average or high incomes, with no apparent health problems, should be prohibited. Note - there is no encroachment on the personal freedom of a woman. It is enough to use contraception, not to have promiscuous sex, that is, to take care of yourself and adhere to at least elementary moral and ethical principles - and the need to periodically run for an abortion will disappear by itself. After all, in most countries of the world - in almost all Latin American states, countries in Africa, the Islamic East, in some Catholic countries of Europe, abortion is prohibited and these countries somehow exist, many - quite well.

Are there any prospects?

The practice of material stimulation of the birth rate, to which Russia switched over during the reign of V.V. Putin, is of great importance for the development of the birth rate in the country. However, it is impossible to induce people to create families and give offspring by mere economic messages - especially in modern society with its temptations and informational pressure of the corresponding propaganda. A whole range of measures is needed - in the social, economic, cultural and educational spheres, health care, which creates the preconditions for a truly full-fledged upbringing of young Russians and for their very birth. This is the payment of decent childcare benefits, and the possibility of introducing a "maternal salary" for women with many children who have decided to devote themselves entirely to caring for a child, and assistance to child families in improving their living conditions (increasing the living space depending on the increase in the number of children in the family) , and the provision of additional means of transport, household appliances for large families. All these activities must be carried out at the federal level and under the strict control of the relevant authorities.

In any case, without going into specifics, it should be noted that the Russian state may find opportunities to organize such events in the direction of ensuring the country's demographic security. It will not be shameful to attract public organizations that have long, at their own peril and risk, at their own expense, have been working among the population of the country, promoting the values ​​of family and childbearing, preventing the spread of Western values ​​alien to Russian society. On the other hand, it is possible to use foreign experience, including the invitation of proven foreign experts for consultations in the direction of improving the demographic policy of the Russian state.

But the main focus of the state should be on information and propaganda policy. While consumer values ​​are advertised in the media, in cinematography, the model of behavior of a "socialite" - a prostitute who has no children, is depicted as a desirable model for a woman, Russian men are denigrated, shown as losers from whom one cannot have children, even a threefold increase in maternal capital, the introduction of additional benefits for childbirth will not correct the situation in the field of demographic security of the Russian state.

In the information sphere, the Russian state should take as a basis the policy of promoting a strong and large family, spreading the cult of fatherhood and motherhood, and increasing respect for children of men and women. Special TV shows, Internet sites, print publications that affirm family values ​​should be created. Moreover, the activities of these projects should be adequate and in demand in modern conditions, which will require additional involvement of specialists in the field of psychology, television and radio broadcasting, journalists, culture and art workers. Accordingly, educational institutions should also implement policies aimed at affirming family values ​​and correct models of sexual and marital behavior. Mechanisms can be developed to support young mothers in obtaining vocational or additional education on preferential terms. The Russian state must understand that without people there will be no state, without children there will be no future. It is people who are the main value of Russia, and the Russian authorities should take care of their dignified existence and reproduction.