The general essence of the concept of industrialization was. The main goals of industrialization in the USSR. Reasons for industrialization, Stalin and his role in industrialization

After the civil war, the Russian economy, to use modern “Obama” language, “was torn to shreds.” Truly torn and ruined. And the NEP only somewhat stabilized the problem of providing the country's population with food and consumer goods, but it caused a sharp increase in class contradictions in the countryside due to the growth in the number of kulaks and aggravated the class struggle in the countryside to open kulak uprisings.

Therefore, the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) party set a course for development industrial production countries in order to gain the opportunity to independently solve the national economic problems facing Russia, destroyed by many years of war. Moreover, an accelerated solution. That is, the party set a course for the industrialization of the country.

Stalin said:

“We are 50-100 years behind advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do this or we will be crushed. This is what our obligations to the workers and peasants of the USSR dictate to us.”

Industrialization is the socio-economic policy of the Bolshevik Party in the USSR, from 1927 to the end of the 30s, the main goals of which were the following:

1. Elimination of the technical and economic backwardness of the country;

2. Achieving economic independence;

3. Creation of a powerful defense industry;
4. Priority development of a complex of basic industries: defense, fuel, energy, metallurgical, machine-building.

What paths of industrialization existed by that time and which ones were chosen by the Bolsheviks?

From Stalin's statements regarding industrialization:

1.“knows various ways industrialization.

England industrialized thanks to the fact that it plundered the colony for tens and hundreds of years, collected “additional” capital there, invested it in its industry and accelerated the pace of its industrialization. This is one way of industrialization.

Germany accelerated its industrialization as a result of the victorious war with France in the 70s of the last century, when it took five billion francs in indemnity from the French and poured it into its industry. This is the second way of industrialization.

Both of these methods are closed to us, because we are a country of Soviets, because colonial robberies and military seizures for the purpose of robbery are incompatible with the nature of Soviet power.

Russia, old Russia, handed over enslaving concessions and received enslaving loans, thus trying to gradually get out onto the path of industrialization. This is the third way. But this is the path of bondage or semi-bondage, the path of turning Russia into a semi-colony. This path is also closed to us, because we did not wage a three-year civil war, repelling any and all interventionists, so that later, after defeating the interventionists, we would voluntarily go into bondage to the imperialists.

There remains a fourth path of industrialization, the path of one’s own savings for the cause of industry, the path of socialist accumulation, which Comrade repeatedly pointed out. Lenin, as the only way to industrialize our country.

(“On the economic situation and policy of the party” vol. 8 p. 123.)

2. “What does it mean to industrialize our country? This means turning an agricultural country into an industrial country. This means placing and developing our industry on a new technical basis.

Nowhere else in the world has it happened that a huge backward agrarian country turned into an industrial country without robbing colonies, without robbing foreign countries, or without large loans and long-term loans from outside. Remember the history of industrial development in England, Germany, America, and you will understand that this is exactly the case. Even America, the most powerful of all capitalist countries, was forced to spend 30-40 years after the civil war in order to develop its industry through loans and long-term credits from outside and the plunder of neighboring states and islands.

Can we take this “tested” path? No, we cannot, because the nature of Soviet power does not tolerate colonial plunder, and there is no reason to count on large loans and long-term credits.

Old Russia, Tsarist Russia, moved towards industrialization in a different way - by concluding enslaving loans and issuing enslaving concessions to the main branches of our industry. You know that almost the entire Donbass, most of the St. Petersburg industry, Baku oil and a number of railways, not to mention the electrical industry, were in the hands of foreign capitalists. This was the path of industrialization at the expense of the peoples of the USSR and against the interests of the working class. It is clear that we cannot take this path: we did not fight the yoke of capitalism for this reason, we did not overthrow capitalism in order to then voluntarily go under the yoke of capitalism.

There is only one path left, the path of one’s own savings, the path of saving, the path of prudent management in order to accumulate the necessary funds for the industrialization of our country. There are no words, this task is difficult. But, despite the difficulties, we are already resolving it. Yes, comrades, four years after the civil war we are already solving this problem.

(“Speech at a meeting of workers of the Stalin railway workshops of the October road” vol. 9 p. 172.)

3. “There are a number of accumulation channels, of which at least the main ones should be noted.

Firstly. It is necessary that the surplus accumulation in the country is not dissipated, but collected in our credit institutions, cooperative and state, as well as through internal loans, for their use for the needs, first of all, of industry. It is clear that investors should receive a certain percentage for this. It cannot be said that in this area things are at all satisfactory for us. But the task of improving our credit network, the task of raising authority credit institutions In the eyes of the population, the task of organizing the business of internal loans undoubtedly faces us as the next task, and we must solve it at all costs.

Secondly. It is necessary to carefully close all those paths and cracks through which part of the country's surplus accumulation flows into the pockets of private capital to the detriment of socialist accumulation. To do this, it is necessary to pursue a pricing policy that would not create a gap between wholesale prices and retail prices. It is necessary to take all measures to reduce retail prices for industrial products and food Agriculture in order to stop or at least minimize the leakage of surplus savings into the pockets of private traders. This is one of the most important issues of our economic policy. From here comes one of the serious dangers both for the cause of our accumulation and for the chervonets.

Third. It is necessary that within the industry itself, in each of its branches, certain reserves should be set aside for the purpose of depreciation of enterprises, for the purpose of their expansion, for the purpose of their further development. This matter is necessary, absolutely necessary, it must be moved forward at all costs.

Fourthly. It is necessary that certain reserves accumulate in the hands of the state, necessary to insure the country against all kinds of accidents (shortfalls), to feed industry, to support agriculture, to develop culture, etc. It is now impossible to live and work without reserves. Even a peasant with his small farm cannot now manage without certain supplies. Moreover, the state of a great country cannot do without reserves.

(“On the economic situation and policy of the party” vol. 8 p. 126.)

Funds for industrialization:
Where did the Bolsheviks get funds for industrialization?

1. Funds were withdrawn from agriculture and light industry;

2. Funds came from the sale of raw materials (Oil, gold, timber, grain, etc.);

3. Some treasures of museums and churches were sold;

4. Taxed private sector up to complete confiscation of property.
5. By reducing the standard of living of the population, due to rising prices, the introduction of a card distribution system, individual government loans, etc.

6. Through the enthusiasm of workers who are building a new world for themselves without the exploitation of man by man.

7. Through powerful propaganda and agitation of new forms and new, collectivist methods of labor organization.

8. By organizing the advanced Stakhanov movement both in industrial production and in agriculture.

9. By introducing state awards for labor achievements.

10.By developing a free system social benefits and state guarantees for working people: free education and free medicine for all groups of the population, free nurseries, kindergartens, pioneer camps, sanatoriums, and so on and so forth.
And again Stalin’s words regarding the foundations of industrialization in the USSR:

“So, is it possible to industrialize our country on the basis of socialist accumulation?

Do we have sources of such accumulation sufficient to ensure industrialization?

Yes, it's possible. Yes, we have such sources.

I could refer to such a fact as the expropriation of landowners and capitalists in our country as a result of the October Revolution, the destruction private property to land, factories, factories, etc. and transferring them into public ownership. It hardly needs proof that this fact represents a fairly substantial source of accumulation.

I could further refer to such a fact as the cancellation of the tsarist debts, which removed billions of rubles of debt from the shoulders of our national economy. We should not forget that in leaving these debts we had to pay annually several hundred million in interest alone, to the detriment of industry, to the detriment of our entire national economy. Needless to say, this circumstance brought great relief to our accumulation.

I could point to our nationalized industry, which has recovered, which is developing and which provides some profits necessary for the further development of industry. This is also a source of accumulation.

I could point to our nationalized foreign trade, which provides some profit and therefore represents a certain source of accumulation.

One could refer to our more or less organized state internal trade, which also produces a certain profit and thus represents a certain source of accumulation.

One could point to such a lever of accumulation as our nationalized banking system, which gives a certain profit and feeds our industry to the best of our ability.

Finally, we have such as state power, which disposes state budget and which collects a small amount of money for the further development of the national economy in general, and our industry in particular.

These are basically the main sources of our internal accumulation.

They are interesting in the sense that they give us the opportunity to create those necessary reserves, without which the industrialization of our country is impossible.”

(“On the economic situation and policy of the party” vol. 8 p. 124.)

For, according to Stalin, the rapid pace of development of industry in general and the production of means of production in particular represents the main beginning and key of the country's industrial development, the main beginning and key of the transformation of our entire national economy on the basis of advanced socialist development.

At the same time, we cannot and should not curtail heavy industry for the sake of the comprehensive development of light industry. And light industry cannot be developed sufficiently without the accelerated development of heavy industry.

(“XV Congress of the CPSU(b)” vol. 10 p. 310.)

The result of industrialization was:

1. Creation of a powerful industry in the country;
From 1927 to 1937, over 7 thousand large industrial enterprises;
2. The USSR took 2nd place in the world in terms of industrial production after the USA.

3. The USSR created its own powerful defense industry, new to Russia.

4. In the USSR, on the basis of powerful industrial production, the industrial science, determining the technical level of technologies being developed and used in industrial production.

5. The USSR became the birthplace of technical astronautics, creating in the country a new, global industry of production, space, significantly ahead of the United States in this direction.

The results of the industrialization of the USSR turned out to be stunning not only for the inhabitants of the USSR, but also for the whole world. After all, former tsarist Russia was unusually short term became a powerful, industrially and scientifically developed country, a power of global importance.

As you can see, Stalin turned out to be right in making from a completely collapsed Russia, from Russia plows and bast shoes, an advanced industrial power with the shortest working day in the world, the best in the world free education, advanced science, free medicine, national culture and the most powerful social guarantee labor rights of the country

However, in today's Russia, everything is done differently from how Stalin did it in the USSR, and we have a Russia with barely glimmering industrial production, completely collapsed agriculture, dead science, a poor population barely making ends meet, but with countless billionaires of its own.

So who was right in choosing the path of development for Russia, the Bolsheviks or the current democrats? In my opinion, Bolsheviks! After all, not a single word of Stalin about the industrialization of Russia is still outdated.

Socio-political preparation for the “great turning point”.

In December 1925, the XIV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was held, at which the results of the previous development of the country were summed up. The congress noted that, despite the successes of the recovery period, the country's economy still remained backward. The USSR remained a multi-structured, agrarian country, industry provided only 32.4% of all production, and small, mostly individual, farming provided 67.6%. Light industry predominated, heavy industry was poorly developed. The industry lacked a number of the most important sectors producing means of production. The objective course of the country's development required the reconstruction of the entire national economy.

The congress proclaimed a course towards industrialization of the country. It went down in history as the “industrialization congress.” From the XIV Congress of the RCP (b) began to be called the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). It was decided to carry out industrialization in a short time.

The rapid pace of industrialization was dictated by the following reasons:

The need to take advantage of the peaceful respite, which could be interrupted at any moment;

The need to quickly provide a technical base for agriculture;

The need to strengthen the defense capability of the state in the shortest possible time.

The implementation of the industrialization of the country was led by the most important state body VSNKh, which in 1926, after the death of F. E. Dzerzhinsky, was headed by V. V. Kuibyshev. The role of planning bodies has sharply increased. The USSR State Planning Committee began developing a five-year plan for the development of the national economy. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Central Executive Committee of the USSR implemented a number of measures aimed at increasing the role of local Soviets, trade unions, and attracting young people, science and technology workers to the cause of industrialization.

In the confrontation between two concepts of industrialization - “Bukharin” (continuation of the NEP, balanced development of industry and agriculture) and “Stalin” (curtailing the NEP, strengthening the role of the state in economic development, tightening discipline, accelerated development of heavy industry, using the countryside as a supplier of funds and labor forces for the needs of industrialization) the “Stalinist” concept prevailed.

The main ideologist of NEP was Bukharin, so the fight against the “right deviation” was directed, first of all, against him and his views. True, the nature of the discussions was now different. They argued mainly behind closed doors, without introducing ordinary communists to the essence of the disagreements.

Taking advantage of his position as editor-in-chief of Pravda, Bukharin published a number of articles in which, under the guise of fighting against Trotskyism, he criticized the rejection of the NEP carried out by the Stalinist leadership. In the article “Notes of an Economist,” Bukharin gave an analysis of the current situation in the country. “Crazy people,” he wrote, “dream of gigantic, gluttonous construction projects that for years give nothing and take too much.” Bukharin pointed out the growing imbalance between various sectors of the economy, the danger of a continuous increase in capital costs, and objected to “the maximum annual transfer from peasant farming to industry, considering it a naive illusion that in this way it is possible to maintain a high rate of industrialization. In the article “Lenin’s Political Testament,” Bukharin again not directly, but indirectly criticized the “general line,” contrasting it with Lenin’s views set forth in his last works.

The defeat of the “rightists,” which also took place behind closed doors, took place at the April joint expanded plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission in 1929. In his speech, Bukharin tried to outline the consequences of the course taken by the Stalinist leadership. Under the Stalinist line, Bukharin said, lies the dominance of the bureaucracy and the regime of personal power. He called grandiose plans for the socialist reorganization of society not plans, but literary works. Industrialization, in his opinion, cannot be carried out through the ruin of the country and the collapse of agriculture. Emergency measures mean the end of NEP. Bukharin accused the Stalinist apparatus of military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry, and the industrialization carried out on its basis as “an airplane without an engine.” Bukharin was skeptical about the idea of ​​mass collectivization. It cannot be built on the poverty of the peasantry - “a thousand plows cannot make a tractor.” Bukharin called Stalin’s main theoretical thesis about the intensification of the class struggle as we move towards socialism “idiotic, illiterate police.”

Bukharin’s harsh speech at the plenum should be viewed rather as an act of despair, a premonition of imminent defeat in view of the violent advance of the Stalinist clique, which now completely “ruled the show” in the party leadership, and the morals that reigned in it. Arguments of reason no longer played any role. Rykov did not receive support, as the chairman of the government, who came up with a fairly reasoned and realistic two-year plan for restoring the disturbed national economy, improving finances, eliminating “bottlenecks” and mothballing construction projects that were not provided with resources.

Stalin's speech at the plenum testifies to the methods of discrediting opponents that were adopted in the party. He retrieved from the archive an old polemic between Lenin and Bukharin regarding state capitalism, recalled Lenin’s “Letter to the Congress,” from which he took the phrase where Lenin speaks of Bukharin as a Marxist who had never seriously studied, and hinted at Bukharin’s alleged participation in the conspiracy of the left Socialist Revolutionaries. When Bukharin spoke about the degeneration of the party, its transformation into a swamp of obedient bureaucrats, its contamination by politically illiterate officials who did not distinguish Bebel from Babel, Stalin interrupted him with the remark: “Who did you copy this from? Trotsky!”, hinting at the contacts of Bukharin, who was looking for allies, with the defeated opposition. As for the substance of the matter, he called the views of Bukharin and his supporters defeatist, a manifestation of panicky sentiments. The plenum condemned the “right deviation” by 300 votes to 13. Following the plenum, the XVI Party Conference was convened, which was held under the sign of condemnation of the right in all areas of current politics. The conference rejected any attempts to slow down the pace of industrialization. The decisions of the conference emphasized that the five-year plan is a process of a comprehensive socialist offensive and its implementation is hampered not so much by organizational and technical difficulties as by the aggravation of the class struggle and the resistance of capitalist elements. Overcoming these difficulties is possible only with a huge increase in the activity and organization of the working people, and the elimination of petty-bourgeois hesitations in deciding the pace and attack on the kulaks.

The “right deviation” was called “openly capitulatory”; a decisive and merciless struggle was declared against it.

The conference, as a way to boost agriculture, relied on the organization of “large socialist agriculture” - collective and state farms, and as the most important direction of the party’s work in the countryside, the organization of the poor peasants to fight together with the middle peasants against the kulaks. The conference decided to carry out a general purge of the party and state apparatus “under the control of the working masses” under the banner of the fight against bureaucracy, against distortions of the party line, and the deployment of criticism and self-criticism. Almost every speech by party leaders from the field at the conference ended with the refrain “give a five-year plan, give industrialization, give a tractor... and to hell with the right!” The mechanism for carrying out the “general line”, established in the party apparatus, operated clearly and almost flawlessly.

Further struggle against the “right deviation” turned into outright persecution of oppositionists. The “right deviation” was personified by the names of Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky. The press launched a wide campaign against them. Meetings and rallies were organized everywhere to “expose” and condemn their supporters. They were required to admit their mistakes and repent. Somewhat later, at the November plenum of 1929, belonging to the “right deviation” was recognized as incompatible with being a member of the party. In a short period of time, 149 thousand people (11%) were expelled from it, mainly on charges of “right-wing deviation.” Apparently, this figure is close to the real number of communists who support the continuation of the NEP. Most of them, one way or another, sooner or a little later were forced to publicly admit their mistakes and delusions. Otherwise, they found themselves in the position of outcasts, who could be subject to all sorts of punishments and repressions.

The defeat of the “right” occurred to the accompaniment of the landslide collapse of the NEP in all areas of economic and social policy. In connection with the transition to directive centralized planning, the entire system of management of the national economy is being restructured, in which, at first, one can easily see features inherited from “war communism.” On the basis of state syndicates, which actually monopolized supply and sales, production associations were created that were very reminiscent of the headquarters of the first post-revolutionary years and marked the beginning of the formation of a “departmental economy.” Production was built through direct centralized regulation from above of everything and everyone, right down to the wage standards for workers. Enterprises, in essence, received the corresponding funds of raw materials and supplies for free through the card-based system. Conversations arose again about direct planned product exchange between city and countryside, about the withering away of money, about the benefits card system supply and distribution. Many banks were liquidated joint stock companies, stock exchanges, credit partnerships. Unity of command was introduced in production; enterprise managers were made directly responsible for the implementation of the industrial and financial plan. Directors of the largest construction projects and enterprises were now appointed according to a special nomenklatura list.

It is obvious that neither Stalin, nor Bukharin, nor their supporters had yet a plan for the economic transformation of the country, or clear ideas about the pace and methods of industrialization. For Stalin and his supporters at that time, the struggle for power was in the foreground. He showed himself to be a supporter of fast pace and preferential development of heavy industry by pumping into it funds accumulated in agriculture, light industry, etc. But he approached this problem in a simplified manner, hence the unprincipled way in which he used the arguments of both the “left” and the “right” for political purposes.

The essence of the concept was formulated by J.V. Stalin and was as follows:

1. The rapid pace of industrialization is dictated by the external and internal conditions of our development. We are significantly behind the advanced capitalist countries in technical terms, so “we need... to catch up and overtake these countries... in technical terms.” economically. Either we achieve this, or we will be wiped out.”

2. “The rapid pace of development of industry in general, production of means, production in particular, represents the main beginning and key of the industrialization of the country... This means more capital investments into industry. And this leads to tension in all our plans.”

3. What is the reason for this tension? “Reconstruction of industry means the movement of funds from the area of ​​production of means of consumption to the area of ​​production of means of production. Without this, there is not and cannot be a serious reconstruction of industry, especially in our Soviet conditions. But what does it mean? This means that money is being invested in the construction of new enterprises, the number of cities and new consumers is growing, while new enterprises can produce a new mass of goods only after 3-4 years.”

4. The need for accelerated industrialization was also dictated by the backwardness of the agricultural sector. To eliminate it, it was necessary to provide the agricultural sector with tools and means of production, which implied “the rapid pace of development of our industry.” In the field of agriculture, it was proposed to pay special attention to collective and state farms.

The difficulties of industrialization consisted of technical and economic backwardness, the predominance in the country's economy of small-scale farming based on outdated equipment; the problem of accumulating funds became acute; there were few industrial personnel in the country; there was no experience in industrialization; difficulties were aggravated by the resistance of capitalist elements who tried to break out from under government regulation, exacerbation of the class struggle in the country; industrialization had to be carried out in conditions of foreign political isolation and the constant threat of attack by imperialist powers. It must be borne in mind that socialist industrialization differed from capitalist industrialization in socio-economic content, methods of implementation, pace of implementation and sources of savings. Special attention should be paid to two problems: the problem of rates and sources of savings.

The first five-year plan.

In 1927, Soviet economists began developing the first five-year plan, which was supposed to provide integrated development all regions and the use of all resources for the industrialization of the country.

At the July plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1928, Stalin presented a theoretical justification for his thesis. He declared the need for a “tribute”, a kind of “super tax” on the peasantry to maintain and increase the high rate of industrial development.

All further events are characterized by the strengthening of the role of directive planning, administrative and police pressure, and the deployment of grandiose mass campaigns aimed at accelerating the pace of socialist construction. Stalin and his nominees are active supporters of the “socialist offensive” and the curtailment of NEP. The attack had to proceed according to all the rules of military operations with the proclamation of fronts: “industrialization front”, “collectivization front”, “ideological front”, “cultural front”, “anti-religious front”, “literary front”, etc.

The deployment of the “industrialization front” resulted in the construction of new industrial facilities, the strengthening of the austerity regime, the voluntary-compulsory distribution of “industrialization loans,” and the establishment of rationing supplies to the population of cities and workers’ settlements. These events were accompanied by the displacement of the private sector from the economy. Throughout 1928 and 1929. Progressive tax rates were repeatedly changed, primarily on trades and excise taxes; a doubling of taxes led to the curtailment of NEPman entrepreneurship, the closure of private shops and shops and, as a result, to the flourishing of speculation on the “black market”. The village was blamed for the continuing deterioration of life, with the kulak as the main culprit of the difficulties. A hostile attitude towards the peasantry was intensified as an inert and inert mass, as a bearer of petty-bourgeois consciousness that impeded socialist transformations. The slogan was spreading more and more widely: “The law of industrialization is the end of the village, the poor, the tattered, the ignorant!” To help the grain procurement commissioners, party bodies sent workers from industrial enterprises to the villages, gradually preparing a mass march of workers to the villages.

A movement of 25 thousand people was unfolding in factories and factories. Its essence was to select the best representatives of the working class from among them and send them to the villages to organize collective and state farms. According to official data, about 700 thousand workers were registered who expressed a desire to go to the front of the “collective farm deployment.”

Extraordinary methods dominated the “grain procurement front.” Commissioners traveled around all the villages and villages, taking away “surplus grain” from the peasants. About 150 thousand envoys of the working class were sent from the city to help them, along the way setting out new policy parties.

No less important events took place on the “cultural front”. The general cultural level of the country's population during the 20s. rose slowly. True, impressive figures have been achieved in terms of literacy levels. By 1930, the number of literate people compared to 1913. almost doubled (from 33 to 63%).

The tasks of the cultural revolution that were put on the agenda included the fight against petty-bourgeois and bourgeois manifestations, the critical processing of the old bourgeois cultural heritage and the creation of a new socialist culture, i.e. primitive cultural cliches and stereotypes were introduced. Slogans were proclaimed for a decisive struggle against hostile ideologies, movements, morals, and traditions both in the field of science, literature, art, and in the field of work and everyday life. Collectivist principles were aggressively instilled, leading to the suppression of individuality and freedom of creativity. Anti-intellectualism and distrust of the “rotten intelligentsia” and “rotten liberalism” were intensified. Unbridled and noisy anti-religious propaganda, led by the “Society of Militant Atheists” and accompanied by the destruction of churches, historical monuments, and arrests of priests as accomplices of kulaks and enemies of socialism, intensified.

On the “literary front,” the struggle for socialism was led by the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (RAPP), created in 1928, and its leadership, united around the magazine “At the Literary Post” (“Napostovtsy”). Napostovites preached “the hegemony of the proletariat in literature.” In this regard, they divided the writing camp according to class principles (“proletarian writers”, “fellow travelers”, “bourgeois” and “neo-bourgeois” authors), periodically organizing reprimands and persecution of various literary groups and associations. Many writers came under the fire of criticism, including M. Gorky as a “not entirely pure” proletarian writer, M. Bulgakov as an exponent of counter-revolutionary neo-bourgeois consciousness, V. Mayakovsky for his anarcho-rebellious individualistic sentiments, etc. Similar phenomena occurred in art, theatrical life, cinematography. They nullified the diversity of cultural and artistic life in the 1920s.

At the beginning of 1929, a campaign began to launch mass socialist competition in factories, factories, transport, and construction. For several months, the entire press, led by Pravda, party, trade union, and Komsomol bodies vigorously promoted various labor initiatives, many of which were taken up by the workers. Such forms of competition as the movement of shock workers, the movement for the adoption of counter plans, “continuity”, the movement to “catch up and overtake” (DIP) capitalist countries in terms of production volumes and labor productivity, etc., became widespread. Socialist competition was proclaimed one of the main conditions for the fulfillment of tasks five-year plans.

In 1929 (April - XVI Party Conference, May - V Congress of Soviets) the First Five-Year Plan (1928/1929 - 1932/1933) was approved, which contained an integral comprehensive program for accelerating the development of the country, providing for an optimal combination of heavy and light industry, public and individual labor, the growth of the living standards of workers, their culture. The plan's indicators were communicated to the people's commissariats and enterprises and were mandatory. A mechanism for planned, centralized, directive management of the country's economy was created. However, the plan of the first five-year plan was not implemented either in the optimal or in the starting version.

In the summer of 1929, despite passed law about the five-year plan, a stir began around its target figures. Counter plans were unconditionally accepted, as if there was already material support for them. In response to the slogan “Five-Year Plan in Four Years!” Stalin called for it to be completed within three years. Tasks for heavy industry (metallurgy, mechanical engineering, etc.) were sharply increased.

On the eve of the 12th anniversary of the October Revolution, Stalin appeared in Pravda with an article “The Year of the Great Turning Point,” in which he spoke about laying the foundations for the construction of socialism, about solving the problem of internal savings, about new forms of increasing labor productivity, about the turn of the peasant masses to complete collectivization and etc. At the November Plenum of the Central Committee, they talked about the enormous successes allegedly achieved by the country in 1929. Based on them, it was decided to increase the planned targets again. There was even a competition over who would promise the most to fulfill the Five-Year Plan ahead of schedule. To bring unity to the “grandiose development of large state farms, collective farms and MTS,” it was considered necessary to create a single body - the union People's Commissariat of Agriculture, which was soon to become a kind of headquarters for mass collectivization.

A cascade of arbitrary, materially unsupported measures, carried out in the form of decrees, orders, orders, literally tormented the country.

Since 1929, the country has resembled a huge construction site. The state begins to build new enterprises: Stalingrad, Chelyabinsk, Kharkov tractor plants. Huge heavy engineering plants in Sverdlovsk and Kramatorsk. Automobile factories in Nizhny Novgorod and Moscow. Magnitogorsk was launched ahead of schedule in 1931. Stalin, intoxicated by successes in industry, in 1929 corrected the figures of the first five-year plan in the direction of increasing them. In January 1933, he declared the first five-year plan completed in 4 years and 3 months.

The results of the first five-year plan can be viewed in two ways. On the one hand, in the field of industry the country in 1928-1932. was experiencing a great upswing. If in 1928 the USSR produced 3.3 million tons. cast iron, then in 1932 - 6.2 million tons, for tractors the increase was from 1.8 thousand pieces. up to 50.8 thousand units, for cars - from 0.8 thousand units. up to 23.9 thousand units But in the field of agriculture there was a clear rollback from the results available at the end of the NEP.

Second five-year plan.

The Soviet leadership drew serious conclusions from the lessons of the first five-year plan and at the XVII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, when discussing the indicators of the second five-year plan (1933 - 1937), the course towards further accelerating the economic development of the country was subjected to significant adjustments. In industry, more realistic targets for annual production growth were approved, while in agriculture it was only envisaged to consolidate achieved level collectivization. There was a slight weakening of directive pressure on the economy, and its management bodies were reorganized.

All this led to the fact that although the second five-year plan in the field of industry, like the first, was not implemented in full, industry in these years developed more dynamically than in the first five-year plan. As a result of the heroic labor of the working class, a significant increase in labor productivity was achieved.

During the Second Five-Year Plan, 4,500 enterprises were built, i.e. three times more than in the first. The largest were the Uralokuznetsk plant, the Uralmash plant, the White Sea-Baltic Canal and the Moscow-Volga Canal, the Moscow Metro, etc. By the end of 1937, industrial output had more than doubled compared to the first five-year plan. A second coal and metallurgical base was created in the east of the country. During the Second Five-Year Plan, the USSR, from a country importing industrial products, became a major exporter of mechanical engineering products.

The Second Five-Year Plan (1933-1937) had more realistic targets, but even during this period the previous scenario repeated itself, and plan targets were repeatedly redrawn. Now there is more new technology, and its development and use has become of great importance. The slogan “Personnel decides everything!” was put forward, which closer to 1937 began to have a double meaning. The emphasis was placed on a labor upsurge, the enthusiasm of the workers, and their involvement in the Stakhanov movement. Its participants fought to set production records, with little regard for their time, effort, or the quality of the products produced.

Stakhanovites, leaders of production, enjoyed certain privileges: they were provided with the best equipment, special conditions labor, bonuses, orders, apartments. Their achievements were often of a propaganda nature in order to maintain the constant labor enthusiasm of the masses. On the other hand, competition made it possible for the new system to organize the masses, captivate them with a lofty idea, and force them to work hard for it. The Second Five-Year Plan, although more successful, was also not implemented.

Third Five Year Plan

Third five year plan development of the national economy of the USSR /1938-1942/ by main economic priorities was drawn up in line with the policies chosen by the Stalinist leadership in the early 30s. Its peculiarity was that it had to, using achievements in the field of industry, direct them to ensure the country's defense capability. Its implementation was complicated both by internal problems that manifested themselves in the second half of the 30s, and by changes international situation THE USSR.

In the Third Five-Year Plan (1938 - 1942), the Soviet people were given the task of catching up and overtaking economically, i.e. in terms of production per capita, the most developed capitalist countries. During the Third Five-Year Plan, as many funds were allocated for the development of industry and agriculture as were allocated during the years of the first two Five-Year Plans. The threat of an impending war determined the nature of industrial development in the Third Five-Year Plan. The defense industry developed at an accelerated pace. The plan provided for the further development of the metallurgical, coal and oil industries, in particular, the creation of a new oil base USSR - Second Baku. It was planned to create large state reserves for fuel and electricity, and to build backup factories in a number of branches of mechanical engineering, chemistry, etc. in the east of the country. capital construction 192 billion rubles were allocated - this is 15% more than was spent on these purposes in the years of the First and Second Five-Year Plans combined.

In three and a half years of the five-year plan, 2,900 were built and put into operation. large enterprises, many new complex types of products have been mastered. The world's first automatic line was launched at the Stalingrad Tractor Plant. The work of transport, especially railway, has improved. Significant progress was observed in agriculture.

The pace of industrial development in the Union republics was tens and hundreds of times higher than the average for the Union.

Sources of accumulation.

Financial resources for investment in the economy were extremely scarce. Hopes for receiving funds from concessions for foreign loans were not justified, and foreign trade operations did not provide official revenue. For this reason, the XIV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), having taken a course towards industrialization of the country at the end of 1925, identified internal sources of its implementation as the main ones. The problem of accumulation thus arose no longer as a subject of theoretical debate or political clashes, but as an inexorable practical need. The methods for solving it were different. For 1929-1932 The money supply in circulation increased 4 times. The government was unable to continue the policies of previous years aimed at maintaining stable prices or even lowering them. Beginning in 1931, a course was set for a significant increase in prices for everything. consumer goods. Hopes for receiving funds from the growing profits of state-owned industrial enterprises were only marginally justified. Therefore, direct and indirect taxes. Since 1931, the main source of budget revenue has been the turnover tax, calculated on the price of all goods in retail trade and, therefore, collected automatically.

Sources of funds for industrialization were loans placed among the population. Initially they were not compulsory, but over time they became mandatory. Another source was also the monopoly on the sale of vodka. Having repealed the “prohibition law” introduced by the tsar, Stalin proposed to Molotov to increase the production of vodka. And this was done because... vodka was the most profitable item in budget revenues.

It turned out to be even more difficult to find funds to pay for foreign purchases. The goods with which the USSR paid for its imports at that time were mainly bread, timber, oil, and furs. The food situation in the country remained extremely difficult. Thus, it was not the surplus that was exported abroad, but the grain that was withdrawn from domestic circulation.

For the needs of industrialization and payment of foreign bills, works of art from museums were sold; With the help of the OGPU, gold was confiscated from private individuals, bronze church bells were removed and melted down, as well as gold from the domes of churches.

However, one of the main sources of accumulation was agriculture, which was supposed to contribute to the growth of industrial production.

Results of industrialization.

For 1929-1937 the country made an unprecedented leap in the growth of industrial output (see Table 1). During this time, about 6 thousand large enterprises came into operation, that is, 600-700 annually. The growth rate of heavy industry was two to three times higher than during the 13 years of Russian development before the First World War.

As a result, the country gained potential, which sectoral structure and technical equipment was mainly at the level of advanced capitalist states. In terms of absolute volumes of industrial production, the USSR in 1937 came in second place after the USA (in 1913 - fifth place). The import of more than 100 types of industrial products from abroad, including non-ferrous metals, bloomings, rail rolling mills, excavators, turbines, steam locomotives, tractors, agricultural machinery, cars, and airplanes, was stopped. In general, by 1937 the share of imports in the country's consumption dropped to 1%.

Table 1. Production of the most important types of industrial products of the USSR in physical terms

During the implementation of the first three five-year plans (1928-32; 1933-37; 1937-42, implementation of the plan was interrupted in 1941), despite the failure of inflated planned indicators, at the cost of incredible strain of the entire population of the USSR, it achieved economic independence from the West. The growth of industrial production in the 30s. amounted to approximately 15% per year. In terms of gross output in a number of industries, the USSR overtook Germany, Great Britain, and France or came very close to them, but lagged behind these countries in production per capita. Results (according to official statistics): during the pre-war five-year plans (1928/29 - 1932/33, 1933 - 1937, 1938 -1941), the USSR came out on top in Europe and second in the world in terms of industrial output:

For the production of cars, tractors, trucks, ranked second in the world in oil production;

New industries have been created (aviation, automotive, bearings, heavy engineering, instrument and machine tool manufacturing, etc.);

Exploitation was eliminated, unemployment ended by 1931;

Significant programs have been implemented in the fields of education, science, and medicine;

A planned socialist economy was created;

Export dependence on the outside world has been eliminated;

Socialism basically won (the transition period ended).

Real data suggests that:

The tasks of none of the five-year plans were fulfilled;

The successes achieved were the fruit of incredible physical, moral and political costs;

– exploitation of enthusiasm, revolutionary activity of the masses;

The command-administrative system established itself and flourished.

New industries were created - machine tool, aviation, automobile, tractor, chemical, etc. About 9 thousand large industrial enterprises of all-Union importance were put into operation. In the 2nd half of the 30s. Stalin announced the transformation of the USSR from an agricultural country to an industrial one. High rates of industrial development were achieved both due to a low starting level and due to the total introduction of team methods of economic management.

The goals of forced industrialization were met by the massive use of cheap labor and the enthusiasm of the masses, inspired by the Bolshevik idea of ​​​​building a classless society. Various forms of the so-called were introduced into the practice of the national economy. socialist competition for fulfilling and exceeding production targets without increasing wages. The labor of prisoners in the camps of the Main Directorate of Camps (GULAG) was widely used; in 1934 the number of prisoners in the Gulag camps was 500 thousand people, in 1940 - more than 1.5 million.

Industrialization took place due to a decrease in the living standards of the urban population, a characteristic indicator of which was the existence in 1929-1933. card system for supplying the population.

The five-year plans had a strong stimulating effect on industrial development, on the optimal placement and interconnection of new productive forces being put into operation. The story of the creation of a dam and hydroelectric power station on the Dnieper, called Dneprostroy, is typical. The project was funded by the state. The project involved the creation of completely new industries, the construction of new plants and factories that would run on electricity provided by this hydroelectric power station. It was planned to supply the Donbass mines with electricity, as well as new metallurgical plants producing aluminum, high-quality steel and iron alloys - thus creating a new industrial complex for the production of means of production. Two new ones have appeared industrial cities- Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk. Dneprostroy turned out to be a model for many bold projects launched in accordance with the first five-year plan.

The most important of them is the creation in the East of the second main coal and metallurgical center of the USSR by using the richest coal and ore deposits of the Urals and Siberia. Instead of the initially designed 16 medium-sized metallurgical plants, at the 16th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (1930), it was decided to build several large plants: the capacity of the Magnitogorsk plant was increased from 656 thousand tons of annual cast iron production to 2.5 million tons, and then to 4 million . T; the capacity of the Kuznetsk plant should have exceeded the previously planned almost 4 times, etc. Created in the 30s. the second coal and metallurgical base played an outstanding role during the Great Patriotic War. It was here that factories and skilled labor moved from the German-occupied western and southern regions. Based on what was created in the 30s. industrial infrastructure, mass production of military equipment was established in the Urals and Siberia, compensating for the loss of traditional centers of military production.

There was a traditional path of industrialization, along which in the 20th century. Many countries received foreign loans. But this path is fraught with debt, dependence, and besides, the Soviet country should not have expected help from the capitalists. The main source of mobilizing savings for the needs of industrialization could only be the village (peasants made up 4/5 of the population). All these sources could ensure industrialization only if the country implemented a strict regime of “thrift, economy, and a merciless fight against all unnecessary unproductive expenses.”

Abstract on the history of Russia

1). Definition: industrialization is the process of creating large-scale machine production in all sectors of agriculture and primarily in industry.

2). Prerequisites for industrialization. In 1928, the country completed the recovery period and reached the level of 1913, but Western countries during this time went far ahead. As a result, the USSR began to lag behind. Technical and economic backwardness could become chronic and turn into historical.

3). The need for industrialization. Economic - large industry, and primarily group A (production of means of production), determines economic development countries in general, and agricultural development in particular. Social - without industrialization, economic development is impossible, and, consequently, social sphere: education, healthcare, recreation, social security. Military-political - without industrialization it is impossible to ensure the technical and economic independence of the country and its defense power.

4). Conditions for industrialization: the consequences of the devastation have not been fully eliminated, international economic ties, there is a shortage of experienced personnel, the need for machines is met through imports.

5). Goals, methods, sources and timing of industrialization. Goals: transforming Russia from an agrarian-industrial country into an industrial power, ensuring technical and economic independence, strengthening defense power and raising the well-being of the people, demonstrating the advantages of socialism. Sources: domestic loans, siphoning funds from the countryside, income from foreign trade, cheap labor, enthusiasm of workers, prison labor. Methods: the state initiative is supported by enthusiasm from below. Command-administrative methods dominate. Timing and pace: Short time frame for industrialization and rapid pace of its implementation. Industry growth was planned at 20% per year.

6). The beginning of industrialization. December 1925 - The 14th Party Congress emphasized the unconditional possibility of the victory of socialism in one country and set a course for industrialization. In 1925, the restoration period ended and the period of agricultural reconstruction began. 1926 - the beginning of the practical implementation of industrialization. About 1 billion rubles have been invested in industry. This is 2.5 times more than in 1925. In 1926-28 large-scale industry doubled, and gross industry reached 132% of the 1913 level.

7). Negative aspects of industrialization: commodity famine, food cards (1928-1935), decline wages, lack of highly qualified personnel, population migration and exacerbation housing problems, difficulties in setting up new production, massive accidents and breakdowns, as a result - the search for those responsible.

8). Pre-war five-year plans. During the years of the first five-year plan (1928/1929 - 1932/1933), adopted by the 5th Congress of Soviets in May 1929, the USSR transformed from an agrarian-industrial country into an industrial-agrarian one. 1,500 enterprises were built. Despite the fact that the first five-year plan was significantly underfulfilled in almost all respects, the industry made a huge leap. New industries were created - automobile, tractor, etc. Even greater success industrial development reached during the second five-year plan (1933 - 1937). At this time, the construction of new plants and factories continued, and the urban population increased sharply. At the same time, the share of manual labor was high, light industry was not properly developed, and little attention was paid to the construction of housing and roads.

Main directions economic activity: accelerated pace of development of group A, annual increase in industrial production - 20%. The main task is the creation of a second coal and metallurgical base in the east, the creation of new industries, the struggle to master new technology, the development of the energy base, and the training of qualified specialists.

The main new buildings of the first five-year plans: Dneproges; Stalingrad, Kharkov and Chelyabinsk tractor plants; Krivoy Rog, Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk metallurgical plants; automobile factories in Moscow and Nizhny Novgorod; canals Moscow-Volga, Belomoro-Baltic, etc.

Labor enthusiasm. The role and significance of moral factors were great. Since 1929, mass socialist competition has been developing. The movement is “five-year plan in 4 years”. Since 1935, the “Stakhanov movement” has become the main form of socialist competition.

9). Results and significance of industrialization.

Results: 9 thousand large industrial enterprises equipped with the most advanced technology were put into operation, new industries were created: tractor, automobile, aviation, tank, chemical, machine tool. Gross industrial output increased 6.5 times, including group A - 10 times. In terms of industrial output, the USSR came out on top in Europe and second in the world. Industrial engineering spread to remote areas and national outskirts, changed social structure And demographic situation in the country (40% of the urban population). The number of workers and engineering and technical intelligentsia increased sharply. Funds for industrial development were taken by robbing the peasantry driven into collective farms, forced loans, expanding the sale of vodka, and exporting bread, oil, and timber abroad. The exploitation of the working class, other segments of the population, and Gulag prisoners has reached an unprecedented level. At the cost of enormous effort, sacrifices, predatory waste natural resources The country entered the industrial path of development.

In 1925, the 14th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) set a course for the industrialization of the country, which generally met the historical objectives of the country.

Goals of industrialization. Industrialization as the process of creating large-scale machine production in industry, and then in other sectors of the national economy at a certain stage of history were a general pattern of social development.

Formed two concepts of industrialization:

- "Bukharinskaya"(continuation of the NEP, balanced development of industry and agriculture, priority development of heavy industry with simultaneous attention to the production of consumer goods, cooperation of peasant farms on a voluntary basis) and

- "Stalinist" ( which corresponded Trotsky's plan - “super-industrialization”)(curtailing the NEP, strengthening the role of the state in economic development, tightening discipline, accelerated development of heavy industry, using the countryside as a supplier of funds and labor for the needs of industrialization)

In the confrontation between the two concepts, the “Stalinist” concept prevailed.

Progress of industrialization

Period 1926-1927 At the XIV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in 1925, the then advanced industries - energy, metallurgy, chemical industry, mechanical engineering, which were the material basis of the emerging military-industrial complex of the USSR - were recognized as priority areas in the implementation of industrialization in the USSR. The primary focus was on creating an energy base for the industry.

In 1926, the construction of four large power plants began, in 1927. - another 14. New coal mines were laid - 7 and 16, respectively, by year, construction of large metallurgical (Kerch, Kuznetsk) and machine-building plants (Rostov, Stalingrad) began.

But due to the insufficient financing of industry, which developed at that time on the basis of its own funds, as well as under the influence of the growing agrarian crisis, the rate of industrial growth in the late 20s. decreased sharply. It was necessary to look for new sources and forms.

In 1927, Soviet economists began developing the first five-year plan (1928/29 - 1932/33), which solved the problem of integrated development of all regions and the use of resources for industrialization. The drafters of the plan highlighted the relationship between the economic indicators of the USSR and the USA, pointing out the lag between them of 50 years (especially in the field of electric power, chemistry, and automotive industry).

In April 1929, out of two options for the plan - starting and called optimal- the last one was chosen, the tasks for which were 20% higher than the first.

First Five-Year Plan (1928-1932) I.V. Stalin argued that it was possible to fulfill the optimal plan in three or two and a half years. They were given the task already at the turn of the 20-30s. exceed the US indicators, making a leap. Through a breakthrough it was supposed to overcome the multi-sectoral system, eliminate the exploiting classes and in 10-15 years, carry out the transition to expanded forms of communist construction. As a result, a year after the start of the five-year plan, the plan was adjusted - its indicators were increased once again. The target figures for the second year of the five-year plan provided for an increase in industrial production by 32% instead of 22%, and the creation of 2,000 new enterprises.

Massive construction began in the country, hundreds of plants, factories, and power plants were founded. However, by 1930 the growth rate had slowed. Despite this, it was announced that the five-year plan had been successfully completed in 4 years and 3 months, although in reality, according to modern standards, the tasks for the main sectors were not completed; although these results were significant.

Second Five Year Plan (1933-1937) the full set of indicators was also fulfilled by 70-77%. At the same time, mainly heavy industry enterprises continued to be built. In addition, in light industry the real underperformance was significantly greater.

The goals of forced industrialization were met by the massive use of cheap labor and the enthusiasm of the masses, inspired by the Bolshevik idea of ​​​​building a classless society. Various forms of the so-called were introduced into the practice of the national economy. socialist competition for fulfilling and exceeding production targets without increasing wages. In 1935, a “movement Stakhanovites", in honor of the mine miner A. Stakhanov, who, according to official information of that time, on the night of August 30-31, 1935, fulfilled 14.5 norms per shift. The labor of prisoners in the camps of the Main Directorate of Camps (GULAG) was widely used.

Realizing that accelerated industrialization and consolidation of commanding heights in the economy are impossible while maintaining small-scale private peasant farming, the Stalinist leadership in 1928-29 set a course for "complete collectivization" of the countryside and the liquidation of the wealthy layer of the peasantry ("kulaks").

Results of industrialization. Stalin's industrialization is considered by many modern researchers as Soviet type of non-capitalist modernization, which was subordinated to the tasks of strengthening the country’s defense and maintaining the status of a great power.

In the process of industrialization, serious disproportions have arisen in the economy between manufacturing and mining industries, between heavy and light industries, between industry and agriculture.

During the implementation of the first three five-year plans, despite the failure of inflated planned indicators, at the cost of incredible effort of the entire population of the USSR, it achieved economic independence from the West.

As a result of complete collectivization, a system was created for transferring financial, material, and labor resources from the agricultural sector to the industrial sector. Due to this The main result of collectivization can be considered an industrial leap THE USSR. At the end of the 30s J.V. Stalin announced the transformation of the USSR from an agricultural to an industrial country.

Introduction.

1. The state of Russia after the revolution, the civil war.

2. Reasons for industrialization, Stalin and his role in industrialization.

3. The essence of industrialization of the five-year state plans, economic programs.

4. Results of industrialization in the USSR.

List of used literature.

Introduction

The task of implementing industrialization, that is, creating a developed industry, Soviet Russia inherited from pre-revolutionary Russia. The first steps in this direction were made in the second half of the 19th century. Industry grew at a high rate at the beginning of the 20th century. The First World War and the Civil War, the devastation of the times of “war communism” threw the country’s economy far back. With the end of the restoration period (1925), the need arose again to complete the process that had begun long ago and was tragically interrupted. At the end of 1925, a course was taken towards industrialization, which included measures to ensure the economic independence of the USSR, priority development of heavy and defense industries, and bridging the gap with Western countries. Got up difficult questions about ways to achieve these goals.

By 1927, two main approaches had emerged. The first approach, substantiated by prominent economists: capital for financing industrialization will provide the development of private entrepreneurship, attracting foreign loans, and expanding trade turnover; the pace of industrialization should be high, but at the same time focus on real opportunities, and not on political needs; industrialization should not lead to a sharp drop in the living standards of the population, the peasantry first of all. The second approach, originally formulated by the leaders of the left opposition: it is not possible to finance industrialization from external resources; it is necessary to find funds within the country, pumping them into heavy industry from light industry and agriculture; it is necessary to accelerate industrial growth, to carry out industrialization rapidly in 5-10 years; it is criminal to think about the cost of industrialization; the peasantry is an “internal colony” that will pay for all the difficulties.

1. The state of Russia after the revolution, civil war

The revolutionary events of 1917, the Civil War and capitalist intervention against the young Soviet Republic caused enormous damage to the industrial and economic potential of the country. Industrial production for the period 1918-1921. decreased fourfold. In general, the work of industry was characterized by a sharp decline in the most important quantitative characteristics of development.

During three years of war and internal turmoil, about 4 thousand bridges were destroyed. Events of 1918-1921 caused incomparably more damage to the country than the First World War. The four-year hard times of war plunged the country into a state of chaos and complete stagnation, into a state that can only be defined as a systemic economic catastrophe.

The situation in which the country found itself was real threat. The potential danger emanating from capitalist states was not a myth, the fruit of the sick imagination of the authorities. Finding themselves face to face with a hostile capitalist environment, the leadership of the Soviet Republic turns its gaze to the only real support - the Red Army. The concept of the relationship between power and the main military force was succinctly and clearly formulated by V.I. Lenin at the XI Party Congress: “We really must be on our guard, and in favor of the Red Army we must make certain heavy sacrifices... Before us is the whole world of the bourgeoisie, which is only looking for forms to strangle us.” Subsequently, the thesis of capitalist danger became the most important justification for many major domestic and foreign policy actions taken by the leadership of the Soviet Union.

V.I. Lenin paid great attention to the development of the domestic economy. Already in the years Civil War The Soviet government began developing a long-term plan for the electrification of the country. In December 1920, the GOELRO plan was approved by the VIII All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and a year later it was approved by the IX All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

The plan provided for the accelerated development of the electric power industry, tied to territorial development plans. The GOELRO plan, designed for 10-15 years, provided for the construction of 30 regional power plants (20 thermal power plants and 10 hydroelectric power stations) with a total capacity of 1.75 million kW. The project covered eight main economic regions(Northern, Central Industrial, Southern, Volga, Ural, West Siberian, Caucasian and Turkestan). At the same time, the development of the country's transport system was carried out (reconstruction of old and construction of new railway lines, construction of the Volga-Don Canal).

The GOELRO project laid the foundation for industrialization in Russia. Electricity production in 1932 compared to 1913 increased almost 7 times, from 2 to 13.5 billion kWh.

Until 1928, the USSR carried out a relatively liberal “New economic policy"(NEP). While agriculture retail, the service sector, food and light industry were mainly in private hands, the state retained control over heavy industry, transport, banks, wholesale and international trade. State enterprises competed with each other, the role of the USSR State Planning Committee was limited to forecasts that determined the directions and size of public investment.

From a foreign policy point of view, the country was in hostile conditions. According to the leadership of the CPSU(b), there was high probability a new war with capitalist states, which required thorough rearmament. However, it was impossible to immediately begin such rearmament due to the backwardness of heavy industry. At the same time, the existing pace of industrialization seemed insufficient, since the gap with Western countries, which experienced economic growth in the 1920s, increased. Serious social problem There was an increase in unemployment in cities, which by the end of the NEP amounted to more than 2 million people, or about 10% of the urban population. The government believed that one of the factors hindering the development of industry in the cities was the lack of food and the reluctance of the countryside to provide the cities with bread at low prices.

The party leadership intended to solve these problems through a planned redistribution of resources between agriculture and industrialization, in accordance with the concept of socialism, as stated at the XIV Congress of the CPSU (b) and the III All-Union Congress of Soviets in 1925. The choice of a specific implementation of central planning was vigorously discussed in 1926-1928 Proponents of the genetic approach (V. Bazarov, V. Groman, N. Kondratyev) believed that the plan should be drawn up on the basis of objective patterns of economic development identified as a result of an analysis of existing trends. Adherents of the teleological approach (G. Krzhizhanovsky, V. Kuibyshev, S. Strumilin) ​​believed that the plan should transform the economy and be based on future structural changes, production capabilities and strict discipline. Among the party functionaries, the first were supported by N. Bukharin, a supporter of the evolutionary path to socialism, and the latter by L. Trotsky, who insisted on immediate industrialization. The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, I. Stalin, initially supported Bukharin’s point of view, but after Trotsky was expelled from the party’s Central Committee at the end of 1927, he changed his position to the diametrically opposite one. This led to a decisive victory for the teleological school and a radical turn away from the NEP.

2. Reasons for industrialization, Stalin and his role in industrialization

The decision on industrialization was made in 1925 at the XIV Party Congress. Its task is to make the USSR an industrially independent country and allow it to confront the Western capitalist powers on equal terms. Collectivization provided funds for the development of industry (primarily heavy industry), which simplified the confiscation of grain from the peasants. Many of them fled to the cities and were ready to work for meager wages. The free labor of prisoners was actively used. Masterpieces of art were sold abroad (mainly in the USA) for pennies. There was almost no Western investment due to the USSR's refusal to pay tsarist debts.

Stalin's industrialization was a process of accelerated expansion of the industrial potential of the USSR to reduce the gap between the economy and developed capitalist countries, carried out in the 1930s. The official goal of industrialization was to transform the USSR from predominantly agricultural country into a leading industrial power. Although the main industrial potential The country was created later, during the years of the seven-year plans; industrialization usually refers to the first five-year plans.

Start socialist industrialization as an integral part of the “triple task of a radical reconstruction of society” (industrialization, collectivization of agriculture and cultural revolution) was laid down in the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy (1928-1932). At the same time, private commodity and capitalist forms of economy were eliminated.

During the pre-war five-year plans in the USSR, a rapid increase in production capacity and production volumes of heavy industry was ensured, which later allowed the USSR to win the Great Patriotic War. The increase in industrial power in the 1930s was considered within the framework of Soviet ideology one of the most important achievements of the USSR. Since the late 1980s, however, the question of the actual extent and historical significance of industrialization has been the subject of debate concerning the true goals of industrialization, the choice of means for its implementation, the relationship of industrialization with collectivization and mass repression, as well as its results and long-term consequences for the Soviet economy and society.

3. The essence of industrialization of the five-year state plans, economic programs

In 1929-1932 The first five-year plan took place, and the second was held in 1933-1937. Old enterprises were reconstructed and hundreds of new ones were built. The most important construction projects are the Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works (Magnitka), the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station (DneproGes), the White Sea-Baltic Canal (Belomorkanal), the Chelyabinsk, Stalingrad, Kharkov Tractor Plants, the Turkestan-Siberian Railway (TurkSib), etc. The plans were inflated, the deadlines were excessively compressed. , enterprises were put into operation unfinished, which later led to long-term stagnation. Product quality was low.

The enthusiasm of the masses, inspired by the ideas of socialist construction, played a major role. In 1935, the Stakhanov movement began (its founder was miner A. G. Stakhanov) for exceeding plans. The government, demanding that everyone follow the Stakhanovites, doubled production standards. Product quality has decreased.

Nevertheless, during the first five-year plans, a powerful industry was created that made it possible to withstand a future war. However, this was often done contrary to the recommendations of economists; haste led to overexertion of forces. The standard of living has fallen compared to the NEP era.

The main task introduced planned economy there was a maximum increase in the economic and military power of the state at a fast pace, at the initial stage this came down to the redistribution of the maximum possible amount of resources for the needs of industrialization. In December 1927, at the XV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, “Directives for drawing up the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR” were adopted, in which the congress spoke out against over-industrialization: growth rates should not be maximum, and they should be planned so that failures. The draft of the first five-year plan (October 1, 1928 - October 1, 1933), developed on the basis of directives, was approved at the XVI Conference of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (April 1929) as a set of carefully thought out and realistic tasks. This plan, in reality much more intense than previous projects, immediately after its approval by the V Congress of Soviets of the USSR in May 1929, gave grounds for the state to carry out a number of measures of an economic, political, organizational and ideological nature, which elevated industrialization to the status of a concept, the era of the “great turning point”. The country had to expand the construction of new industries, increase production of all types of products and begin producing new equipment.

First of all, using propaganda, the party leadership ensured the mobilization of the population in support of industrialization. The Komsomol members in particular received it with enthusiasm. There was no shortage of cheap labor, since after collectivization rural areas A large number of yesterday's rural residents moved to the cities from poverty, hunger and arbitrariness of the authorities. Millions of people selflessly, almost by hand, built hundreds of factories, power plants, laid railways, metro. Often I had to work three shifts. In 1930, construction began on about 1,500 facilities, of which 50 absorbed almost half of all capital investments. A number of gigantic industrial structures were erected: DneproGES, metallurgical plants in Magnitogorsk, Lipetsk and Chelyabinsk, Novokuznetsk, Norilsk and Uralmash, tractor factories in Volgograd, Chelyabinsk, Kharkov, Uralvagonzavod, GAZ, ZIS (modern ZIL), etc. In 1935 The first stage of the Moscow metro opened total length 11.2 km. Engineers were invited from abroad, many well-known companies, such as Siemens-Schuckertwerke AG and General Electric, were involved in the work and supplied modern equipment, a significant part of the models of equipment produced in those years at Soviet factories represented are copies or modifications of Western analogues (for example, the Fordson tractor assembled in Volgograd). To create our own engineering base, we urgently created domestic system higher technical education. In 1930, universal primary education was introduced in the USSR, and compulsory seven-year education in cities. Attention was also paid to the industrialization of agriculture. Thanks to the emergence of the domestic tractor industry, in 1932 the USSR refused to import tractors from abroad, and in 1934 the Kirov Plant in Leningrad began producing the Universal row crop tractor, which became the first domestic tractor exported abroad. During the ten pre-war years, about 700 thousand tractors were produced, which amounted to 40% of their world production.

In 1930, speaking at the XVI Congress of the CPSU (b), Stalin admitted that industrial breakthrough possible only by building “socialism in one country” and demanded a multiple increase in the five-year plan targets, arguing that for a number of indicators the plan could be exceeded.

To increase incentives to work, pay became more closely tied to productivity. First of all, the drummers at the factories were simply better fed. (In the period 1929-1935 urban population was rationed with essential food products). In 1935, the “Stakhanovite movement” appeared, in honor of the mine miner A. Stakhanov, who, according to official information of that time, on the night of August 30-31, 1935, completed 14.5 norms per shift.

Since capital investment in heavy industry almost immediately exceeded the previously planned amount and continued to grow, money emission (that is, the printing of paper money) was sharply increased, and throughout the first five-year plan the growth money supply in circulation was more than twice as fast as the growth in production of consumer goods, which led to rising prices and a shortage of consumer goods.

For getting foreign currency necessary to finance industrialization, methods such as the sale of paintings from the Hermitage collection were used.

At the same time, the state moved to a centralized distribution of its means of production and consumer goods; command-administrative management methods were introduced and private property was nationalized. A political system emerged based on the leadership role of the CPSU(b), state property on the means of production and a minimum of private initiative.

The first five-year plan was associated with rapid urbanization. The urban labor force increased by 12.5 million, of whom 8.5 million were rural migrants. However, the USSR reached a share of 50% of the urban population only in the early 1960s.

At the end of 1932, the successful and early completion of the first five-year plan was announced in four years and three months. Summing up its results, Stalin said that heavy industry fulfilled the plan by 108%. During the period between October 1, 1928 and January 1, 1933, the production fixed assets of heavy industry increased by 2.7 times. The first Five-Year Plan was followed by a Second, with somewhat less emphasis on industrialization, and then a Third Five-Year Plan, which took place during the outbreak of World War II.

4. Results of industrialization in the USSR

The result of the first five-year plans was the development of heavy industry, due to which GDP growth during 1928-40. amounted to 4.6% per year. Industrial production in the period 1928-1937. increased by 2.5-3.5 times, that is, 10.5-16% per year. In particular, the production of machinery in the period 1928-1937. grew at an average of 27.4% per year.

According to Soviet theorists, the socialist economy was significantly superior to the capitalist one

By 1940, about 9,000 new factories had been built. By the end of the second five-year plan, the USSR took second place in the world in terms of industrial output, second only to the USA (if we consider the British metropolis, dominions and colonies as one state, the USSR will be in third place in the world after the USA and Britain). Imports fell sharply, which was seen as the country gaining economic independence. Open unemployment was eliminated. For the period 1928-1937. Universities and technical schools have trained about 2 million specialists. Many new technologies were mastered. Thus, during the first five-year plan alone, the production of synthetic rubber, motorcycles, wristwatches, cameras, excavators, high-quality cement and high-quality steel was established. The foundation was also laid for Soviet science, which over time took leading positions in the world in certain areas. On the created industrial base, it became possible to carry out large-scale rearmament of the army; During the first five-year plan, defense spending increased to 10.8% of the budget.

During the Soviet era, communists argued that industrialization was based on a rational and feasible plan. Meanwhile, it was assumed that the first five-year plan would come into effect at the end of 1928, but even by the time of its announcement in April-May 1929, work on its preparation had not been completed. The original form of the plan included goals for 50 industrial and agricultural sectors, as well as the relationship between resources and capabilities. Over time, the main role began to be played by achieving predetermined indicators. If the growth rate of industrial production initially set in the plan was 18-20%, then by the end of the year they were doubled. Despite reporting the success of the first five-year plan, in fact, the statistics were falsified, and none of the goals were even close to being achieved. Moreover, in agriculture and industrial sectors dependent on agriculture, there was a sharp decline. Part of the party nomenklatura was extremely indignant at this; for example, S. Syrtsov described reports about achievements as “fraud.”

On the contrary, according to critics of industrialization, it was poorly thought out, which was manifested in a series of declared “turning points” (April-May 1929, January-February 1930, June 1931). A grandiose and thoroughly politicized system arose, characteristic features which included economic “gigantomania”, chronic shortage of goods, organizational problems, wastefulness and unprofitability of enterprises. The goal (i.e., the plan) began to determine the means for its implementation. Over time, neglect of material support and infrastructure development began to cause significant economic damage. Some of the industrialization efforts turned out to be poorly thought out from the start. An example is the White Sea-Baltic Canal, built in 1933 with the labor of more than 200,000 prisoners, which turned out to be practically useless.

Despite the development of new products, industrialization was carried out mainly by extensive methods, since as a result of collectivization and a sharp decline in living standards rural population human labor greatly depreciated. The desire to fulfill the plan led to an overexertion of forces and a permanent search for reasons to justify the failure to fulfill inflated tasks. Because of this, industrialization could not be fueled by enthusiasm alone and required a number of coercive measures. Beginning in 1930, the free movement of labor was prohibited, and criminal penalties were introduced for violations of labor discipline and negligence. Since 1931, workers began to be held liable for damage to equipment. In 1932, forced transfer of labor between enterprises became possible, and the death penalty was introduced for the theft of state property. On December 27, 1932, the internal passport was restored, which Lenin at one time condemned as “tsarist backwardness and despotism.” The seven-day week was replaced by a continuous working week, the days of which, without having names, were numbered from 1 to 5. Every sixth day there was a day off, established for work shifts, so that factories could work without interruption. Prisoner labor was actively used. All this has become the subject of sharp criticism in democratic countries, not only from liberals, but primarily from Social Democrats.

Per capita consumption rose by 22% between 1928 and 1938, although this increase was greatest among the group of party and labor elites (who fused with each other) and did not affect the vast majority of the rural population, or more than half of the country's population.

The end date of industrialization is defined differently by different historians. From the point of view of the conceptual desire to raise heavy industry in record time, the most pronounced period was the first five-year plan. Most often, the end of industrialization is understood as the last pre-war year (1940), or less often the year before Stalin's death (1952). If we understand industrialization as a process, the goal of which is the share of industry in GDP, characteristic of industrial developed countries, then the USSR economy reached such a state only in the 1960s. The social aspect of industrialization should also be taken into account, since only in the early 1960s. the urban population exceeded the rural one.

conclusions

Industrialization was largely carried out at the expense of agriculture (collectivization). First of all, agriculture became a source of primary accumulation, due to low purchase prices for grain and re-export at higher prices, as well as due to the so-called. “super tax in the form of overpayments on manufactured goods.” Subsequently, the peasantry also provided the labor force for the growth of heavy industry. The short-term result of this policy was a decline in agricultural production: for example, livestock production decreased almost by half and returned to the 1928 level only in 1938. The consequence of this was a deterioration in the economic situation of the peasantry. The long-term consequence was the degradation of agriculture. As a result of collectivization, famine and purges between 1926 and 1939. the country lost various estimates from 7 to 13 million and even up to 20 million people, and these estimates include only direct demographic losses.

Some critics also argue that, despite the declared increase in labor productivity, in practice average labor productivity in 1932 fell by 8% compared to 1928. These estimates, however, do not tell the full story: the decline was driven by the influx of millions of untrained workers living in poor conditions. By 1940, average labor productivity had increased by 69% since 1928. In addition, productivity varied widely across industries.

List of used literature

1. Verkhoturov D. Stalin’s economic revolution. - M.: Olma-Press, 2006.

2. Industrialization of the USSR 1926-1941. Documents and materials. / Ed. M. P. Kim. - M.: Nauka, 1970.

3. History of Russia. Theories of learning. Under. ed. B.V. Lichman. Russia in the late 1920s-1930s.

4. History of Russia: Textbook for technical universities / A. A. Chernobaev, E. I. Gorelov, M. N. Zuev and others; Ed. M. N. Zuev, Ed. A. A. Chernobaev. - 2nd ed. reworked and additional.. - M.: graduate School, 2006. - 613 s.

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