State economic policy. Economic policy Economic policy of the Russian Federation presentation

Slide 5

Reference

5 of 65 Renald Khikarovich Simonyan (b. May 1, 1935) - Russian sociologist. Doctor of Sociological Sciences, Chief Researcher at the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Chief Researcher at the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Head of the Russian-Baltic Center of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Deputy Head of the Center for Northern European and Baltic Studies at MGIMO. Member of the editorial board of the journal Sociological Research. Expert of the Committee on Federation Affairs and Regional Policy of the Federation Council.

Slide 6

20th anniversary of current economic reforms in Russia

6 of 65 For more than a thousand years, Russia has experienced many different reforms. The current reforms began immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was led to humpback perestroika (?!). Twenty years in a time of rapid social change that characterizes the end of the 20th - beginning of the 21st century is a significant period. What did economic reforms give to post-Soviet Russia? Simonyan's article analyzes the economic, social, demographic, cultural, and moral-psychological consequences of the economic reforms launched by young Russian reformers in early 1992, led by EBN.

Slide 7

Start

7 of 65 On January 2, 1992, the administration of B.N. Yeltsin (often said: “The Government of E. Gaidar”) retail prices for consumer goods were released. From this date the countdown of Russian economic transformations begins. They are evaluated in different ways - from praise to blame. This means we need to look for new judgments and assessments. Otherwise it will lead to civil conflicts.

Slide 8

L.I.Abalkin

8 of 65 In December 2007, speaking at a meeting of the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences dedicated to the 15th anniversary of economic reforms, Academician L. Abalkin decided to interrupt the general critical tone of the speakers, but did it in an almost shocking manner. “It is impossible, dear colleagues, to see only the bad,” he said, “Russian reforms also have achievements. Look around - almost every Muscovite today has a mobile phone. Isn't this a positive result?

Slide 9

The cause of disputes is poor knowledge

9 of 65 This example plunged those present into deep bewilderment. Indeed, in 1991, before the start of reforms, Russians did not have cell phones (they could not have existed; they appeared in Russia several years later). Over the past 15 years, Russia has been enriched with many technical innovations, including cell phones. Which is not at all surprising, since Russia, like all other countries, benefits from the achievements of global scientific and technological progress. L. Abalkin’s sarcasm was aimed at those who seek to present everything positive in today’s Russia as the result of economic reforms. Indeed, in comparison with the Soviet past, today the country’s isolation from the outside world has been overcome, censorship has been destroyed, the ideology of egalitarianism has been rejected, private property has been restored, free currency exchange has been allowed, business initiative has been liberated, the administrative-command system has been eliminated with the inevitable emergence of natural market regulators in society, the first commercial banks, Soviet people got the opportunity to travel abroad. In this sense, life has become better for Russians. But all this happened even before Gaidar’s reforms (Thanks to or in spite of?)

Slide 10

How to evaluate the activities of Russian reformers?

10 out of 65 (“young reformers”)? On the one hand, we must admit haste and unpreparedness (See Bilzho’s cartoons in Izvestia), arrogance (attitude towards pensioners) and deceit (See Chubais in Posner!). But on the other hand, it is impossible to imagine the transition to a market economy without such mandatory, generic elements as price liberalization, commodity and stock exchanges, development of the securities market, etc. regardless of who was assigned to carry it out. In creating forms of market infrastructure, Russian reformers implemented the well-known economic axiomatics. But they are bad. They clumsily did something that could not have been done, which was dictated not by someone’s personal idea, but by a procedure given (by whom?). In all post-socialist countries, the planned distribution economy was dismantled; in each of these countries, its specific difficulties were overcome and market regulators were restored. Commodity shortages have disappeared in all countries

Slide 11

General patterns of reforms

11 of 65 In all post-socialist countries, the planned distribution economy was dismantled, in each of these countries its specific difficulties were overcome and market regulators were restored. The commodity shortage disappeared in all states of the “socialist camp” that abandoned the planned distribution economy. And in this sense, life in all these countries has also become better. But only in Russia are the mandatory attributes of a market economy presented in the form of “merits” of reformers. There is a general logic of events, and sometimes even just an ordinary standard, routine procedure for performing a specific task.

Slide 12

Politicians and "politicians"

12 of 65 But in the same way, there are politicians who try to take credit for normal submission to this logic. Yes, life has become different than it was in 1991. Today these are cell phones, laptops, liquid crystal monitors, digital cameras, Skype, Wi-Fi, broadband computers, electronic tablets, smartphones, and tomorrow some other new technical innovation that, if not the reformers themselves, then their admirers will (no matter directly or indirectly) will be presented as a consequence of the reforms of the 1990s or even as their own achievements. Alas, in everyday consciousness there is always a disarming quasi-logical figure - “after, therefore, therefore.” And cell phones appeared after Gaidar’s reforms, therefore, that’s why. It was this plot that was articulated by L.I. Abalkin.

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Real and illusory results of reforms

13 of 65 It was this plot that was articulated by L.I. Abalkin at the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Having heard about mobile phones, everyone sitting in the hall could not help but be surprised: what does Gaidar have to do with it? This is exactly the reaction the speaker was counting on. His example also seems particularly successful, since the presence of cell phones in the modern world is not at all an indicator of material well-being. Residents of Cairo or Nairobi are no less equipped with this technology than residents of Moscow or St. Petersburg. (Just as owning a used car is not an indicator of financial wealth)

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Privatization and its consequences

14 of 65 Privatization of 1992-1995 created new owners and new property relations in Russia. Namely, these relations in the system of social relations are basic. Property relations determine not only economic development, but the social structure of society, its civil legal system, management organization, and have a decisive influence on value orientations and attitudes, on the general moral and psychological atmosphere in the country.

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Privatization and corruption

15 of 65 “It was assumed that young democrats would restore order in Russia, develop an appropriate legal system and give the green light to a market economy,” writes P. Khlebnikov, the author of a documentary book on reforms in Russia. “Instead, they led a regime that turned out to be one of the most corrupt in the history of mankind.” Private owners really don’t steal from themselves. They steal from each other, from others. Including the state...

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Specifics of Russian privatization

16 of 65 The reasons for the emergence of an economically ineffective, corrupt state in place of the USSR excites the minds of our neighbors in Eastern Europe. Most social scientists agree that privatization is the main factor in the emergence of this. Here, for example, is how the director of the Institute of Sociology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, P. Tamás, explains it: “Unlike post-socialist countries, in Russia the new order arose not as a result of the breakdown of the state, but as a result of specific privatization. The system that had always surrounded and protected the state was completely disabled. They shouted “grab everything.” Why shouldn't a police officer take advantage of this? Why shouldn’t an officer at the military registration and enlistment office or an official giving permission to export oil take advantage of this?”28. “Specific” privatization is the main difference between the economic transformations in Russia and the post-socialist states of Europe.

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State capitalism + rent seeking

17 of 65 By the end of 1999, a new political economic mechanism had finally taken shape. The leaders of the right opposition themselves admit this. “Capitalism, with large elements of state capitalism, a huge concentration of property in very few hands, appeared precisely in the nineties and has successfully survived to this day,” writes one of its leaders, V. Ryzhkov, in Izvestia. – Friedman, Potanin, Abramovich, Deripaska, Vekselberg, Alekperov – these people still remain. In the same nineties, the subordinate role of parliament and courts in Russia also became apparent.” What we have in the socio-economic sphere today was created in the 1990s. Therefore, attempts to place responsibility for the results of reforms on the current leadership of Russia are methodologically naive and historically absurd. Now society is reaping the fruits sown and nurtured by the reformers of the 1990s. The model created during that period has significant stability. It consists of three elements, or rather three rents: natural rent (inexhaustible natural resources), administrative rent (corruption), social rent (ensuring social stability) That is, the model constructed by the reformers combined bureaucracy and wealth, therefore bureaucracy invariably and consistently increases its political and economic potential. This phenomenon was noticed by Herbert Marcuse, who emphasized that “the conflict between the productive potential of society and its destructive use inevitably leads to strengthening the power of the state apparatus over the population.” Pensions also have a rental nature, and pensioners behave like rent seekers..

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Is Russia lagging behind?

18 of 65 Private property, which emerged and became dominant in the national economy, and private initiative, liberated from the rigid totalitarian shackles in the post-socialist countries of Europe, served as a powerful impetus for the economic development of these countries. But to varying degrees. Why has Russia, in many areas, with the exception of natural resource potential, not retained its former leadership either in development or in politics?

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Nomenclature (see Voslensky)

19 of 65 “The core of the economic reforms carried out by Gaidar’s government,” writes academician T. Zaslavskaya, “was privatization, which allowed the new Russian nomenklatura to appropriate the main and most promising part of state property practically free of charge”2. She further writes that “the clans that took possession of state property lost interest in further reforms. The liberalization of the economy that had begun was put on hold, the development of small and medium-sized businesses froze at one point, and steps towards democratization of the political sphere stopped.”3 The practically free distribution of state property is a disastrous result of the reforms. This fact is so destructive and obvious that even the most consistent defenders of Gaidar’s reforms are forced to condemn it.

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Reform failures

20 of 65 “In my deep conviction, the monetary phase of privatization has largely failed,” Prof. E. Yasin. “We could get a lot more money for state property.” American economists P. Reddway and D. Glinsky in their book “The Tragedy of Russian Reforms” provide statistical data: “During the Second World War, gross domestic product in the USSR decreased by 24%, during the Great Depression in the USA, GDP decreased by 30.5% , in Russia from 1992 to 1998. GDP in Russia decreased by 47%, and industrial production decreased by 58%.”

Slide 21

Financial capital at the expense of industrial capital?

21 of 65 In Russia there is a well-known fable about Trishkin’s caftan. The reformers' emphasis on financial scams where quick money could be made led to the destruction of the real economy. “The fall in output in Russia is already qualified in economics textbooks,” state the director of the Institute for European and Russian Studies at Carleton University (Ottawa) P. Dutkevich and professor of the Russian Economic School V. Popov, “as the largest man-made economic crisis in the history of mankind, fabricated by the creators economic policy".

Slide 22

The gap is growing

22 of 65 On the eve of the 15th anniversary of the reformation, academician N. Petrakov wrote that “in the overwhelming majority of cases, the new owners have not proven the effectiveness of private property. Reforms in Russia not only did not bring it closer, but also moved it even further away from the average world standard - they dropped it from the 20s-30s to 70-80th places in terms of level and quality of life. They simply seized natural resources and instead of a state monopoly we got a private one. Labor productivity in all privatized industries fell by 2-3 times. Production volumes have not yet exceeded those of Soviet times. Neither modernization, nor the introduction of new technology, nor the use of advanced scientific achievements - as a rule, there is none of this.” The promised structural reorganization of industry did not happen. On the contrary, the technological gap has increased

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Not post-industrialization, but deindustrialization

23 of 65 The promised structural reorganization of industry did not happen. On the contrary, the technological gap has increased. “Was it possible to assume then, in the early 1990s,” writes R.S. Grinberg, “that after 15 years of reform, the country’s economy would not only not reach a qualitatively new level in terms of diversification of production and the share of goods with high added value , but, on the contrary, it will turn out to be even more primitive than in late Soviet times”8. Russian reforms have led to the fact that even third world countries have begun to bypass it. Russia has become a raw materials appendage not only of the West, but also of the East. The export of raw materials, and not the development and modernization of industrial production, is the economic result of the reforms. Russia found itself on an oil needle. The Dutch disease will drive us into the epicenter of a global crisis, which will destroy us.

Slide 24

Oil and gas trap

24 of 65 Experts from the energy company BP have calculated that the world's proven oil reserves will last for 53 years, and natural gas reserves for 56 years at the current level of fuel production and consumption. In terms of proven gas reserves at the end of 2012, Iran took first place with 33.6 trillion cubic meters, surpassing Russia, whose reserves are estimated at 32.9 trillion cubic meters of gas.

Slide 25

Vicious commodity model

25 of 65 Launched in the 1990s. the economic model determines the dynamics of the commodity structure of exports, in which the share of products with high added value is constantly decreasing. The share of mineral raw materials in total exports in 1995 was 44.1%, in 1999 – 44.4%9, in 2001 – 54.7%, in 2002 – 58.8%10, in 2007 63 .3%, and in 2008 – 67.8%. The share of machinery and equipment fell during this time from 10.4% in 1995 to 5.1% in 2007,11 to 4.7% in 201012 In the same year in China, which the Soviet Union in 1950- The 1960s helped create a modern industry, with the share of finished products in exports amounting to 92%.13 In 2008, exports from Russia reached a huge amount of $469 billion, having increased almost 5 times since 2000. Hydrocarbons, ore, concentrates, timber, seafood and other nature-intensive products accounted for more than 90% of all exports

Slide 26

Is raw material dependence objective for Russia?!

26 of 65 The dependence of today's Russia on raw materials is increasingly presented in our media as a supposedly fatal inevitability. Seems. That after the reforms of the 1990s one can already believe in this. But world practice indicates other options for states rich in natural resources. The work of J. Robinson, R. Torvik and T. Verdier shows that resource dependence does not arise in countries where there was no appropriation of national wealth by the oligarchy, but essentially by a historically random group of individuals. The most obvious examples of this are demonstrated by Norway with its oil, Australia with its gold, Chile with its copper, and especially Finland with its forest wealth (reproducible wealth!). Over the past twenty years, our northern neighbor Finland has turned into one of the most modern technology park states.

Slide 27

Deindustrialization instead of modernization

27 of 65 In 1992, starting economic reforms, Russia, like all post-socialist countries, had to solve the central problem - industrial modernization. Actually, this is why economic reforms were started. But no modernization took place. As a result of the reforms, production was curtailed, and the economy turned into a primitive sale of natural resources. Russia has moved not forward, but backward. Instead of modernization, the country experienced deindustrialization.

Slide 28

Techno-economic failure

28 of 65 Currently, in Russia, the share of innovative products accounts for less than 3.0% of the total volume of manufactured products, 12-15 times less than in developed countries. The volume of Russian high-tech is 90-120 times smaller than the American one, and its share in domestic GDP ranges from 0.6 to 1%.15 Russia’s share in global trade in technology and high-tech goods does not exceed 0.2%, and in all engineering products 0. 5%. In terms of exports of high-tech products, Russia in 2008 was 41 times behind the United States, 13 times behind China, and 15 times behind South Korea.

Slide 29

Decline of the most advanced industries and technologies

29 of 65 In the 1980s, Russia produced an average of 130-140 civil aircraft annually, and in the 2000s - no more than 5-716. If in 1991 our aircraft made up about 40% of the world civil aviation fleet, then at the beginning of 2009 it was less than 2%. And three quarters of them are old aircraft with increased specific fuel consumption.

Slide 30

There was no modernization. Will there be? (Primakov: there won’t be!)

30 of 65 No modernization has occurred even in the primary industries. For those who own the Russian economy, there is no need to create new technologies and new production facilities; it is easier to buy them abroad. In post-reform economic usage, the concept of “easy money”—income from the sale of natural resources—has become established. Why take the risk, for any additional worries for the new owners, when they already don’t know what to do with this “easy money”, whether to buy another villa on the French Riviera, or to order a new yacht, or to buy an English football club? . What is the investment risk? And anyway, why invest money in the Russian economy? As long as these people have power, Russia will have no prospects. They will finish off Russia in the same way as Brezhnev killed the animals in Zavidovo, the PMC killed honey bears and bear cubs while hunting, the GDP catches huge pikes, and his advisers hunt in Russian nature reserves.

Slide 31

Irresponsibility and mismanagement

31 of 65 In order to obtain high-octane gasoline from oil, which can be exported abroad and have much greater profits than by selling crude oil, certain efforts are necessary - to create appropriate production facilities, train personnel, form cooperative supply ties, organize labor, implement control, in a word, to manage, i.e. to have, as they say now, “an extra headache.” It’s the same with unprocessed wood - they sell sawlogs, round timber, and just a plot, i.e. forest on hectares (!). Thus, even the most minimal added value is excluded from the production process, and raw materials are sold in their purest, most pristine form.

Slide 32

Offshore theft

32 of 65 Russian foreign trade is largely carried out through offshore companies, where export prices are usually understated and import prices are overstated. Of course, the difference falls on Russian taxpayers, whom the authorities are brazenly fleecing. For this purpose, Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 213 of November 25, 1991 “On the liberalization of foreign economic activity” was very convenient, which actually legalized this practice of foreign trade, since it allowed it to be carried out without special registration (!). This decree, which opened the way to chaos and lawlessness in our foreign trade, legally formalized for everyone the export of looted valuables from the country, did not cause, with the exception of two or three specialized publications, any response in the Russian media.

Slide 33

Not environmentally friendly and ineffective

33 of 65 These “not” are closely related to the unworthy power and anti-national behavior of the “nomadic elite”. There is no industrial production, because the easiest way for those in power is to buy everything they need by selling energy resources and raw materials, the extraction of which makes the economy unenvironmentally friendly and inefficient. More than 90% of aluminum, copper, tin, and 2/3 of zinc are exported from Russia. After economic reforms, Russia stopped feeding itself, clothing itself and putting on shoes. Half of the food sold through the retail chain, 80% of manufactured goods, and 75% of medical supplies come from abroad. National security is lost.

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New nomadic elite

34 of 65 In 1980, Jacques Attali, a French economist who was an adviser to President François Mitterrand at the time, used the term "nomads" to predict a time when the rich and elite would travel the world in search of fun and opportunity, and the poor , but in the same way workers who are not tied to their place of residence will migrate in search of a place to live. In 1990, Tsugio Makimoto and David Manners co-authored the first book with “digital nomads” in the title, adding the bewildering capabilities of the latest gadgets to their vision. But in all these descriptions of the new nomadism as a phenomenon, one very important detail was missed. The mobile lifestyle is now emerging all over the world and it is nothing like what was described in those old books. But the authors cannot be blamed for this, since basic technologies and a genuine and everyday nomadic way of life did not yet exist. But the threat of the Elite being separated from the Nation cannot be underestimated!

Slide 35

Construction

35 of 65 Construction is one of the most profitable types of business in modern Russia. But in the RSFSR in 1989 housing was built with a total area of ​​74 million square meters. m., and in 2010 in Russia - only 58 million square meters. m. But there is an even more impressive result: by the beginning of 2009, i.e. Over the 17 years since the beginning of reforms, 184 km of new roads have been built in Russia. In China, over the same period, over 190,000 km were built, of which 56,000 were modern highways. Unlike China, Russia, unfortunately, does not yet have anything like this. Even the road connecting both capitals – Moscow and St. Petersburg – bears very little resemblance to a modern transport highway.

Slide 36

Rogue's repentance

36 of 65 Even former high-ranking officials are forced to admit that the reforms of the 1990s led the country to a difficult situation. So, A.Ya. Livshits, who held the position in 1996/1997. the post of Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation in 2005 stated that “the Gaidar market and the privatization of Chubais did not create any productive capitalism, but only gave birth to an economic model like the Philippines during the time of Marcos or Indonesia during the time of Sukarno. In fact, Boris Yeltsin distributed state property to his immediate circle for personal use.

Slide 37

Still socialism?

37 of 65 We don’t even realize that we live in a socialist country. The oligarchs earn money from socialist factories - they have not yet built anything themselves. They transport their goods along socialist rails, and transmit current along socialist transmission lines. Are they repairing? Yes, but they don't build it. All this was inherited from that country that has been gone for fifteen years. But we don’t see any commissioning of capacity”19. A similar admission was made by an even higher-ranking Russian official, Deputy Head of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation V. Surkov: “Let’s not forget that we live on the inheritance we inherited from the Soviet Union, that we have so far done little on our own.” Now Surkov performs the functions of Golikova

Slide 38

Why do satellites fall and the Bulava does not fly?

38 of 65 A.S. Novikov on secret secrets in imported electronics: “Only a well-developed domestic electronic industry can serve as a guarantee (of Russia’s security). But here it has been destroyed for a long time.” About the failures of bonon tests, experts unofficially say that imported electronics failed. “The Medvedevs, Manturovs and Pogosyans still rely on imported electronics. What is this: stupidity or betrayal?! (AN, September 19-25, 2013. P.25). Most likely, both!

Slide 39

What awaits science and education?

39 of 65 Expert: We are at the lowest point in the financing of science and at the highest point - the destruction of the Russian Academy of Sciences. If the State Duma passes the bill on reform of the Russian Academy of Sciences, this will be a terrible blow not only for Russian science, but also for the world, since Russian scientists, despite numerous difficulties, do a lot for science in general. This is how Sergei Smirnov, senior researcher at the Main Astronomical Observatory (GAO RAS), commented to Rosbalt on the situation with the reform of the Academy of Sciences. He said: “The situation in the RAS cannot but worry. It is a pity that in the preparation of all these documents on the RAS there was no scientific, intelligent, or intellectual approach. It was prepared behind the scenes, and by the most unpopular ministers. We really hope that decisions will prevail reasonable. I would like to return to creating large telescopes and receive decent funding for research. But, alas, now many graduate students do not return to Russia from foreign trips, and even their scientific supervisors hint that there is no future for them here yet.” According to the scientist, now astronomy is in dire need of modern scientific equipment. Lack of attention to science has already led to chronic failures of the most sought-after spacecraft and projects. Let us remind you that the bill on the reform of the Russian Academy of Sciences was approved by the State Duma of Russia in the second reading on July 5. The document, in particular, proposes to enlarge the RAS by merging with other academies. Scientists believe that such reforms will cause serious damage to Russian science. Earlier today, the draft law was returned to the second reading. More details: http://www.rosbalt.ru/piter/2013/09/17/1176729.html S. Navalny called United Russia a party of zhiliki and thieves.

Slide 40

Secrets of Russian growth

40 of 65 For almost ten years, Russia has lived under conditions of unusually favorable global price conditions. In the rate of GDP growth in 1999-2008, it is difficult to see the merit of the reformers - two-thirds is a consequence of world prices for raw materials and energy resources, and one-third is the result of the adaptation of Russian entrepreneurs, primarily small businesses, to new conditions, or rather , to living conditions in an aggressive environment. In addition to the hand-to-mouth and therefore “unsinkable” small business, this is the rapidly growing quality of financial adventurous and speculative management of Russian companies, and the increased aggressiveness of domestic business in competition with imports for effective demand, and other natural processes of self-regulation of any social system. In Russia, a modern combination of all 4 (according to Max Weber) types of business (RP, AC, shadow and criminal) is being formed.

Slide 41

Not thanks to, but in spite of! How long?

41 of 65 Adaptation to changes in the environment (including the political environment, power and management) is a natural quality of people. As for the Russian people, they have unprecedented historical experience in adapting to any, even the most unfavorable conditions for survival. Suffice it to recall the millions of those from whom, during the process of collectivization, their farms were taken away, and the owners themselves were expelled, and who again built and produced in a new place. And often they were taken away again in a new place, but they built and produced again and again. In the USSR there were not only “twice”, but also “thrice dispossessed.” Our country's history in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s is replete with similar examples of “living in spite.” This is the genotype of a significant part of the Russian ethnic group. The state machine infringes on him, suppresses him, destroys him, but he stubbornly survives and produces, and - what a paradox! – only thanks to his work this machine is gaining momentum.

Slide 42

Is there hope?

42 of 65 The indestructible natural energy characteristic of our people (Russian. Russian) is described in classical literature. For example, in L. Tolstoy’s novel “Resurrection” there is a famous description of spring in the city: “No matter how hard people tried... to disfigure that land, they huddled on it, no matter how they stoned the ground so that nothing would grow on it, no matter how they cleared away any erupting grass, no matter how they smoked coal and oil, no matter how they trimmed the trees and drove out all the animals and birds - spring was spring even in the city.” But will it continue to be like this? Or is the global crisis just the beginning of a global catastrophe?!

Slide 43

Search, search, search...

43 of 65 By the end of the 1990s, the population found its new forms of survival in a system that was uniquely tuned to the formation and support of a large owner and in every possible way suppressing small and medium-sized entrepreneurs. Internal mechanisms for regulating the new socio-economic system have emerged and gained momentum. Just as in the USSR, grassroots spontaneous self-organization, and, consequently, natural production and distribution, constantly took place, just like today, a significant part of the gross domestic product (GDP) is made up of the results of that same internal self-regulation. Thus, the poor and middle class, small and medium-sized businesses experience the monstrous pressure of the bureaucracy, but, nevertheless, taxes from them flow into the budget in an incomparably greater volume than from the Russian oligarchs. Now the oligarchs are no longer a pillar of power, but a dead weight. And the authorities can now show the notorious “political will” if they are not on the hook.

Slide 44

Increased external dependence

44 of 65 Until now, the external factor of economic growth has also had no connection with the effectiveness of reforms. It was due to the existing (or artificially created?!) unusually favorable price situation for Russia on the world market (on July 5, 2008, the price of one barrel of oil reached $144). The placement of Russian assets abroad politically means that the elite and the authorities will become more dependent on the countries that accepted these assets than on the Russian people. Hence the deceitfulness of the authorities.

Slide 45

Reforms did not increase Russia's development potential

45 of 65 In January 2008, Rosstat reported that Russia's GDP had reached the pre-reform level. This practically coincided with the peak of world oil prices. In the 1990s in Russia there was neither the Great Patriotic War, nor the Civil War, nor the First World War. However, it took the country more than 15 years (longer than after the wars) to return to the pre-reform level in terms of GDP. For many other equally important indicators of socio-economic development, and, above all, for real incomes of the population and consumption, this level was far from being achieved even 15 years later.

Slide 46

Time and money work against Russia

46 of 65 How was the pre-reform level of GDP achieved? Since 1999, world energy prices began to rise sharply. The favorable situation for Russia lasted for almost ten years, until the start of the financial crisis in the fall of 2008. And it took 15 years. It should be emphasized here that the speed of social life in the 1990s compared with the 1940s, and even more so with the 1920s, differed qualitatively. Time is inexorably compressing, the world is developing at an ever more rapid pace. The slow passage of time in past times must be compared with the frantic speed of modern life. This makes the contrast even more striking. So both time and money work against us. against Russia.

Slide 47

Increase in man-made disasters

47 of 65 Profits from natural resource rent are “stuffed into pockets,” but there is no money to update fixed production assets, and hence the rapid increase in man-made disasters. Calling post-reform Russia a society of increased and general risks, Prof. O.N. Yanitsky emphasizes that “the line is approaching, beyond which the production of risks begins to exceed the production of products, management turns into putting out fires, into activities to eliminate accidents and disasters.” The recent accident at the world's largest Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station - the largest man-made disaster in Russia over the past 25 years - confirms this grim forecast.

Slide 48

Agriculture

48 of 65 Reforms in the 1990s led to a sharp decline in agriculture. Reduction of acreage, slaughter of cattle - if during the period of collectivization Russia lost 16.1 million heads, then from the reforms of 1992-1996. – 19.8 million heads, i.e. during the reformation period the livestock was halved22 - this led to the fact that the food needs of the Russian population are now met mainly through imports. Analyzing the current crisis in agriculture, the director of the research institute of the All-Russian Academy of Agricultural Sciences, Prof. V. Desyatov, gives the following figures: “The United States invests $327 in the development of 1 hectare of arable land, other developed countries invest $400-500, and Russia only $9-10.” . With this attitude, agriculture cannot develop. Therefore, 40 million hectares of arable land in present-day Russia are overgrown with weeds and bushes, while in the West every meter is protected.”

Slide 49

Hopelessness?

49 of 65 If even loud declarations regarding the need to create high-tech industries, which intensified at the beginning of 2009 due to a sharp drop in oil prices, lead not only to an increase in various programs and projects on this topic, but also to some targeted implementations, then this will not affect the general trend. According to B. Kagarlitsky, even if rapid development suddenly begins in certain industries, several modern enterprises are built, this in itself will not be able to compensate for the accumulated general backwardness. The economic model created in the 1990s is aimed at extracting and distributing resource rent, rather than at developing the national economy and technological progress. Occurred in the 1990s. In the country, deindustrialization has too much inertia, and the degradation of mechanical engineering dooms all efforts to create a course for technological innovation useless. It must be emphasized that every year the possibilities for diversification of Russian industry are reduced, because in

Slide 50

Growth without development and development without growth

50 of 65 The flow of “oil dollars” has not brought Russia success in modernizing the country, because the economic model created by the reformers blocks technical progress. In Russia in 1999-2008. there was GDP growth, but no economic development. Now, apparently, there is a need to achieve development without growth

Slide 51

The need to change the model and change in the world

51 of 65 The economic model created in the 1990s is aimed at extracting and distributing resource rent, rather than at developing the national economy and technical progress. Occurred in the 1990s. In the country, deindustrialization has too much inertia, and the degradation of mechanical engineering dooms all efforts to create a course for technological innovation useless. It must be emphasized that every year the opportunities for diversification of Russian industry are reduced, because in a globalized world the division of labor and the level of specialization of individual countries and regions is rapidly increasing. Having taken upon itself the function of providing raw materials and energy services to countries that have carried out technological modernization, Russia after the 1990s is quickly losing its prospects of taking a place among them. Over the 20 post-reform years, competition has increased, and the spheres of world production have practically already been divided.

Slide 52

Political corruption

52 of 65 Unprecedented manipulation of mass consciousness and rigging of voting results carried out by the ruling nomenklatura in the 1996 presidential elections radically changed the vector of the country's political development. Russia was not given the opportunity to correct the excesses of the monetarists, as happened in all post-socialist countries of Eastern Europe, when parties on the left of the political spectrum replaced the first extreme liberal ones. Parliamentary elections in Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and other post-socialist countries held in 1994/1995, i.e. after the first results of economic reforms this was convincingly shown. It was thanks to the votes of those who “were not ready for fundamental social changes” that the parties of the left political spectrum (former communist, as well as socialist, social democratic) won, which allowed these states to balance the economy, ease social tension, and take into account the interests of those who failed to adapt to the free market segments of the population. The rise to power of leftist and center-left politicians in many post-socialist countries in the mid-1990s. freed economic reforms from excessive liberalization and monetarist excesses, which turned out to be very useful for the economy itself, and for the civil world, and the general political atmosphere in these countries. The attempt to create a popular front in Russia has not yet been successful. GDP skillfully used this idea as an instrument of its own influence, and not of national consolidation.

Slide 53

Manipulation of the Century

53 of 65 To gain approval for their reforms from the West, the reformers sought to present the Russian people as a kind of regressive force, as if 18 only yearning for the restoration of communist power. They somehow immediately forgot about the recent multimillion-dollar rallies of Soviet people, as a result of which the fall of that very government occurred. A. Chubais, the main organizer of the 1996 presidential elections, then explained the need for dirty election technologies by the fact that the Russian people cannot be trusted with elections, since they will definitely choose communists. Therefore, V. Putin should not be accused of “destroying democracy” by canceling fair, free elections. The destruction of elections as the most important, in fact, the main instrument of democracy in Russia occurred in 1996, i.e. four years before the arrival of V. Putin. GDP intercepted this manipulation and thereby saved it (and the reforms) and continued them

Slide 54

Social results of reforms

54 of 65 Russian reformers chose exactly that version of reforms, which obviously ensured the new nomenclature the possession of all state property, and doomed the majority of the population to poverty and misery. Today, even according to official data in Russia, over 26 million people (every fifth or sixth) are below the poverty level.31 In the summer of 2006, employees of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences under the leadership of the director of the institute, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences M.K. Gorshkov, together with the Gorbachev Foundation ", based on an all-Russian representative sample, a multifaceted study of social inequality was conducted. Its results showed that more than a third of the Russian population lives below the threshold or on the verge of poverty, and 7% are in a state of extreme poverty, deep poverty. Another 14% of the poor are actually also firmly “stuck” in this state. In addition, 17% of the population is at constant risk of poverty, although so far they have managed to stay afloat, balancing on the brink of poverty and low income, and the number of this “risk group” is increasing.

Slide 55

Social results of reforms-2

55 of 65 This negative trend is recorded by sociologists against the backdrop of a decrease in the number of poor people in all regions of the world over the past 10 years.33 During the years of reforms, emphasizes prof. A. Vdovin, real wages in Russia decreased by almost 2.5 times, average per capita income - by 2 times.

Slide 56

Social results of reforms -3

56 of 65 Director of the All-Russian Center for Living Standards Vyacheslav Bobkov, noting that the official cost of living, taken into account by statistics when determining the number of poor, is clearly underestimated, provides no less discouraging data: in 2006, a third of the Russian population were poor, another third were low- and medium-income. And only about 10% are wealthy and wealthy. A year later, in an interview with Rossiyskaya Gazeta, he estimates the number of poor people in Russia at 50 million people, i.e. 42% of the population. Another impressive figure comes from the Russian Citi-Bank: there are approximately 1.2 million people in the country who are actively looking for ways to preserve their savings. And at the same time, 72.6% (!) of the population, according to Rosstat, have no savings at all.

Slide 57

Social results of reforms - 4

57 of 65 In 1990, Russian railway transport transported 3098 million people, and in 2002 only 1241 million people, Russian civil aviation in 1990 - 97 million people, in 2002 - 25 million people; maritime transport in 1990 – 16 million people, in 2002 – 0.6 million people.39 The growth of railway and aviation tariffs significantly outpaces the growth of wages. Russians stop traveling around the territory of their state and visiting relatives and friends. This is not only a severance of the most important social ties, this is a real danger of disintegration of the country. In the conditions of the largest territory in the world, it is in principle impossible for the state to maintain its unity without communication exchange.

Slide 58

Social results of reforms - 5

58 of 65 Beggarly wages exist in such mass professions as healthcare and education, not to mention science and culture. The country's leaders often talk about the extremely difficult financial situation of 37 million Russian pensioners (the average pension today is about 180 euros). Retail prices for basic necessities are continuously rising, food price increases are far outpacing wage increases, and so the number of poor people is increasing. “For all 18 years, the balance of monetary income and expenditure of the population,” notes the head of the Center for Financial Research at the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, prof. V. Senchagov, - comes down to increased consumer prices and increased imports in the absence of production and a market for domestic goods"

Slide 59

Social results of reforms - 6

59 out of 65 There are significantly more poor people in today's Russia than official statistics claim. The main criterion for determining the level of poverty is the subsistence minimum, established on the basis of the minimum consumer basket. “Neither the structure, nor, to an even greater extent, the very value of the subsistence minimum corresponds to the cost of the set of funds necessary for the implementation of the reproductive and social functions of income,” emphasize leading researchers at the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences E.E. Shestakova and T.V. Sokolova, – Volume consumption of meat, fish, vegetables and fruits lags not only from the norms adopted in developed countries, but also from the norms of the former USSR.

Slide 60

Social results of reforms - 7

60 of 65 Experts note that the subsistence minimum is actually taken out of the context of real distribution relations in society and does not regulate the level of correspondence between actual income and payments in practice. Official sets of norms for food and non-food products included in the subsistence level reflect the wishes of experts, and not the real characteristics of the population’s consumption”41. According to the Levada Center, in Russia the population estimates the cost of living to be 2 times higher than its official level, while 21.3% of the population can barely make ends meet and their income is not enough even for food, another 40.5% are teetering on the verge of absolute poverty. poverty, they have enough money for food, but not enough for clothing.

Slide 61

Social results of reforms - 8

61 of 65 The country continues to experience the sharp polarization of personal income that emerged in the 1990s. The distribution of income is also aimed at strengthening it: both those who receive a million dollars a month and those who receive 200 dollars a month pay the same tax - 13%. The 10% increase in real incomes of Russians, noted by official statistics since 2000, mainly concerns non-poor social strata. Thus, from April 2002 to April 2003, in the group of rich citizens, the increase in the average monthly increase amounted to 3,300 rubles, and in the group of poor people - only 116 rubles43. This trend is confirmed by more recent studies. According to calculations carried out at the Institute of Socio-Economic Problems of Population of the Russian Academy of Sciences, in 2007, for every 100 rubles of GDP growth per capita, the income of the poor increases by 5 rubles, and for the rich by 200 rubles.44 That is. the economic model created in the early 1990s reinforces social stratification. To this we can add that in 1999 there were 7 official billionaires in Russia, in 2008 there were 102, and in September 203 and 131

Slide 62

Social results of reform-9

62 of 65 Russian nouveau riche have taken leading positions in the world in purchasing real estate in European capitals and the richest resorts, and in prestigious acquisitions at international auctions. Thus, the share of Russians among buyers of luxury housing on the French Riviera is 12%.45 VTsIOM surveys indicate that the majority of Russians are either ashamed that Russia ranks second in the world in terms of the number of dollar billionaires, or are confused by this phenomenon (only 7 are proud %)

Slide 63

Social results of reforms - 10

63 out of 65 Corresponding Member RAS Prof. N.M. Rimashevskaya believes that “as a result of “shock therapy”, the problem of poverty as an independent one disappears, being replaced by the problem of economic devastation, a drop in the level of economic development and, as a result, the standard of living of the population as a whole. The country as a whole is becoming poor.” Other leading economists come to the same conclusion regarding the assessment of the social results of reforms. “A unique category of “new poor” has emerged in the Russian Federation,” says academician S.Yu. Glazyev, “those groups of the working population who, in terms of their educational level and qualifications, social status and demographic characteristics, have never been low-income before.” The reformers indoctrinated people. that it is a shame to be poor in a rich country. The nouveau riche are not at all ashamed. That they are destroying the country and compatriots

Slide 64

What is wrong with the nation?

64 of 65 “Implemented in 1992-1994. the so-called “shock therapy” hit the health of the population with the greatest force, sharply increasing its mortality rate, states the famous Russian demographer prof. L. Rybakovsky. – The number of deaths in the country in 1994 exceeded the level of 1991 by 760 thousand people. The essence of the reforms of the Yeltsin-Gaidar era is most clearly characterized by the dynamics of suicides. The number of suicides in 1994 compared to 1991 increased by 59.7%, including 66.4% among men, and even 73.6% among rural men”61. The famous cardiologist Academician E. Chazov writes: “In the “wild 1990s” I repeatedly warned the authorities about the impending surge in mortality “from the heart” after shock therapy. Including due to the depletion of the vital forces of the people. They didn’t listen! We haven’t lost such a huge number of people since the war.” Drug addiction, child crime, general demoralization of the population, and uncertainty about the future are on the rise. Distrust of the authorities and each other.

Slide 65

There are all the signs of a disaster

65 of 65 The death of Atlantis was followed by a deep decline in the economy and civilization as a whole. The catastrophe of the Roman Empire led to a decline in living standards and to the so-called Dark Ages, which spanned almost a thousand years. The global crisis could lead to an even more severe catastrophe, if not death. The reforms did not improve, but rather worsened, Russia’s position in the world and undermined its competitiveness for a long time. Now there is little that can be improved. Almost nothing depends on us except the global authority of GDP.

Slide 66

Thank you for your attention

66 of 65 Patience and success!

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Economic and social policy of the Government of the Russian Federation in the years. 1.Chairman of the Government: B.N. Yeltsin (– d) simultaneously with the post of President of the Russian Federation. 2. Gaidar E.T. (– g.) Main policy directions Beginning of radical Economic reform – “shock therapy” (January 1992) 1. A sharp decline in production. 2. Decline in living standards of a significant part of the population. 3. The emergence of unemployment. 4. Massive delays in payment of wages.

Economic and social policy of the Government of the Russian Federation in the years. 3. Chernomyrdin V.S. (g.) Main policy directions 1. Achieving commodity abundance. 2. Attracting foreign investment. 3. Stabilization of the ruble exchange rate. 3. The beginning of privatization. 1. Sharp social stratification. 2.Growth of the shadow economy. 3. The emergence of an oligarchic clan 4. The rise and collapse of financial pyramids. 5.Gangster methods of privatization. 6.Commercialization of science and culture. 7.Speculation in the GKO (state credit obligations) market in order to maintain a high ruble/dollar exchange rate. 8. Dependence on imports of consumer goods.

Economic and social policy of the Government of the Russian Federation in the years. 4.Kirienko S.V. (d.) Main policy directions An attempt to balance the state budget, an end to speculation in the GKO market. 1.Financial and banking crisis (default) on August 17, 1998. 2. Worsening of the energy crisis. An attempt to balance the state budget, an end to speculation in the GKO market. 1.Financial and banking crisis (default) on August 17, 1998. 2. Worsening of the energy crisis.

Economic and social policy of the Government of the Russian Federation in the years. 5. Primakov E.M. (g.) Main directions of policy 1. Maintaining the ruble exchange rate 2. Stabilization of the situation in society. 3.Repayment of debts on salaries and pensions. 4. Anti-corruption criminal cases. 1. The beginning of industrial growth in the country. 2.Growing tensions in relations with the West. 3. Failures in the negotiation process with the IMF.

Economic and social policy of the Government of the Russian Federation in the years. 6. Stepashin S.V. (g.) Main policy directions 1. Obtaining loans from Western countries. 2. Restructuring of debts of the former USSR. Aggravation of the situation in the North Caucasus.

Economic and social policy of the Government of the Russian Federation in the years. 7. Putin V.V. (d.) Main directions of policy Course towards stabilization of political and social relations. The beginning of the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya and Dagestan. (August 1999) 2nd Chechen war.

Economic and social policy of the Government of the Russian Federation in the years. 8. Kasyanov M.M. (d.) Main policy directions 1. Carrying out tax reform. 2. Introduction of 13% income tax and unified social tax. 3. Beginning of pension reform. 1. Reducing the volume of barter in the economy. 2. Decrease in unemployment rate. 3.Growth of real incomes. 4. The beginning of economic growth.

Economic and social policy of the Government of the Russian Federation in the years. 9. Fradkov M. (–) Main policy directions 1. Beginning of monetization of benefits. 2. Housing and communal services reform. 3. Doubling the level of GDP by 2010 through the development of high technology. 4.Army reform. 5.Creation of a stabilization fund. 1.Increase in social benefit payments. 2. Rising prices in housing and communal services structures. 3.Growth of Central Bank reserves. 4.Containing the growth of the ruble exchange rate. 5. The beginning of the creation of Science Cities. 6.Increasing spending on the army, science and culture. 7.Changing the procedure for electing local authorities in order to monitor the effectiveness of public administration. 8.Increasing salaries for public sector employees.

Economic and social policy of the Government of the Russian Federation in the years. 10. Zubkov V. (–) Main policy directions Stable rhythm of government work during the parliamentary (December 2, 2007) and presidential (March 2008) elections in Russia. October 2007 – Vladimir Putin headed the United Russia List in the Duma elections. On December 2, United Russia received 67%. December 2007 – Vladimir Putin announces First Deputy Prime Minister D.A. Medvedev as his political successor.

The main directions of the policy of Russian President V.V. Putin in the years. 1.Strengthening the vertical of power and achieving political stability in society. 2.Creation of seven federal districts with authorized representatives of the President. 3. Changing the principle of forming the upper house of the Federal Assembly - the Federation Council and turning it into a permanent legislative body. 4.Creation of the State Council of the Russian Federation as an advisory and advisory body of the heads of constituent entities of the Russian Federation under the President of the Russian Federation. 5.Change in the procedure for electing heads of constituent entities of the Russian Federation. 6. Course towards consolidation of the regions of the Russian Federation.

The main directions of the policy of Russian President V.V. Putin in the years. 1. Continuation of the course towards economic liberalization: weakening of bureaucratic guardianship and state control over business activities; taking measures to support small businesses; 2. More efficient use of budget funds in the field of social payments through monetization of benefits and targeted assistance. 3.Use of the stabilization fund to increase real incomes of public sector employees. 4.Control over the growth of tariffs in the housing and communal services sector and energy companies. 5. Guarantees of non-revision of the results of privatization in order to attract investment in production. 6.Creation of Science Cities to increase the share of exports of technology, rather than energy resources. 7. Strengthening the fight against terrorism. 8. January 2006 Adoption of 4 national projects: healthcare, education, housing, agriculture and measures to increase the birth rate in the country.

The main directions of the policy of Russian President V.V. Putin in the years. 1. Adoption of a new concept of Russian foreign policy based on a multipolar system of international relations. 2.Development of partnerships with all countries of the world. 3.Striving for Russia's entry into the WTO and the structure of the EEC. 4. Strengthening cooperation in the fight against international terrorism. 5. The struggle for an equal position for Russia in the European community in terms of partnership in the economy, human rights, and the position of Russian-speaking citizens in the countries of the former USSR. 6. Reform of emigration policy.

1. Stabilization of political relations and improvement of the psychological mood of citizens. Putin's popularity. 2. The collapse of financial pyramids in August 1998, which diverted funds to the speculative market from the real sector of the economy. The devaluation of the ruble means an increase in the attractiveness of Russian exports on the world market. 3. Strengthening domestic production. Revival in the military-industrial complex. Over the years of reforms, the emergence of a critical mass of enterprises operating effectively in market conditions. 4. Favorable conditions on the world oil and metals markets for domestic exporters. 5.Creation of a program to double GDP by 2010. 6.Reducing the inflation rate to 8% per year. Revival of activity in the credit and banking sector.