News / 27.09.2019

Witte monetary reform. Monetary reform S.Yu. Witte

S. Yu. Witte became Minister of Finance in 1893. Having assumed a new position (before that, S. Yu. Witte headed the Ministry of Railways), he no longer doubted that “monetary circulation based on metal is a blessing; but since I had not deeply dealt with this issue before, therefore, I had not only some hesitation, but inconsistent steps, and there is nothing surprising in this. If this most important principle was accepted by the new Minister of Finance immediately, then the specific ways of its implementation in the first year and a half of his ministry served as the subject of lively discussions and reflections.

Initially, Sergei Yurievich was a supporter of strengthening the credit ruble through administrative control. It seemed to him that tightening supervision over the circulation of money and strengthening the responsibility of domestic financial circles for the execution of orders from the central government would strengthen the ruble.

At the beginning of 1893, a number of steps were taken that showed that the financial department was very resolute. Customs duties were established (1 kopeck for 100 rubles), a state monopoly was introduced on the sale of alcohol, wine and vodka products. Transactions based on the exchange rate difference of the ruble, as well as other values, were banned, control over exchange operations in Russia was strengthened, and a ban on the production of exchange transactions foreign brokers. Thanks to these decisions, exchange rate fluctuations began to decrease. So, if in 1891 in London they were 28.4%, then in 1892 - 8.8%, and in 1893 - 5.3%. But rather quickly, the Minister of Finance realized that these measures were ineffective and that a qualitative restructuring of the entire financial system.

But before proceeding with the reform, it was necessary to finally decide for yourself and prove to others, first of all, to the monarch, in which direction to carry out the reform: on the basis of monometallism (gold) or bimetallism (silver and gold). In favor of the second option, as a tradition of the Russian monetary circulation, and the huge reserves of silver accumulated in the country. But tying the credit ruble to the bimetallic equivalent was also fraught with great danger: with a high market situation in one of the parities, a steady decline in the value of the other could not only not lead to the stability of the monetary unit, but even increase its instability. The introduction of gold circulation in this respect seemed preferable, but here were hidden hitherto unknown “financial reefs”. Will there be a massive outflow of the precious metal from circulation into "pods" within the country and will it go abroad? Will there be enough gold reserves for its free exchange? Will the appreciation of the monetary unit lead to a drop in living standards? Only life could provide convincing answers to these questions. A sober calculation and a vision of the historical possibilities of Russia were made by S.Yu. Witte is a staunch supporter of monometallism.

The introduction of the monometallic parity of the ruble, stable convertibility was facilitated by the general political conditions in the country and the world, and the relatively favorable economic situation. The international situation remained calm, the success of trade activity was obvious, and for many years Russia had a positive trade balance (see Appendix 1). Impressive gold holdings were also formed.

The accumulation of the gold reserves of the state and the formation of the exchange fund took place in various ways, but the main ones were two: mining and purchase. In terms of production, Russia in late XIX century, it occupied one of the leading places in the world, second only to the United States in this indicator (see Appendix 2). At the end of 1897, the gold reserves of Russia (holdings of the state bank) were estimated at 1315 million rubles, and 155 million gold rubles were in circulation, and a year later, at the end of 1898, already 1146 and 445 million rubles, respectively.

A decisive step towards gold circulation was the law approved by Nicholas II on May 8, 1895. It contains two main provisions: any written transactions permitted by law can be concluded with Russian gold coins; for such transactions, payment can be made either in gold coin or banknotes at the rate of gold on the day of payment. In the following months, the government took a number of measures aimed at approving the gold equivalent. Among them: permission for offices and branches of the State Bank to buy a gold coin at a certain rate, and capital ones - to sell and make payments at the same rate; then the admission rules were introduced State Bank gold coins to the current account. Soon the same operation will be introduced in private commercial banks, who announced that they would accept gold for current accounts and for all obligations.

Despite these measures, the gold coin was very slowly established as a priority means of payment. This was due to the lack of habit among the population, and the obvious inconvenience of the gold coin for large payments and forwarding, since there was no correspondence between the common noun and market prices. Semi-imperials and imperials with the designation 5 rubles and 10 rubles circulated at 7 rubles. 50 kop. and 15 rubles, which constantly caused bewilderment and numerous abuses in the calculations. Demand for the gold coin was also restrained by fears that the State Bank would lower the exchange rate by administrative means, which could lead to financial losses (there were many rumors about this in the spring and summer of 1895). In an effort to dispel such fears, the State Bank announced on September 27, 1895 that it would buy and accept a gold coin at a price not lower than 7 rubles. 40 kop. for a semi-imperial, and in 1896 the purchase rate was set at 7 rubles. 50 kop. These decisions led to the stabilization of the ratio between the gold ruble and the credit ruble at a ratio of 1:1.5. To stabilize the ruble, the Ministry of Finance recognized the need to devalue the credit currency on the basis of monometallism. The parity between the paper credit ruble and gold was established not on the basis of a nominal designation, but in accordance with the real exchange rate.

The introduction of the exchange of the ruble for precious metal was established on the basis of the actual and fairly stable exchange rate ratio: the credit ruble - 66 2/3 kopecks in gold. By January 1, 1896, 1121.3 million credit rubles were available, and the gold reserve was estimated at 659.5 million rubles, of which 75 million rubles were in the change fund. During 1896, the change fund was increased to 500 million rubles. This was a milestone that seemed sufficient for the development of an exchange operation and the introduction of a gold coin into wide circulation, although paper banknotes for some time retained their predominant influence on the money market.

The decisive stage in the reform of monetary circulation came in 1898, when a series of nominal royal decrees were legally fixed essential elements new financial system. On January 3, a decree was issued to put into circulation a gold imperial coin of 15 rubles and a semi-imperial coin of 7 rubles 50 kopecks; August 29 - on the establishment of a solid basis for the issuance of credit notes. The State Bank undertook to issue banknotes in accordance with the needs of monetary circulation, but without fail secured by gold: at least half the amount, until the total amount of the issue reaches 600 million rubles. In excess of this norm, credit notes must be provided in the proportion of a ruble for a ruble (one imperial is equal to 15 credit rubles). This was followed by an order to mint and put into circulation a five-ruble gold coin, equal to one third of the imperial. On the same day, another decree appeared regarding the inscription on banknotes: they now indicated the obligation of the state and the state bank to exchange banknotes for gold without fail, and the definition of a new coin was established (one ruble - 1/15 imperial, containing 17.424 shares of pure gold ).

The transformation of the monetary system on the basis of gold monometallism required a change in the monetary charter, new edition which was approved by Nicholas II on June 7, 1899. Its main provisions were as follows. The state monetary unit of Russia was the ruble, which contained 17.424 shares of pure gold. A gold coin could be minted both from gold owned by the treasury and from metal provided by private individuals. A full-fledged gold coin is required to be accepted in all payments for an unlimited amount. Silver and copper coins were made only from the metal of the treasury and were auxiliary in circulation, obligatory for acceptance in payments up to 25 rubles. A silver coin of one ruble 50 kopecks contained 900 parts of pure silver and 100 parts of copper, and a silver coin of 20, 15, 10, and 5 kopecks contained 500 parts of copper. In addition to the gold coin of 15 rubles (imperial), ten rubles, 7 rubles 50 kopecks and 5 rubles, coins of the former minting circulated. Of these, imperials (ten rubles) and semi-imperials (5 rubles), produced according to the law on December 17, 1885, were accepted into government cash desks: imperials for 15 rubles and semi-imperials for 7 rubles 50 kopecks, if the weight of the first was at least three spools and one share , and the second - at least one spool and 48 shares. Coins of lesser weight, as well as coins of earlier years, were accepted at the cost of pure metal. Gold quickly established itself as the main means of payment, which helped to stop fluctuations in the exchange rate.

The results of the reform S.Yu. Witte.

The results of the monetary reform became noticeable very quickly. The report of the State Comptroller for 1897 stated: “Judging by the reviews that she met everywhere abroad, there can be no doubt about her fruitful significance as proof of the financial strength of Russia, which even our obvious ill-wishers have begun to recognize. The impact of the monetary reform within the country can be judged by the fact that the number of credit notes issued for public circulation decreased from January 1897 to May 1, 1898 by 221 million rubles (from 1121 to 900 million rubles), and in return for this, the commercial and industrial market within the country is saturated with gold and silver coins, with which more than 250 million rubles have already been put into circulation (including over 170 million rubles in gold). This fact testifies that the gold circulation is not only expanding the circle of its distribution, but has already penetrated into the remote areas of our vast Fatherland, entering into the daily practice of the people.

The entire reform of monetary circulation was designed for the future industrial development of Russia, and it served him. But the question inevitably arose of how the devaluation and free exchange of the ruble for gold would affect the internal economic activity and, first of all, the position of the main part of the subjects of the Russian crown in the near future. S. Yu. Witte believed (and his assumptions were completely justified) that the reorganization of financial circulation would not lead to any noticeable socio-economic perturbations. The currency conversion system affected mainly foreign economic activity, and the introduced ratio of metal and paper banknotes only consolidated the real situation. The way of life of the bulk of the population, its daily material and production support, in fact, did not depend either on the gold parity itself or on the nature of world monetary settlements. Russian peasants for the most part remained outside the system of the world money market, and the “price weather” within the empire was controlled by the state.

At the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th century, the gold unit prevailed in the composition of Russian money circulation, and by 1904 it accounted for almost 2/3 money supply. On January 1, 1900, the metal security accounted for 189% of the amount of credit notes, and the gold coin already accounted for 46.2% of the total monetary circulation.

The introduction of the gold currency strengthened public finances and stimulated economic development. At the end of the 19th century, in terms of growth in industrial production, Russia overtook all European countries. This was largely facilitated by a large influx foreign investment to the country's industry. Only during the ministry of S.Yu. Witte (1893-1903), their size reached a colossal size - 3 billion rubles in gold.

From 1860 to 1880, foreign investments in Russian joint-stock enterprises increased 10 times (from 9.7 million to 97.7 million rubles) and amounted to approximately 1/3 of the total share capital. British, French, German investments prevailed (see Appendix 3).

From the 90s of the XIX century. the era of intense tide began foreign capital in its industrial form in the coal, metallurgical, oil industries, transport and other industries. If earlier foreign capitalists preferred loans, then at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, investments also gained great importance. Foreign capitalists were now more willing to invest in industry than in government loans, since they received an incomparably greater profit, over 10% for the capital expended. Loans gave about half of this rate (Appendix 2). However, the import of capital into Russia in the form of loans to the government, railways and individual cities was still predominant.

Under the upswing of the 1890s, the Witte system contributed to the development of industry and railroad construction; By 1900, Russia had taken the 1st place in the world in terms of oil production. The seemingly stable political regime and the developing economy fascinated the small European holder, who willingly bought high-interest bonds of Russian state loans and railway companies.

In the 1890s, the influence of the Ministry of Finance increased sharply, and Witte himself for some time came to the fore in the bureaucratic apparatus of the empire. Witte did not skimp on expenses, advertising in European newspapers and magazines financial position Russia, its economic course and its own person.

In the Russian press, the minister was sharply criticized for apostasy by his former associates. For his unrestricted use of state intervention, Witte was also criticized by the reformists of the 1860s, who believed that industrialization was possible only through changes in state system- the creation of a real ("united") government and the introduction of a government agency. In liberal circles, Witte's "system" was perceived as a "grand economic subversion of the autocracy" that diverted the attention of the population from socio-economic, cultural and political reforms. In the late 1890s, it seemed that Witte had proved the unbelievable with his policy: the viability of power that was feudal in nature in the face of industrialization, the ability to successfully develop the economy without changing anything in the system of state administration.

However, Witte's ambitious plans were not destined to come true. The first blow to them was dealt by the world economic crisis, which sharply slowed down the development of industry; the influx of foreign capital decreased, the budget balance was disturbed. Economic expansion in the Far and Middle East, in itself associated with high costs, also exacerbated the Russian-English contradictions and brought the war with Japan closer. With the outbreak of hostilities, no consistent economic program there could be no more talk.

The accelerated industrialization of Russia could not be successful while maintaining traditional system authorities and existing economic relations in the countryside and Witte soon began to realize. "... having become a mechanic of a complex machine called finance Russian Empire one had to be a fool not to understand that the car would not run without fuel. Fuel is - economic condition Russia, and since the main part of the population is the peasantry, it was necessary to delve into this area. "In 1896, Witte refused to support communal land ownership. In 1898, he made the first attempt to achieve a revision of the agrarian course in the committee of ministers, which was thwarted, however, K.Pleve, K.P. Pobedonostsev and P.N. the agricultural industry, thereby, it would seem, taking the general development of the peasant question into the Ministry of Finance. Witte's opponents from the landlord camp accused him of ruining agriculture with his policy of encouraging industry. This, in general, is unfair. main reason lagging behind agriculture was to preserve the remnants of serfdom in the countryside. The ransom for the land was taken out of the pocket of the peasants more money than the establishment of industry. The agrarian crisis did its job. But Witte's policy has already been added to all this.

The development of industry in all countries proceeded at the expense of funds initially accumulated in agriculture. Where this process proceeded at a natural and unhurried pace, it was not painful. The need for a fast jump proved to be sensitive. Russia was a catch-up country and paid for it.

The incompleteness of the reform of 1861, the global agrarian crisis and Witte's industrialization, taken together, really led agriculture at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries to a deep crisis. By the end of the 19th century, both Witte and his opponents started talking about "overstrain of the payment forces of the rural population." These words reflected the sincere and deep concern of the authorities. Both the development of industry and the state budget rested on the solvency of the peasants. Witte's opponents intensified their attacks on industrialization policies.

Whatever the cumulative reasons for dismissing Witte from the post of minister, the resignation in August 1903 dealt him a blow: the post of chairman of the committee of ministers, which he received, was immeasurably less influential.

Russia at the beginning of the 20th century.

IN economic policy tsarism of the late XIX - early XX century, there were many strengths. In those years, Russia confidently gained positions in the markets of the Far and Middle East, pushing its rivals there. However, this policy remained internally controversial. And not only because it was dominated by administrative measures and underestimated the importance of private enterprise. The main thing was that the very course of the government lacked a balance between the needs of industry and agriculture.

The imbalance of the economy has become one of the reasons economic crisis the beginning of the 20th century, which was then replaced by a long "depression" of 1904-1908. From 1909 to 1913, an economic boom begins. As a result of the past crisis, weak, small enterprises went bankrupt, and the process of concentration of industrial production accelerated. Along with a highly developed industry in the country's economy, a large proportion belonged to the early capitalist and semi-feudal forms of economy - from manufacturing to patriarchal subsistence. The Russian countryside, as in a mirror, reflected the remnants of feudalism: large landed estates, working off, which are a direct relic of corvée. Peasant shortage of land, the community with its redistribution hampered the modernization of the peasant economy.

There were the stresses of economic and social imbalances and sharp class differences. The largest enterprises, especially mines, were often part of international economic structures and had only a limited relation to the economy in which the majority of Russians existed. Significant underemployment throughout the country was accompanied by a shortage of qualified and "reliable" workers. The largest factories in European Russia, where the majority of the workers were semi-peasants, existed side by side and were associated with handicrafts and primitive agricultural methods. The development of industry, urbanization and literacy were accompanied by a deepening of the gulf between the social upper classes and the rural and urban poor. Rough and naked exploitation, huge degree state control, repression in the event of any disobedience - all this caused an increase in political discontent and resistance, expressed both in the hidden indignation of the lower classes, and in the protests of the intelligentsia.

By 1916, military spending had more than doubled the foreign debt, and that was just the beginning. In addition, the war greatly exacerbated Russia's technological dependence on its Western allies. If it had not been "hindered" (we again use the words of Timashev, speaking of extrapolating the same line of development), Russia after the First World War would have faced the largest and growing crisis of redemption external debt and further borrowing to pay off old debts, dividends and foreign patents and imports. A similar scenario is well known to us on the example of modern Latin America, Africa and Asia, be it Brazil, Nigeria or Indonesia.

By the end of the century, awareness of the impending crisis was growing among the educated sections of Russia.

Russia in its socio-economic development was trying to keep up with the times, and no one could say what the final of this race would be - and this is not just a rhetorical phrase or an eclectic refusal to "substitute" by giving a clear, definite answer.

This is confirmed by statistical data. The figures show that throughout the entire period under review, Russia has neither caught up nor lagged behind its Western rivals. Between 1861 and 1913 rates of growth national income per capita in Russia were roughly in line with the European average and were twice as slow as in Germany. Russia's national income growth rates were higher than the non-European averages, but significantly lower than those of the US and Japan. Further deterioration of Russia's chances in this race was expected, which made the time factor of particular importance. In such a situation, not only the matrix of causes, tendencies and objective factors is also important, but also the factor of consciousness, i.e. the active search for alternatives by the authorities, the forces they could count on, the tasks that they faced, and how these tasks were understood and solved.

With this sovereign courage, Witte introduced the gold standard, that is, the free exchange of the ruble for gold. In his own words, "almost all thinking Russia was against this reform," because one (primarily exporters of raw materials) benefited weak ruble, others were frightened by the complexity of this financial transaction. Witte convinced his opponents that the paper ruble was the main obstacle to normal development. When the new golden imperials were minted, connoisseurs predicted that these, as they were ironically called, "wittekilders" would be washed out of circulation instantly. However, the Minister of Finance carefully prepared the reform, having previously accumulated a large gold reserve. The ruble has turned from a weak currency into one of the strongest and most stable in the world.

By the time he took the post of Minister of Finance, S.Yu. Witte no longer doubted the expediency and necessity of the accelerated industrial development of Russia, which he saw as a guarantee of state stability. To achieve this strategic goal, it was necessary to decide critical tasks: increase capital investment, create a reliable credit system and provide guarantees foreign investors. In the industrialization of Russia by foreign financial centers Witte attached great importance, since internal sources seemed inadequate to him. However, it was impossible to achieve any favorable results until the Russian monetary unit was securely backed and stable.

The credit ruble, which became the basis of money circulation since the middle of the 19th century, served as the object of shameless speculative manipulations abroad, and in Berlin there was even a special "ruble exchange".

To eliminate the precariousness of the financial system, it was necessary to find a reliable metal equivalent, which silver had long served. However, since the 1970s, the price of the "second noble metal" has been steadily falling for a number of reasons, and there was little hope of changing this steady trend. The state tried with all its might to support the ruble and for this purpose artificially limited the issue of paper money: in 1881 their number was 1180 million rubles, and by 1896 it even decreased somewhat - 1175 million rubles.

Later, S. Yu. Witte wrote that when he became Minister of Finance (in 1893), he no longer doubted that “monetary circulation based on metal is good; but since I had not previously dealt with this issue in depth, that is why I had not some hesitation, but inconsistent steps, and there is nothing surprising in this. If this most important principle was accepted by the new Minister of Finance immediately, then the specific ways of its implementation in the first year and a half of his ministry served as the subject of lively discussions and reflections.

Before proceeding with the reform, it was necessary to finally decide for yourself and prove to others, primarily the monarch, in which direction to carry out the reform: on the basis of monometallism (gold) or bimetallism (silver and gold). The second option was supported by both the tradition of Russian money circulation and the huge reserves of silver accumulated in the country. But tying the credit ruble to the bimetallic equivalent was also fraught with great danger: with a high market situation in one of the parities, a steady decline in the value of the other could not only not lead to the stability of the monetary unit, but even increase its instability. The introduction of gold circulation in this respect seemed preferable, but here were hidden hitherto unknown "financial reefs". Will there be a massive outflow of the precious metal from circulation into "pods" within the country and will it go abroad? Will there be enough gold reserves for its free exchange? Will the appreciation of the monetary unit lead to a drop in living standards? Only life could provide convincing answers to these questions. A sober calculation and a vision of the historical possibilities of Russia were made by S.Yu. Witte is a staunch supporter of monometallism.

A decisive step towards gold circulation was the law approved by Nicholas II on May 8, 1895. It contains two main provisions: any written transactions permitted by law can be concluded with Russian gold coins; for such transactions, payment can be made either in gold coin or banknotes at the rate of gold on the day of payment. In the following months, the government took a number of measures aimed at approving the gold equivalent. Among them: permission for offices and branches of the State Bank to buy a gold coin at a certain rate, and capital ones - to sell and make payments at the same rate; then the rules for accepting a gold coin to the current account by the State Bank were introduced. Soon, the same operation will be introduced in private commercial banks, which have announced that they will accept gold for current accounts and for all obligations.

Despite these measures, the gold coin was very slowly established as a priority means of payment. This was due to the lack of habit among the population, and the obvious inconvenience of the gold coin for large payments and shipments, since there was no correspondence between nominal and market prices. Semi-imperials and imperials with the designation 5 rubles and 10 rubles circulated at 7 rubles. 50 kop. and 15 rubles, which constantly caused bewilderment and numerous abuses in the calculations. Demand for the gold coin was also restrained by fears that the State Bank would lower the exchange rate by administrative means, which could lead to financial losses (there were many rumors about this in the spring and summer of 1895). In an effort to dispel such fears, the State Bank announced on September 27, 1895 that it would buy and accept a gold coin at a price not lower than 7 rubles. 40 kop. for a semi-imperial, and in 1896 the purchase rate was set at 7 rubles. 50 kop. These decisions led to the stabilization of the ratio between the gold ruble and the credit ruble at a ratio of 1:1.5. To stabilize the ruble, the Ministry of Finance recognized the need to devalue the credit currency on the basis of monometallism. The parity between the paper ruble and the credit one was established not on the basis of a nominal designation, but in accordance with the real exchange rate.

The activities of the Ministry of Finance became the target of fierce attacks from the conservative circles of society. Supporters of historical exclusivity and national identity launched a noisy campaign to discredit both S. Yu. Witte himself and his financial undertakings. Public passions reached their peak in 1896. Russian society, quite recently very far from economic interests, suddenly, with unprecedented fervour, plunged into lively discussions about the ways and methods of financial reorganization.

Opponents of the gold ruble had practically no specific and weighty arguments. The attacks were based almost exclusively on emotion. There were voices about "the coming squandering of national wealth", about the impoverishment of the country, about turning it into a second India, etc.

Such fears and arguments were well known to the Minister of Finance and his "monometallic team". However, firstly, according to the ministerial program, the introduction of the gold equivalent of the ruble did not imply the establishment of the identity of paper and metal money. The thought of this was considered dangerous and did not appear in the plans. The reform was based on the principle of significant devaluation. Second, the widely held fears of gold leaking out of the country were based on poor knowledge economic potential countries. In addition, as S. Yu. Witte repeatedly explained, if part of the gold really goes abroad (the minister considered this possibility), then it will go there "not just like that", but as payment for loans, goods and services that contributed to growth industry.

The entire reform of monetary circulation was designed for the future industrial development of Russia, and it served him. But the question inevitably arose of how the devaluation and free exchange of the ruble for gold would affect the internal economic activity and, first of all, the position of the main part of the subjects of the Russian crown in the near future. S. Yu. Witte believed (and his assumptions were completely justified) that the reorganization of financial circulation would not lead to any noticeable socio-economic perturbations. The currency conversion system affected mainly foreign economic activity, and the introduced ratio of metal and paper banknotes only consolidated the real situation. The way of life of the bulk of the population, its daily material and production support, in fact, did not depend either on the gold parity itself or on the nature of world monetary settlements. Russian peasants for the most part remained outside the system of the world money market, and the "price weather" within the empire was controlled by the state.

In presented to the State Council in March 1896. In the draft law "On the Correction of Monetary Circulation", S. Yu. Witte defined the main conditions for the implementation and goals of the reform as follows: "To consolidate the successes achieved in the field of financial economy by laying a solid foundation for metallic money circulation under them."

In 1896, it became necessary to start making a new type of gold coin. By that time, it had not been carried out for several years due to the planned financial reorganization. The Ministry of Finance believed that issuing coins of five and ten ruble denominations, despite the fact that they cost 50% more, was inefficient. This discrepancy between the indicated dignity and the real value was one of the most important obstacles in the circulation of circulation. It was decided to mint a new coin with the inscription on the imperial "15 rubles" and on the semi-imperial "7 rubles 50 kopecks" (the first gold imperial coins in denominations of ten rubles and semi-imperial - five rubles appeared in Russia as early as 1755). The value of the credit ruble was determined to be 1/15 of the imperial, and the law obliged to exchange paper money for gold without restriction. The decisive stage in the reform of monetary circulation came in 1898, when the most important elements of the new financial system were legally fixed by a series of personal royal decrees. The State Bank undertook to issue banknotes in accordance with the needs of monetary circulation, but without fail secured by gold: at least half the amount, until the total amount of the issue reaches 600 million rubles. This was followed by an order to mint and put into circulation a five-ruble gold coin, equal to one third of the imperial. On the same day, another decree appeared regarding the inscription on banknotes: they now indicated the obligation of the state and the state bank to exchange banknotes for gold without fail, and the definition of a new coin was established (one ruble - 1/15 imperial, containing 17.424 shares of pure gold ).

The transformation of the monetary system on the basis of gold monometallism required changing the monetary charter, the new version of which was approved by Nicholas II on June 7, 1899. Its main provisions boiled down to the following: the state monetary unit of Russia was the ruble, which contained 17.424 shares of pure gold. A gold coin could be minted both from gold owned by the treasury and from metal provided by private individuals. A full-fledged gold coin is required to be accepted in all payments for an unlimited amount. Silver and copper coins were made only from the metal of the treasury and were auxiliary in circulation, obligatory for acceptance in payments up to 25 rubles, etc. Gold quickly established itself as the main means of payment, which helped to stop fluctuations in the exchange rate.

Late 19th - early 20th century. It strengthened the ruble not only in our country, but all over the world thanks to the establishment of its free exchange for gold. The reason for its implementation was the instability of the monetary system in Russia at the end of the century. However, after the "recovery" of the ruble, the prestige of the domestic economy increased significantly, which led to an increase in investment and an influx of foreign capital.

Causes

Witte's financial reform was caused by the need to create stable currency which the monopoly associations that emerged at the turn of the century in our country so badly needed. The fact is that in the period under review, under the influence of the main trends of the world economy, large monopolistic associations began to appear in Russia, such as cartels and syndicates. For large monetary transactions, a currency was required that would preserve the value of financial capital.

At first, the government tried to solve the problem by issuing so-called extra paper money, but this did not help. By the end of the century, the necessity of introducing Witte's financial reform was carried out according to the Western European model. The fact is that the gold standard was introduced in many European countries in connection with the emergence of a single world market. Russia actively conducted foreign trade, and therefore, just like its partners, needed a similar monetary system.

Target

The tsarist government was interested in developing the countries. The latter circumstance was greatly hindered by the fact that the ruble, despite the fact that it was convertible currency, however, was not strong enough to serve as the equivalent of an exchange.

Foreign entrepreneurs were often hesitant to sell their denominations as it was not backed by gold. Witte's financial reform aimed to overcome this barrier and put the ruble on a par with European monetary units. This was supposed to attract investments in the domestic economy.

Preparatory measures

Witte's financial reform, dated 1897, was prepared by his predecessors. Bunge and Vyshnegradsky understood the weakness of the paper money system and tried to replace it with a metal standard. Both wanted to make the domestic ruble strong enough to be freely exchanged not only for silver, but also for gold. To achieve this goal, they set the task of creating a stock of this valuable metal by foreign loans as well as limiting imports and increasing exports of goods.

Thus, even before Witte came to the post of Minister of Finance, the rate of the domestic currency was stabilized. By the year of the reform, the gold reserves of our country reached more than 800 million rubles. The State Bank under the new minister put into circulation foreign currency and stopped speculative activities on the credit ruble.

"Improvement" of the economy

Holding financial reform Witte was a natural continuation of the policy of his predecessors, who by their measures achieved a firm fixation of the ruble and an end to stock exchange speculation. Thus, all the necessary prerequisites for the introduction of the gold standard were created. Stock of this precious metal, stable exchange rate, a well-formed budget, the development of foreign and domestic trade, the independent work of the Ministry of Finance contributed to the "improvement" of the domestic economy and became an incentive for a breakthrough in industrial development reached by Russia by the beginning of the First World War.

Minister of Finance policy

Sergei Yulievich Witte held this post for ten years and achieved a lot during this period. Thanks to his efforts, railway construction was accelerated, a profitable trade agreement was concluded with Germany, a wine monopoly was introduced, which became an important source of replenishment. state budget. Thanks to his monetary reform, the circulation of gold increased dramatically, and the number of paper units fell, which, of course, increased the prestige Russian economy on the world market.

Sergei Yulievich Witte achieved the "recovery" of the domestic financial system, which was reliable until the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. However, it should be noted that many contemporaries were dissatisfied with the abolition of bimetallic circulation in the country, since the bulk of the population began to experience an acute shortage of monetary units, which negatively affected their purchasing power.

gold standard

This concept means the recognition of gold as the main monetary commodity and the only equivalent of values. The advantage of this system is that it is not subject to inflation. In the event of a fall in economic activity, this valuable metal settled in the hands of contemporaries, but when the situation stabilized, it was put back into circulation. Witte's financial reform of 1897 was primarily beneficial for the development of foreign trade, as it facilitated the payment of transactions. The introduction of the gold standard was very dissatisfied with the landlords and nobles, but the enterprises of the domestic bourgeoisie received a new impetus for development largely due to the export of bread, which increased incomes.

First measures

Witte's financial reform, the causes of which were caused by the instability of the monetary system of the second half of the 19th century, began with the emperor's decree of 1895, which allowed transactions to be paid in gold domestic currency or credit notes at its rate. However, the new monetary denominations came into circulation rather slowly. Therefore, the State Bank decided to buy a gold coin at a good price - 7 rubles 40 kopecks.

The latter measure contributed to the stabilization of the ratio between paper and metal monetary units. In 1897, the government decided to introduce gold circulation in Russia. Coins from this metal began to be minted in 1897. The first of them were in denominations of 5 and 10 rubles. Imperials (15 rubles) and semi-imperials were also issued, which accounted for half of their cost. However, it is indicative that the majority of the population still preferred paper money, since it was easier to keep it on hand.

Consequences

Witte's financial reform, the results of which turned out to be generally very positive for the domestic industry, was prepared in strict secrecy, since its developers were not in vain afraid of opposition from court circles and the local nobility. The fact is that the introduction of the gold standard strengthened the positions of the Russian bourgeoisie, but led to a fall in prices for agricultural products. After the start of the reform, its initiators were sharply attacked by the public.

However, Witte enlisted the support of the emperor and the special financial committee and secured the approval of his project. As a result, the ruble exchange rate stabilized, and domestic entrepreneurship received a new impetus for development. The positions of the domestic economy in the world market have strengthened, which led to Russian industry on new level. One of the shortcomings of the reform is the increase in Russia's debt due to the attraction of foreign capital, but the cost of borrowing has fallen.

In addition, during the reform there was an increase state property by creating a gold reserve and acquiring railways owned by the treasury. The skillful budgetary policy Witte, who refused to save public funds. He countered this frugality with financial activity, contributing to the inclusion of capital in industrial circulation. So, it strengthened the Russian economy and brought it to the world level.

In the 19th century, especially in its last quarter, most countries switched to a gold-exchange system in connection with the enormous growth in commodity circulation and the development of credit. England actually switched to a gold currency at the end of the 18th century, and gold monometallism was officially proclaimed in 1816.

In the 70s it was introduced in Germany, in the Scandinavian countries, in the countries of the Latin Monetary Union (France, Italy, Belgium and Switzerland), as well as in Greece and the USA, and in the 90s in Austria-Hungary, Japan and Argentina. Thus, all world economy. Therefore, it must be emphasized that the collapse of the Russian monetary system during the First World War was not a failure of the Witte model, but an integral part of the collapse of the world system of gold monometallism.

Monetary reform in Russia, it took a long time to prepare and took about 15-17 years in general. A significant contribution to its implementation was made by three previous ministers of finance - M. Reitern, N. Bunge and I. Vyshnegradsky. S.Yu. Witte went on and completed their work. Moreover, "the new Minister of Finance had to act in a more favorable environment: industry was on a steep rise; the rapid process of railway construction continued; a number of positive changes were observed in agriculture; the trade balance had a stable positive balance. The fact that the gold reserves of the state by the beginning of the monetary reform increased to 645.7 million rubles. (under I. Vyshnegradsky - by 309 million rubles). Witte skillfully realized these advantages. Its main goal was to strengthen Russia's monetary system - load-bearing structure rapidly emerging single national market.
The beginning of the monetary reform was preceded by a series of acts designed to reduce the volume of speculative transactions and weaken foreign exchange intervention. June 13, 1893 banks were prohibited from even indirectly facilitating the game on the course. Persons guilty of concluding such transactions were subject to a fine of 5-10% of the transaction amount. A "statistical" duty (1 kopeck per 100 rubles) was introduced on the import and export of credit notes. For secret import or export, that is, without paying a fee, a fine of 25% of the smuggled amount was provided. On the Berlin Stock Exchange, which played an important role in speculation with Russian rubles, in 1894 a massive (for 30 million rubles) purchase of credit tickets at a low rate was carried out. When making settlements, they had to be repaid at a higher rate, which was very beneficial for Russia.
Among the preparatory measures can be attributed to the conclusion of a customs agreement with Germany. In response to high duties on Russian grain exports, Witte passed a law through the State Council, according to which tariff rates were recognized as minimal only for those countries that adhered to the most favored nation treatment in relations with Russia. Germany did not adhere to such a regime, and its exports to Russia were subject to duties on increased rate. Germany was forced to make concessions. In 1894 a new trade agreement was signed. Witte's pride was flattered by the fact that from that moment on, the highly respected Chancellor of the German Empire, Prince Otto Bismarck, became interested in his person.
In February 1895 Witte came out with his proposals for the reform of the monetary system. They were approved in principle by the Finance Committee and the Council of State. The decision of the State Council was approved by the king in May of the same year and took the force of law. However, for a number of reasons (ignorance of the population about the plans of the government in the monetary policy, restrictions on the use of gold currency, the inconvenience of using the new exchange rate - 1 gold ruble was equal to 1 ruble 48 kopecks in credit rubles), operations with gold currency were extremely weak.
In March 1896 Witte entered the financial committee with the final draft of the monetary reform, and in April - the State Council. The new monetary system, built on the principle of gold monometallism, included the following elements.
1. A ten-ruble gold coin of the new coinage was the main coin of Russia and legal tender. Gold coins minted according to the law of 1885. were required to be accepted for all payments until they were withdrawn from circulation at a ratio of 1 rub. = 1 rub. 50 kop. in a new minted gold coin.
2. The payment power of silver was limited to 50 rubles.
3. State credit notes had the force of legal tender and were included in the liabilities of the bank. Their exchange for gold was carried out at the rate of 1 rub. 50 kop. credit for 1 rub. in gold, or 66 2/3 kopecks in gold for credit ruble, which corresponded to the average exchange rate of the ruble and the ratio of the settlement balance that had developed in the years before the reform.
4. Issue of credit notes was carried out by the State Bank only for commercial operations of the bank. Up to 1 billion rubles credit notes were backed by 50% gold, over 1 billion rubles. - fully.
5. All obligations under government and private loans concluded in metal rubles before this law remained unchanged, that is, they were payable in new rubles in one and a half times.
The main provisions of the project were already published in March and gave a powerful impetus to discussions, behind which the positions of different classes and social groups were clearly traced. Russian society. If the main provisions of the project were approved in the Finance Committee, then in the State Council they met with almost unanimous rejection. In such a situation, Witte decided to bypass the State Council and turned directly to the king. “His Majesty fulfilled my request,” he wrote in his memoirs, “and gathered on January 2, 1897, the financial committee in a reinforced composition under his chairmanship. At this meeting, the fate of the financial reform was, in essence, decided, that is, it was decided to introduce empire a metallic circulation based on gold".
The first law "On the minting and issuance of gold coins" was signed by Nicholas II the day after the meeting - January 3, 1897. 10-ruble gold coins were issued - imperials, equal to 15 rubles in credit notes, and 5-ruble - semi-imperials, equal to 7.5 rubles in credit notes. The next act was the decree of August 29, 1897. on the basics of issuing credit notes. Compared to the previously planned issue of credit notes backed by 50% gold, in the amount of 1 billion rubles. it was reduced to 600 million rubles. Finally, on August 27, 1898. A decree was signed on the basics of the circulation of silver coins. She was assigned the role of auxiliary money, which was also a certain concession to the supporters of bimetallism.

The monetary reform played a huge role in economic growth Russia, accelerated the development of national productive forces. In his memoirs, S.Yu. Witte highly appreciated its results and implementation technique. “One of the biggest reforms,” he wrote, “that I had to make ... was the monetary reform, which finally strengthened Russia’s credit and put Russia in financially along with other great European powers".
As a result of preparatory measures, the monetary reform was carried out according to the ratio between treasury notes and their gold content, which actually prevailed on the market before it began. Therefore, it was carried out without replacing banknotes, without recalculating prices and obligations. The process of redistribution of income between classes that took place at the same time was not a one-time, but a long process, which allowed Witte to write: "I made the reform in such a way that the population of Russia did not notice it at all, as if nothing, in fact, had changed." Such a mechanism for the implementation of the monetary reform was highly appreciated in Russia and abroad.
An important condition The success of the reform was the involvement of leading scientists and statesmen of the country in the work on it. Commission established on October 6, 1895. "for development with legal side the question of what coin, according to the current legal provisions, the Russian government is obliged to pay for state credit notes "included mainly people of science. It included former professor of Kiev University P. Tsitovich, professor of St. Petersburg University I. Kaufman, doctor of criminal law N. Neklyudov, author of works on civil law A. Borovikovsky.The project of monetary reform was entrusted to defend the specially educated employees of the Ministry of Finance A. Guryev and V. Kasperov. The principle of gold monometallism in the Bulletin of Finance was officially defended by Professor of Yuryev University A. Miklashevsky. Inquiries regarding the reform were made both to scientists (Professor V. Lebedev and Professor V. Lexis), and to bankers, representatives of trade and industry.
The issue of attracting foreign capital to the country and the growth of Russia's debt obligations to its creditors is controversial. Here, I think, two points must be distinguished. On the one hand, the direct impact of the monetary reform on the rise of the Russian economy, and on the other hand, a colossal increase in external debt aimed at repaying the consequences of the Russo-Japanese war (of which Witte was always an opponent). By the way, as studies have shown, all the failures of monetary reforms in the XIX century. were due to wars: the Patriotic War of 1812, the Crimean campaign, the war with Turkey.
However, under Witte, although Russia increased its debt, it reduced the cost of borrowing. The state's debt increased from 4905 million to 6679 million rubles. (as of January 1, 1904), that is, by 36%. Moreover, this corresponded to an increase in state property (acquisition of the gold fund, railways). Payment of the public debt demanded in 1903. 292 million rubles against 261 million rubles, that is, it increased by only 12%. Average percentage on public debt decreased from 4.35 in 1892. to 3.96 in 1902 The interest on state treasury tickets was lowered to 3. Through conversion, redemption, exchange for a decade (1892-1901), it was achieved with an increase in annual debt by 125 million rubles. annual savings on interest payments of about 13.5 million rubles. and on the payment of capital - more than 18 million rubles.
The success of Witte's monetary reform is largely due to his stabilization policy. budget system Russia. S.Yu. Witte, proceeding from the foundations of his economic views, rose above the primitive and vulgar (well known to us) interpretation of saving budget expenditures as a panacea for all ills. "Restraint has its limits, beyond which the rejection of the demands for increased spending may seriously hinder the normal development of civil and economic life country". To bureaucratic thrift, he opposed financial policy aimed at all-round "promotion of economic success and the development of the country's productive forces. Such a policy can give the best results in relation to the financial economy, rising along with the people's well-being, the population's payment power and multiplying the sources of state revenues."
The implementation of monetary reform in Russia in 1895-1897. took place in the conditions of sharp controversy between its supporters and opponents, between those who thought about the renewal of the country and its growth, and those conservative forces who wanted to preserve the current situation. Representatives of industry and trade advocated monetary reform. This was due to the fact that the measures being introduced to stabilize the ruble and the banknote coverage system coincided with the completion of the formation of the Russian national market and the emergence financial capital. The process of merging industrial and banking capital began, which brought together the interests of industrialists and bankers.
The nobility, as well as the kulaks, opposed the monetary reform. Its implementation "deprived the nobility of cheap money, which they used to pay their workers, receiving the price of their bread abroad in pure European gold." This explains, in the final analysis, the resistance to reform on the part of the State Council.
Summing up the consideration of the pros and cons of the monetary reform of 1895-1897, we can agree with the general assessment expressed at the time by D. Lutokhin: "The protection of gold circulation is associated with the imposition of a significant burden on the state, but, not to mention the need for this burden, the beneficial effects of the improvement of monetary circulation more than cover these costs.

It was allowed to conclude transactions for gold, at the same time all offices and branches of the State Bank were given the right to buy a gold coin, and 8 offices and 25 branches also made payments with this coin. In June 1895 State Bank it was allowed to accept a gold coin to a current account (private St. Petersburg banks followed this example); in November 1895, the cash desks of all government agencies and state-owned railways were allowed to accept gold coins. In December 1895, the rate of the credit (paper) ruble was set at 7 rubles. 40 kop. for a gold semi-imperial with a face value of 5 rubles. (from - 7 rubles 50 kopecks).

The State Bank increased its gold cash from 300 million to 1,095 million rubles, which almost corresponded to the amount of credit notes in circulation (1,121 million rubles).

On August 29, a decree was issued on the issue operations of the State Bank, which received the right to issue banknotes backed by gold. Credit notes secured by gold cash were exchanged for gold without restrictions. 5-ruble and 10-ruble gold coins were minted.

The reform strengthened the external and internal exchange rate of the ruble, improved the investment climate in the country, and contributed to attracting domestic and foreign capital to the economy.

With the outbreak of the First World War, the exchange of money for gold was discontinued.

Photo gallery

Golden ten of Nicholas II. 1899. Eagle

Golden ten of Nicholas II. 1899. Tails

Seven fifty. 1897

Golden five-ruble note. Eagle.

Golden five-ruble note. Tails.

Monetary reforms in Russia
Muscovite Rus' and Russian empire	1535 (Elena Glinskaya) 1645 (ruble of Alexei Mikhailovich) 1700-1718 (reforms of Peter I) 1769 (banknotes of Catherine II) 1839-1843 (silver monometallism) 1897 (gold chervonets Witte)
USSR	1922-1924 (Soviet chervonets) 1947 ("post-war") 1961 ("Khrushchev") 1991 ("Pavlovskaya")
Russia after 1991	1993 (rejection of Soviet rubles) 1998 (denomination)

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The monetary reform of 1897 (Witte's monetary reform) was a monetary reform that established the gold monometallism of the ruble or a rigid peg of the ruble to gold, the gold standard of the ruble. Preparations for the reform began in the 1880s. and was caused by instability ... ... Wikipedia

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Books

Collected works and documentary materials. In 5 volumes. Volume 3. Monetary reform, credit and banking system in Russia. Book 1, S. Yu. Witte. The documents published in this book reflect the activities of S. Yu. Witte in the preparation, implementation and completion of the monetary reform of 1895-1897. Much of the content presented...

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Witte monetary reform. Monetary reform S.Yu. Witte